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The Uniform Probate Code' was promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on August 7, 1969, and
was approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
ion2 one week later. This bold and progressive achievement3 completed
the first phase of a project which began in 1962; 4 the second phase of that
project is now under way, the objective of which is to introduce the Code
before the legislatures of the several states with the purpose of state en-
actment.5 It is perhaps too soon to paraphrase Justice Cardozo's famous
observation on the demise of the doctrine of privity of contract,6 but the
"assault upon the citadel of probate" has begun-and none too soon. In
the past few years there has been unparalleled public criticism of exist-
ing probate practices.7
The Uniform Probate Code states as its intended purposes the follow-
ing: "(1) to simplify and clarify the law ... ; (2) to discover and make
effective the intent of the decedent ... ; (3) to promote a speedy and ef-
ficient system for liquidating the estate ... ; (4) to facilitate use and en-
forcement of certain trusts; (5) to make uniform the law .... .- 8 Thus
the Code attempts to overcome the high cost and long delays that are pre-
sently built into most states' probate procedure. An additional national
purpose of the Code is to upgrade the probate court and establish it as a
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron. The author wishes to express his
gratitude to Mr. Donald E. Wright, second year law student at The University of Akron, for his
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE (1969) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM PROBATE CODE].
2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, 55 A.B.A.J. 976 (1969).
3 Straus, The Uniform Probate Code Approved: A Bold and Progressive Reform, 41 PA. B.
Ass'N. Q. 71 (1969).
4 Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in The 70's, 2 CONN. L. REV.
453 (1970).
5
"The Uniform Probate Code has been enacted in Alaska and Idaho to date. It is before
the legislatures in Arizona and Michigan and is making good progress toward introduction in
Colorado, Washington, Hawaii, Nebraska and some other states." Letter From Richard V. Well-
man, Educational Director of the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, to the
author, October 3, 1972.
6 "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace." Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441,445 (1931).
7 N. DALEY, How To Avow PROBATE (1965); M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS
(1968); Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate Courts, Reader's Digest, Oct. 1966, at 102; Bloom,
Time to Clean Up Our Probate Courts, Reader's Digest, Jan. 1970, at 112; Taylor, You can
Avoid the Probate Trap, Reader's Digest, June 1970, at 93; Bloom, At Last: A Way to Settle
Estates Quickly, Reader's Digest, Sept. 1972, at 193.
8 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b).
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court of record with broad jurisdiction over the subject areas that are gen-
erally considered to be probate matters, equivalent to the jurisdiction of a
general trial court.9 In states in which the probate court is established as a
division of the general trial court there is no need to adopt such provisions.
In states comparable to Ohio, however, in which there currently exist
alternative provisions for the establishment of a probate court, the enacting
of such provisions is necessary to establish uniformity within the state."0
The Uniform Probate Code covers the areas of law that relate to the
work of the courts which handle, in the broadest sense, those areas gener-
ally referred to as "probate law":" the administration of decedent's estates,
guardianships, testamentary trusts, and the substantive law of intestate
succession and wills.'2 This discussion, however, is limited to an analysis
of Article II, which deals with the substantive law of intestate succession
and wills. The reason for choosing this particular article, aside from the
fact that the Code is too broad to cover in a detailed analysis in one article,
is that Article II is one of the most controversial Articles in the Code.
Critics of Article II have called it confusing and complicated.' 8 Perhaps
one of the reasons for this controversy is that the area of intestate succes-
sion and wills is the area of probate law with which lawyers are most
familiar and thus the most concerned. Old and familiar rules always seem
less complicated than new and unfamiliar ones. The approach of this
discussion will be to take each section of Article II and compare it to ex-
isting Ohio law. It is hoped that this discussion will facilitate an exami-
nation of the Uniform Probate Code by the Ohio bar and legislature. If
this study acts as a catalyst for a further discussion of the Uniform Probate
Code in Ohio in the form of a legislative study commission to consider the
adoption of the Code, then the author's goal will have been more than
achieved. In addition, it is hoped that this analysis will serve as a useful
tool for students and attorneys, not only during the desired public debate
on the Uniform Code in Ohio, but also during the transition period should
it be adopted.
The Uniform Code has, in appropriate places, added alternative provi-
sions for adoption in community property states.'4 Because Ohio is not a
9 Wellman, supra note 4, at 477.
10 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2101.43-.45 (Page 1968).
11 O'Connell & Effland, Interstate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of the Law
of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARIz. L. REV. 205, 207 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as O'Connell & Effland].
12 The Uniform Code is organized as follows: Article I, General Provisions, Definitions and
Probate Jurisdiction of Court; Article II, Intestate Succession and Wills; Article III, Probate of
Wills and Administration; Article IV, Foreign Personal Representatives; Ancillary Administra-
tion; Article V, Protection of Persons under Disability and their Property; Article VI, Non-
Probate Transfers; Article VII, Trust Administration; Article VIII, Effective Date and Repealer.
13 Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 413, 415
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Zartman].
14Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-102 (A), 2-401 (A), 3-101 (A), and 3-902 (A).
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community property state I have excluded from my discussion these alter-
native provisions.
I. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Intestate succession laws in a democracy should have patterns of distri-
bution that reflect the wishes of the majority of its citizens who die intes-
tate. In order to determine those wishes, a legislature should make an at-
tempt to discover how the average person would wish to dispose of his
property at his death, and then draft intestate succession statutes consistent
with those wishes. Such a determination requires the identification of the
important characteristics of those who die intestate and an examination of
the will provisions of persons who die testate and possess those same char-
acteristics. On the basis of this type of analysis the legislature can deter-
mine the probable intent of those persons who die intestate. 5 One recent
empirical study16 completed in Ohio17 shows that most of those who die
intestate are younger,' more likely to be single,'9 less wealthy,20 and of a
lower social-occupational 2' status than those who die testate. By comparing
a sample of wills of persons in similar circumstances to the "average" per-
son who dies intestate, one can determine by inference the testamentary
wishes of such "average" intestate.
This is the approach that the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code
have taken.22  By using the data made available by recent and authorita-
tive studies23 which have identified the characteristics of decedents who
die intestate and comparing those characteristics to decedents who die tes-
tate, in addition to relying upon the experience and opinions of lawyers
who help clients with wills, 24 the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code
have been able to outline the common wishes of the average decedent. 5
15 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 209.
16 M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES, & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (1970) [herein-
after cited as M. Sussman).
17 The study was done in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. A five percent random sample was taken
of all estates dosed by the probate court of that county between November 9, 1964, and Au-
gust 8, 1965. Id. at 45.
18 Id. at 65.
19Id. at 70.
20 The gross median size for testate estates in this sample was $15,000; the median for
intestate estates was $6,000. Net estate medians were $12,000 and $3,000 for testate
and intestate, respectively. The average net estate for all decedents was $27,007; for
testate decedents, $35,160; and for intestate decedents, $6,694. The average gross estate
for all decedents was $31,097; for testate decedents, $41,218; for the intestate group,
$8,599.
Id. at 73.
21 Id. at 76.
2 2 Welhnan, Selected Aspects of Uniform Probate Code, 3 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST
J. 199, 204 (1968).
25 See Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30
U. CH. L. REv. 241 (1963); M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 86.
24 Wellman, supra note 22, at 204.
2 5 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE Article II, Part 1, General Comment:
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As an aid in evaluating the Uniform Probate Code and the effect its
adoption would have upon the present laws of Ohio, I have attempted to
contrast it with similar Ohio statutes, or in those areas in which there are
no statutes in Ohio, to the Ohio case law. The inclusion of each section
if Article II is intended to furnish the reader with a general idea of the
likely effect of each section upon the present law in the event the Code is
adopted in Ohio. Since the consideration of the Proposed Code offers an
opportunity for thorough revision of the law in this area, I have suggested
two additional alterations to the current Ohio law of intestate succession
at the end of this section.
A. The Proposed Uniform Probate Code and Present Ohio Law
Section 2-101 Intestate Estate.
Any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by his
will passes to his heirs as prescribed in the following sections of this
Code.
The law in Ohio is the same. While there is no Ohio statute directly
on point, the common law rule should govern. The Ohio legislature has
inferred as much in the statute26 dealing with the application of undevised
real estate to debts, "[w]hen part of the real estate of a testator descends
to his heirs because it was not disposed of by his will ... 
Section 2-102 Share of the Spouse.
The intestate share of the surviving spouse is:
(1) if there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the entire
intestate estate;
(2) if there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by a par-
ent or parents, the first [$50,000],28 plus one-half of the balance of the
intestate estate;
(3) if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving
spouse also, the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the in-
testate estate;
(4) if there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of
the surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
This section leaves the surviving spouse a larger share of the decedent's
estate than does the present Ohio statute.29 Under Ohio law there is no
provision for the surviving spouse to take a lump sum before the division
The Code attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to disposition
of his property at death, and for this purpose the prevailing patterns in wills are useful
in determining what the owner who fails to execute a will would probably want.
26 OHMo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.53 (Page 1968).
27 Id.
28 The $50,000 amount is bracketed to indicate that the commissioners did not attempt to
specify appropriate amounts. This has been left to the discretion of the legislature. Wellman,
Acceptable Variations Within The Code, 2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NOTES (Oct. 1972).
2 9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.06(B)-(D) (Page 1968).
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of the estate. If there is one child or its issue surviving, the spouse and
the child or its issue share equally; 30 if there is more than one child or
the issue of more than one, the spouse takes one-third and the children
take two-thirds equally.31 Under Ohio's statute, parents receive one-fourth
if there is a surviving spouse but no children or their issue, and the spouse
receives three-fourths.3 2 It would appear that this dispository scheme does
not reflect the testamentary intent of the average decedent. The empirical
study3" mentioned above shows that in cases in which the decedent was
survived by a spouse and either parents or issue, almost 86 percent of the
testators left their entire estate to the surviving spouse. 4 Other studies re-
flect similar kinds of dispositive patterns.3 5
Under the Uniform Code, the surviving spouse takes the first $50,000
and one-half of the balance of the estate if there are either parents or issue
who are also issue of the surviving spouse surviving the decedent. If there
is neither surviving issue nor parents, the entire estate passes to the spouse.
While the $50,000 figure is a suggested one, it is based on the idea that in
a small estate 6 the surviving spouse should have it entirely if the only
children are issue of both. This not only avoids the problems of passing
property to minor children, but is in accord with the probable intent of
the decedent, as indicated by the empirical studies. If there are surviving
issue of the decedent who are not issue of the surviving spouse, then the
$50,000 provision is omitted and the surviving spouse shares equally with
the issue as a class, one-half to each. In this situation we do not have the
presumption (that exists in the case in which the children of the decedent
are also the children of the surviving spouse) that the surviving spouse
will provide for the children of the decedent. This provision is consistent
with the findings of the Ohio study, which indicated that a testator usually
divides his estate between the surviving spouse and legatees of an earlier
marriage when the estate is large enough.3 1
There are several advantages to the Uniform Probate Code as opposed
to Ohio law in the common situation in which the decedent leaves a sur-
viving spouse. First, the Code is more consistent with the probable intent
of most decedents-unless there are children of a previous marriage, most
persons who have wills leave their entire estate to their spouse. In this
case, the Uniform Code protects the children of the previous marriage from
30 Id. § 2105.06(B).
31 Id. § 2105.06(C).
3 2 Id. § 2105.06(D).
3 3 M. Sussman, supra note 16.
34 Id. at 89.
3 5 Durman, supra note 23, at 258-63.
36 The drafters considered a small estate to be one that would be less than $50,000 after all
allowances and exempt property are deducted. UNIFORM PRoBATE CODE § 2-102, Comment.
3 .M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 91.
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being disinherited by the surviving spouse. Second, should there be minor
children who are also children of the surviving spouse, the Code eliminates
the necessity of creating costly and cumbersome guardianships of property
in the vast majority of cases.18  The Code also simplifies the problem of
title to land in many cases. Under Ohio law the issue, or the parents of
the decedent, if there are no issue, share with the surviving spouse an un-
divided interest in realty left by the decedent. If one party refuses to sell
when the others wish to do so, however, many complications may arise.39
Section 2-103 Share of Heirs Other Than Surviving Spouse.
The part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse under
Section 2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse,
passes as follows:
(1) to the issue of the decedent; if they are all of the same degree of
kinship to the decedent they take equally, but if of unequal degree, then
those of more remote degree take by representation;
(2) if there is no surviving issue, to his parent or parents equally;
(3) if there is no surviving issue or parent, to the brothers and sisters
and the issue of each deceased brother or sister by representation; if
there is no surviving brother or sister, the issue of brothers and sisters
take equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the dece-
dent, but if of unequal degree then those of more remote degree take
by representation;
(4) if there is no surviving issue, parent or issue of a parent, but the
decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or issue of grandpar-
ents, half of the estate passes to the paternal grandparents if both sur-
vive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the issue of the
paternal grandparents if both are deceased, the issue taking equally if
they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of un-
equal degree those of more remote degree take by representation; and
the other half passes to the maternal relatives in the same manner; but if
there be no surviving grandparent or issue of grandparent on either the
paternal or the maternal side, the entire estate passes to the relatives on
the other side in the same manner as the half.40
In Ohio the children of a decedent receive one-half to two-thirds of
the estate, depending upon whether there are one or more children.41 The
Uniform Probate Code makes no distinction as to the children's share based
upon the number of children or issue the decedent left. After the spouse
38 See note 20 supra.
39 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 213.
40 The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code has recommended that § 2-103
be changed by eliminating the use of the words "brother" and "sister," and substituting in their
place "issue of parents." The Board gives as its reason for this proposed change the following:
"Brother" and "Sister" are not defined in the Code; "parent and issue" are defined in
ways that leave no question about the status of illegitimate and adopted persons. We
did not want "brother" to include a blood brother who had been adopted into another
family when the basic position of the Code regarding adoption is that it effects a full
transplant.
2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NOTES (Oct. 1972).
41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.06(B), (C) (Page 1968).
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receives the share provided by § 2-102, or if there is no spouse, the issue
take equally if they are of equal consanguinity; if they are not, they take
per stirpes. If, for example, three children survive the decedent, each child
would take a one-third- share; however, if one of these three children had
predeceased the decedent, leaving two children (grandchildren of the de-
cedent), the two children who survived the decedent would each receive a
one-third share and the children of the predeceased child would each re-
ceive a one-sixth share. This is also true under Ohio law.42
After the issue of the decedent, assuming there is no surviving spouse,
parents are next in the order of taking, and under the Code they are fol-
lowed by brothers and sisters of the decedent and their issue; the same is
true in Ohio.3 The Uniform Code provision for grandparents and their
issue is also the same as in Ohio: the estate is divided in half, one part go-
ing to the paternal side, the other to the maternal side. If there are no
grandparents or their issue on one side, then the whole passes to the other
side of the family.4 Both the Code and the Ohio statute allow the issue
of grandparents to take by representation.
At this point the Uniform Probate Code deviates from the Ohio statu-
tory scheme. The Uniform Code prevents relatives more remote than
grandparents and their issue from taking. These relatives, who would be
the next-of-kin,45 take under the current Ohio provisions if there are no
grandparents or their issue. The Ohio statute provides that next-of-kin
take on a per capita basis, with no right of representation.46  There is an-
other provision in Ohio not found in the Uniform Probate Code, which
provides for stepchildren of the decedent or their issue to take if there are
no next-of-kin.47
There is considerable merit in the inheritance limitation contained in
the Uniform Code; in our mobile and urban society, known family rela-
tionships rarely extend beyond the group included under it.41 In most cases
it is unlikely that a decedent would even be acquainted with his remote
collateral relatives and most of these distant relatives probably do not want
an inheritance from persons they have never known or even seen.49 For
many years commentators have been suggesting that the rules of succes-
42 Id. § 2105.13; Snodgrass v. Bedell, 134 Ohio St. 311, 16 N.E. 2d 463 (1938); Parsons
v. Parsons, 52 Ohio St. 470, 40 N.E. 165 (1895); Dutoit v. Doyle, 16 Ohio St. 400 (1865).
43 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.06 (E), (F) (Page 1968).
44 Id. § 2105.06(G), (H) (Page 1968).
45 "Next-of-kin" as used in the Ohio statute connotes great-grandparents and their issue or
beyond. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(H) (Page 1968).
46 Id.
47Id. § 2105.06(1).
48 M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 138-42.
49 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 215; M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 139-40.
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sion be changed to prevent these unintended windfalls." Also, by allow-
ing remote kindred to inherit, the problems involved in administration
are multiplied, for if the heirs are not readily available a time consuming
and expensive search is required with no assurance of finding any or all
of the heirs. Typically in these cases, the professional heir hunters who
work on a percentage basis of from one-third to one-half of the estate,
and the attorney and administrator who handle the estate, gain far more
than the heirs. Often, if the heirs are found, the number of claimants re-
quires that the estate be fragmented into less than token amounts.5 Fur-
ther, since standing to contest a will exists in any potential heir, allowing
remote relatives to take can increase the delay and expense of settling the
estate by a will contest.52
The policy of unlimited succession such as we have in Ohio has its
basis in history: it is the result of our adoption of the English scheme of
distribution in intestacy. Mr. Justice Holmes once stated that it was "re-
volting" that a rule of law should persist solely from "blind imitation of
the past."54  A policy which allows "laughing heirs" potentially to take,
and thus complicate the probate procedure, should not be allowed to con-
tinue in a modern society, simply on the basis of its historical precedence.
Section 2-104 Requirement That Heir Survive Decedent For 120 Hours.
Any person who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to
have predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance,
exempt property and intestate succession, and the decedent's heirs are
determined accordingly. If the time of death of the decedent or of the
person who would otherwise be an heir, or the times of death of both,
cannot be determined, and it cannot be established that the person who
would otherwise be an heir has survived the decedent by 120 hours, it is
deemed that the person failed to survive for the required period. This
section is not to be applied where its application would result in a taking
of intestate estate by the state under Section 2-105.
Ohio's present law55 is very similar to the Code. The major difference
is that under the Ohio statute the heir, legatee or devisee must survive 30
days56 after the death of the decedent, unless the will of the decedent pro-
vides otherwise. The two statutes are the same as to the presumptive or-
der of death when it cannot actually be determined, but the 30-day provi-
50 Cavers, Change in the American Family and the 'Laughing Heir,' 20 IOWA L. REv. 203,
208-09 (1935).
51 M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 140-41.
52 O'Connell & Efland, supra note 11, at 215.
53 See 6 POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 5 998 at 664 (1972).
54 "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." O.W.
HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
5 5 OmO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.21 (Page 1968).
56 Henry v. Central Nat'l. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968).
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sion of the Ohio statute seems preferable to the five day provision of the
Uniform Code. The purpose of the section is to prevent multiple probate
of the same property when both the owner and the taker die within a rela-
tively short time of each other. By maintaining the 30-day provision, the
administration of the decedent's estate is not appreciably delayed, nor are
tax advantages or consequences changed;57 furthermore, the probability of
including lingering victims of common disasters or suicides is increased.
The Code differs from Ohio law in another respect: the survivorship
requirement, under the Code, does not apply to cases in which it would
prevent an inheritance by the last eligible relative of an intestate who sur-
vived the intestate for any period." This prevents property from un-
necessarily escheating to the state in those cases.
Section 2-105 To Taker.
If there is no taker under the provisions of this Article, the intestate es-
tate passes to the [state].
Ohio law59 also provides for property to escheat to the state if there are
no takers among any of the allowable degrees of kinship. The Uniform
Probate Code leaves to the discretion of the legislature the determination
of how escheating property shall be applied. Presumably the present Ohio
provisions°° would still be applicable.
Section 2-106 Representation.
If representation is called for by this Code, the estate is divided into as
many shares as there are surviving heirs in the nearest degree of kinship
and deceased persons in the same degree who left issue who survive the
decedent, each surviving heir in the nearest degree receiving one share and
the share of each deceased person in the same degree being divided among
his issue in the same manner.
Both the Uniform Probate Code6' and the Ohio statutes62 provide for
the issue of a predeceased member of the primary class to share in the de-
cedent's estate. Under the Ohio statute"3 the heirs in the nearest living
class of relatives take per capita, while lineal descendents of deceased mem-
bers of this primary class take per stirpes,"4 unless they are so far removed
57 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(3).
5 8 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-104, Comment.
5 9 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(j) (Page 1968).
60 1Id. §§ 2105.07, .09. Personal property is to be applied to the support of the schools of
the county in which the property is collected. Real property, depending on whether it is in or
out of a city, is to be used for health, welfare or recreational purposes if the former, and to pro-
mote agriculture if the latter.
6 1 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-103, 106.
62 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.06, .11-.13 (Page 1968).
63 Id. § 2105.12. "When all the descendants of an intestate, in a direct line of descent, are
on an equal degree of consanguinity to the intestate, the estate shall pass to such persons in equal
parts, however remote from the intestate such equal and common degree of consanguinity may
be.2 
0
64 Id. § 2105.13.
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in kinship so as to fall within the "no representation" provision of the
statute of descent and distribution.65 This prohibits representation when
the next of kin are more remote than lineal descendants of the grandpar-
ents. If it were not for the exception provided by § 2105.12 of the Ohio
Revised Code, the per stirpes provision of the descent and distribution
statute would require division among lineal descendants on a per stirpes
basis, regardless of the fact that all members of the closest living class
were of an equal degree of kinship to the decedent.66 Both Ohio and the
Uniform Probate Code have rejected this pattern of distribution and have
provided that the first and principle division will be to the nearest class
which includes living members.
There is one situation, both under the present Ohio law and the Uniform
Probate Code, that seems to result in an inequitable distribution: if the de-
cedent leaves as his nearest relatives a living brother or sister, one child of
a predeceased brother or sister, and several children of another predeceased
brother or sister, the living sibling would take one-third, the child of the
deceased sibling would take a third by representation, and the several
children of the other deceased sibling would share a one-third interest.
This method of distribution is contrary to the basic principle that there
should be equality among persons who are of the same degree of con-
sanguinity. No good reason has been suggested for the failure to preserve
the principle of equality among the children of predeceased siblings when
one or more of the decedent's siblings survive. A more equitable division
would be to give the surviving sibling his one-third share and divide the
remaining two-thirds equally among all of the children of those siblings
who did not survive the decedent.67
Section 2-107 Kindred of Half Blood.
Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if
they were of the whole blood.
A half blood relationship exists when two persons are related to only
one common ancestor, as, for example, when a person has children by more
than one spouse. The children of each of these unions are related by the
half blood to the children of the other, as are their descendants. Ohio's
present statute of descent and distribution provides that if no spouse, chil-
dren or their lineal descendants, or parents survive the decedent, then the
decedent's estate passes "to the brothers and sisters, whether of the whole
or of the half blood of the intestate, or their lineal descendants, per
65Id. § 2105.06(H).66 Ewers v. Follin, 9 Ohio St. 327 (1859); Goff v. Disbennet, 14 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 557, 23
Ohio C. Dec. 234 (C.P. 1911).
67 O'Connell & Efland, supra note 11, at 217-18; See also McCall & Langston, A New Intes-
tate Succession Statute for North Carolina, 11 N.C.L. REV. 266, 290-92 (1933); Waggoner,
A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's System for Intestate Distribution AmongDescendants, 66 Nw. U.L. Rev. 626 (1971).
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stirpes." s The statute makes no reference to half blood kinship other than
to this class. The Ohio courts have held, however, that if the intestate's
heirs include first cousins of the whole and of the half blood, no distinc-
tion is to be made between them for purposes of descent and distribution.
One court has stated that "[t]he civil law of descent is followed in Ohio
and under that law kindred of the half-blood are recognized.... Remote
collaterals of the half blood are entitled to share with those of the whole
blood in real, as well as personal, property, or even to take in preference
to kindred of the whole blood of a more remote degree." '69 The Uniform
Probate Code has adopted the rule of a majority of states concerning in-
heritance by relatives of the half blood ° and thus would not change Ohio's
law on this point.
Section 2-108 Afterborn Heirs.
Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter
inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.
Generally speaking, a person must have been born at the time of the
decedent's death to qualify as an heir in Ohio. Exception is made, how-
ever, for lineal descendants of the intestate "begotten before his death,
but born thereafter,"' 71 in which case the descendant inherits as if he had
been born prior to the decedent's death. If, for example, the decedent is
survived by the wife of a predeceased son, who gives birth to a child of that
union after the death of the decedent, the grandchild will share in his
grandparent's estate.
The Ohio statute limits this exception to descendants of the intestate,
while the Uniform Probate Code applies the exception to the much broader
class of relatives of the intestate, which would include all of the decedent's
heirs conceived but not born during his lifetime. Under the present Ohio
statute, the exception does not apply to collateral heirs. Thus, if a nephew
heir of the decedent predeceased him, leaving a wife who had a child prior
to the decedent's death, the grandnephew could not inherit under the
Ohio statute even though his older brothers and sisters could. This applies
even if it would mean that the estate would pass to a more distant heir. By
adopting the rule followed in a majority of states,72 the Uniform Code
would allow the grandnephew to share in the inheritance. Adoption of
the Code would thus change the present law which specifically limits
afterborn heirs to the class of the decedent's descendants. 73
6 8 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(F) (Page 1968).
69 Sheeler v. Burkhart, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 356, 101 N.E.2d 401, 402-03 (P. Ct. 1951).
70 T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw or WILLS § 19 (2d ed. 1953).
71 OHo RE v. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (Page 1968).
72 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at § 20.
7a "[Blut in no other case can a person inherit unless living at the time of the death of the
intestate." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (Page 1968).
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Section 2-109 Meaning of Child and Related Terms.
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child
must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a per-
son,
(1) an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the
natural parents except that adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural
parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and that nat-
ural parent.
(2) In cases not covered by (1), a person born out of wedlock is a child
of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if:
(i) the natural parents participate in a marriage ceremony before or af-
ter the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or
(ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of
the father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, ex-
cept that the paternity established under this subparagraph (ii) is inef-
fective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or through
the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has
not refused to support the child.
With respect to adopted persons, the Uniform Probate Code is very
similar to present Ohio law. The proposed Code provides that, for pur-
poses of inheritance by, through, or from a person, an adopted child is
treated as the child of the adopting parent and not of the natural parents,
and the Ohio statute agrees.74  The Uniform Code, however, does not
contain the provision found in the Ohio statute75 which bars the adopted
child from inheritances that are limited to the heirs of the body of the
adopting parents. Nor does the Code follow that part of the Ohio stat-
ute7 which allows the adopted child to inherit under a will of a natural
relative if the will identifies the child by any known name or by other clear
identification.7 7 However, these differences should not affect present Ohio
law: in the former situation the phrase "heirs of the body" connotes a
biological relationship to the parents which would seem to exclude adopted
children; in the latter it would also seem that since any person, stranger-
to-the-blood or relative, may take under the will of the testator, the natural
relative who has been adopted could also take, as any stranger can, so long
as he is clearly identified. Thus, the adoption statute which cuts off the
adopted person's right to inherit by intestate succession would not affect
the right of a testator to leave his property to those he chooses.
Both the Ohio statute and the Code provide for the situation in which
the spouse of a natural parent adopts the stepchild; the rights of the nat-
ural parent who is the spouse of the adopting parent are not affected.78
Conversely, it would seem by implication that the rights of the adopted
74 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page Supp. 1972).
7 Id. § 3107.13(A).
76 Id. § 3107.13(B).
77Saintignon v. Saintignon, 5 Ohio App. 2d 133, 214 N.E.2d 124 (1966).
70UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.13(B) (Page
Supp 1972).
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child to the other natural parent (the one replaced by the adopting par-
ent), and vice versa, are cut off by the statute. The language of the Uni-
form Code is that "adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent
has no effect on the relationship between the child and that natural par-
ent."79  One Ohio court has held, however, that a child whose natural
parents were divorced, whose mother remarried, and who was then adopted
by her stepfather after the natural father's death could inherit from the
estate of her grandmother through her natural father.80 The court's hold-
ing stated that in those cases in which the natural parent could not, be-
cause of death, ever be given a chance to contest the adoption, the legis-
lature had not intended to sever the child from the natural bloodlines.8 '
In dictum, the court further stated that the rule would be the same whether
the natural parent who was not a party to the adoption died prior to or
after the adoption. 2 It is not clear how the adoption of the proposed Code
would affect this interpretation of the Ohio law.
There is at least one other situation that the Code provision leaves am-
biguous: should a child be adopted a second time, it is not clear whether
he may be entitled to inherit from both sets of adopting parents, or vice
versa.8" The Uniform Code ought to be modified to make it clear that,
in the case of multiple adoptions, the child is to be considered the child
of only his most recent adoptive parents. 84
With respect to illegitimate children, both the Uniform Probate Code
and the relevant Ohio statute 5 provide that they may inherit from and
through the mother. The Ohio statute86 provides alternative methods
for establishing paternity if the child is treated as the child of the father.
One of these methods is for the father to marry the mother and acknowl-
edge the child as his own. This differs from the Uniform Code provision
which establishes paternity of the natural father solely by his marriage
to the mother.87 The proposed Code is silent, however, as to whether the
natural father must acknowledge the child as his. This failure to require
acknowledgment by the father leaves unresolved the situation in which a
man marries the mother of an illigitimate and does not acknowledge the
child as his own, but his wife claims that it is his; in such a case the Code
does not specifically decide whether or not the child is to be considered
legitimate. The Code should be modified either to make it clear that the
7 9 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1) (emphasis supplied).
80 First Nat'l. Bank v. Collar, 27 Ohio Misc. 88, 272 N.E.2d 916 (C.P. 1971).
81 Id. at 91-92, 272 N.E.2d at 918-19.
82 Id. at 92, 272 N.E.2d at 919 (dictum).
83See Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa 246, 178 N.W. 406 (1920). The court allowed a twice-
adopted child to inherit from the former adoptive parents.
84 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 219.
85 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.17 (Page 1968).
86Id. § 2105.18.
8 T UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2)(i).
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father must acknowledge the child as his, or devise a procedure for defin-
ing and determining the identity of the natural father.88
Both Ohio and the Code provide that the issue of void marriages are
legitimate.8 ' Both statutes also provide a procedure for adjudicating the
paternity of the natural father, the second alternative method for establish-
ing paternity under both statutes. In Ohio the natural father may legiti-
mize the child without a marriage to the mother by filing an application in
the appropriate probate court acknowledging the child as his.9 ° If the
mother (or the guardian if it is someone other than the mother) consents
to the establishment of the relationship, and the court both finds that it is
in the best interest of the child to do so and is satisfied that the applicant
is in fact the natural father, then it may enter a decree establishing the le-
gal relationship of parent and child. This will be the same relationship as
though the child were born to the father of a lawful marriage. The pro-
posed Code also allows paternity to be established by an adjudication,
either before the death of the natural father or by clear and convincing
proof after his death.9 The Ohio statute makes no provision for the es-
tablishment of the relationship after the death of the father.
The Code contains an exception to the general rule that a child who
has been legitimized, by whatever procedure, is treated the same as the
child who is born of a lawful marriage. If paternity is established under
the adjudication procedure, neither the father nor his kindred are quali-
fied to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly ac-
knowledged him and has not refused support. 2  The purpose of this pro-
vision would seem to be to encourage a father to acknowledge and support
his natural children; if he has failed to do so, it would seem inequitable to
allow him to share in the child's estate.93
Section 2-110 Advancements.
If a person dies intestate as to all his estate, property which he gave in
his lifetime to an heir is treated as an advancement against the latter's
share of the estate only if declared in a contemporaneous writing by the
decedent or acknowledged in writing by the heir to be an advancement.
For this purpose the property advanced is valued as of the time the heir
came into possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the time of
death of the decedent, whichever first occurs. If the recipient of the
property fails to survive the decedent, the property is not taken into ac-
88 Section 2-109(2)(i) provides that the child is legitimate only if the "natural parents" are
married either before or after the birth of the child. It does not provide a means for determining
who the natural father is if he fails to acknowledge the child as his own after marrying the
mother. See Comer v. Comer, 175 Ohio St. 313, 194 N.E.2d 572 (1963); Eichorn v. Zedaker,
109 Ohio St. 609, 144 N.E. 258 (1924).8 9UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2)(i); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page 1968).
9 0 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page 1968).
9 1 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(27)(ii).
92 Id. § 2-109(2)(ii).
9 3 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 221.
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count in computing the intestate share to be received by the recipient's
issue, unless the declaration or acknowledgment provides otherwise.
The generally accepted rule on advancements is: if an intestate makes
a substantial gift to one of his children, the gift is presumed to be an ad-
vancement, and the value of the gift shall be deducted from the child's
share of the intestate's estate upon distribution in order to equalize the
shares of the other children or their descendents." In Ohio an advance-
ment to a child or his descendents is deducted from the child's intestate
share of the parent's estate,95 and whether a transfer is an advancement or
not depends upon the intent of the donor at the time that he makes the
transfer.16 This section of the Uniform Code would effect a major change
in the Ohio doctrine of advancements. The present Ohio statute limits the
doctrine to children of the intestate or their descendents, while the Code
applies the doctrine to the much broader class of heirs of the intestate.
The Code, for example, would apply to advancements made to collateral
heirs, such as nephews and nieces, as well as to lineal descendants. Ohio,
on the other hand, does not apply the doctrine to collateral heirs.97 The
Uniform Probate Code limits the application of the doctrine to those cases
in which there is a contemporaneous writing by the decedent stating that
the gift is intended to be an advancement, or an acknowledgment in writ-
ing from the heir indicating that the gift is intended as an advancement.
The proposed Code does not apply the doctrine if there is only partial in-
testacy, while the doctrine would apply in Ohio should a parent die intes-
tate, either in whole or in part, survived by children or their descendants.9
The reason given for this major change from the traditional and major-
ity view 9 is that today most inter vivos transfers are intended to be abso-
lute gifts and not advancements, or alternatively are explicitly integrated
into the decedents total estate plan. 00 In our affluent society this is, in all
probability, true in the vast majority of cases. At the time the doctrine of
advancements developed, and until recent years, most persons did not ac-
cumulate enough wealth to make absolute gifts not intended to be treated
as advancements. Because the original reason underlying this doctrine is
no longer valid, it is senseless to continue the rule; thus the Uniform Pro-
bate Code has limited it to those cases in which the donor's intent is ac-
tually shown in the form of the contemporaneous writing by the donor or
94 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 716; Shehy v. Cunningham, 81 Ohio St. 289, 90 N.E. 805
(1909).
95 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.05 (Page 1968).
9
6 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 719-22.
97 Stewart v. Yeazell, 4 Ohio App. 82, 21 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 357, 25 Ohio C. Dec. 318
(1914).
9 8 Dittoe v. Cluney, 22 Ohio St. 436 (1872).
99 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 716 n.3.
10 0 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-110, Comment.
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acknowledgment by the donee. By requiring the writing, the Code has
done much to eliminate the uncertainties in proof by parol evidence that
have always persisted in most determinations of whether or not an advance-
ment was intended.
An additional issue which will also change Ohio law is whether or not
an advancement to a predeceased child of an intestate is to be charged
against the share the predeceased child's children receive by representa-
tion. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the statute requires that an
advancement made to a deceased child be charged against the share the de-
ceased child's children receive. "fT~he legislature had in view the equal-
ity of inheritance which is made prominent in the general scope of the
statutes, and that it intended, for the purpose of attaining it in cases of this
character, that the 'portion' of the deceased child should be charged with an
advancement made to him, though the portion should be inherited by his
representatives."' ' The Uniform Code takes the opposite approach: an
advancement is not to be taken into account in computing the share of the
descendents, unless provided to the contrary in the written declaration of
the decedent or by the written acknowledgment of the predeceased child.
Section 2-111 Debts to Decedent.
A debt owed to the decedent is not charged against the intestate share
of any person except the debtor. If the debtor fails to survive the de-
cedent, the debt is not taken into account in computing the intestate
share of the debtor's issue.
When an heir is indebted to an intestate decedent, the weight of author-
ity02 requires that the debt be deducted from the heir's share of the estate.
Both Ohio and the Code have adopted'03 this common law doctrine of
equitable set-off. 104  The Code, following the majority view,105 does not
charge the debt against the intestate share of anyone except the debtor;
if the debtor does not survive the decedent, the debt is not taken into ac-
count in computing the share the debtor's representatives receive. This is
contrary to the view presently taken in Ohio which holds that, in light of
the statutory provisions'0 6 requiring that the lineal descendents of a de-
ceased child take the share in equal parts, their parent would have been
entitled to take had he been living; the debtor's children, if they are tak-
ing by representation and not per capita, are entitled to take the share sub-
ject to the debts of their parent 1'07 if the debt is not barred by the statute of
101 Parsons v. Parsons, 52 Ohio St. 470, 487,40 N.E. 165, 166 (1895).
302 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 787.
103 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.59 (Page 1968).
104 Russell v. Rexroad, 16 Ohio Op. 209, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 450 (P. Ct. 1939).
105 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 790.
106 Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.13 (Page 1968).
107 Gruhler v. Hossafaus, 93 Ohio L. Abs. 71, 195 N.E.2d 387 (P. Ct. 1963).
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limitations. 08 Thus the adoption of the Code by Ohio would change the
Ohio law and would be beneficial in avoiding litigation on this problem.
Section 2-112 Alienage.
No person is disqualified to take as an heir because he or a person
through whom he claims is or has been an alien.
Neither the Code nor the applicable Ohio law0 9 place any restrictions
on the ability of an alien to inherit property. In Ohio, an alien has the
same rights of inheritance as does a citizen of Ohio or of the United States.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller,"' how-
ever, state retention statutes"' such as Ohio's, which direct that funds in a
decedent's estate which would otherwise be distributable to the benefi-
ciaries or heirs, be held in trust if it appears that the distributee resides in a
country where he will be prevented from having the benefit, use, or control
of the property due him, are invalid under the constitutional" 2 provision
which places exclusive power over foreign affairs in the federal govern-
ment."' It would thus be appiopriate for the Ohio legislature to repeal the
retention statute pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig."4
Section 2-113 Dower and Curtesy Abolished.
The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished.
This section of the proposed Uniform Code would abolish the remain-
ing vestiges of dower in Ohio." 5 Present law provides for an inchoate
dower interest in either spouse which is terminated upon the death of the
spouse, except as to property which is: (1) conveyed by the deceased
spouse during the marriage; or (2) encumbered or aliened by the deceased
spouse during the marriage, the surviving spouse not having been barred
from dower under one of the statutory provisions,'" nor having voluntarily
relinquished the interest. Common law dower and its counterpart, cur-
tesy, were designed to give appropriate rights to a surviving spouse in an
108 Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 112 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
109 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.16 (Page 1968).
110 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
111 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2113.81 (Page 1968).
112 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
".1 First Nat'l. Bank v. Fishman, 16 Ohio Misc. 185, 239 N.E.2d 270 (P. Ct. 1968).
114 389 U.S. 429 (1968). The Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute that
provided for escheat if a nonresident alien did not meet three requirements: (1) a reciprocal right
of United States' citizens to take property on the same terms as citizens or inhabitants of the
foreign country; (2) a right of United States' citizens to receive payment here of funds from
estates in the foreign country; and (3) a right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of
local estates without confiscation by the foreign government. The rationale of the Court was
that such a statute constituted "an intrusion by the state into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and Congress." Id. at 432. Th ecourt in the Fishman
case held the Ohio retention statute (§ 2113.81) invalid on the basis of the Zschernig case.
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2103.02-.08 (Page 1968). Curtesy has been abolished in
Ohio by § 2103.09. The inchoate dower interest applies to both husband and wife.
116 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2103.02(B), .03, .05, .07 (Page 1968).
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agricultural society in which the primary form of wealth was land and the
primary form of income was rents and profits from land. The widow's
dower historically provided the widow the support her husband was obli-
gated to furnish during his life. Curtesy gave the husband the same rights
in his wife's land after her death that he had enjoyed while she was alive.
In our industrial society the form and nature of wealth and income have
changed; dower and curtesy no longer give the protection originally in-
tended.11 For this reason, most of the states have enacted legislation which
gives the surviving spouse the right to elect taking a designated share of
the deceased spouse's estate.118 The major practical effect of the inchoate
dower interest that exists in Ohio today is to preclude one spouse from
conveying or encumbering real property without the consent of the other.
The Uniform Code would eliminate this power,"i 9 which is a title-search-
er's headache and a bothersome cloud upon title. It would seem prefer-
able to abolish all remaining vestiges of dower, because it does not pro-
vide the protection originally intended, and it has been supplanted or sup-
plemented in most states, including Ohio, by a statutory forced share. It
is, in short, of little more than a nuisance value in dealing with title to real
property.
B. Further Suggestions for Change
1. Ancestral Property Restrictions and
Ohio's "Half and Half" Statute.
The Uniform Probate Code does not adopt the common law doctrine of
ancestral property. 20  The doctrine has also been abolished in Ohio, 12' but
with an exception'22 that provides for the descent of property which came
from a deceased spouse.'2 3 Unfamiliarity with this statute by the bar and
the general public has often resulted in its misapplication. Because of this
lack of understanding of the statute's effect, there is often a cloud upon
the title of real property and title companies therefore refuse to insure or
guarantee title; as a result, property becomes unmarketable.
If Ohio adopts the Uniform Probate Code, the legislature should take
that opportunity to abolish the half and half statute in Ohio, thus elimi-
117 W. B. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON THE LAW OF WILLS, 17 (2d ed. 1960).
118 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.39-.45; T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 108-09.
119 The power existing in either spouse to preclude the other from making inter vivos trans-
fers of real property without the consent of that spouse would be supplanted by the provisions
for the surviving spouse in Part 2 of Article II; see text accompanying notes 137-89 infra. Thus
the protection against a disinheritance by an inter vivos transfer is still afforded the surviving
spouse.
120 J. FiTCHIE, N. ALFORD, & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 67 (4th
ed. 1971).
121 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.01 (Page 1968).
122 Id. § 2105.10.
123 Hammel v. Hammel, 2 Ohio Op. 73, 3 Ohio Supp. 291 (P. Ct. 1935).
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nating a source of confusion and clouds upon title. The statute is also dif-
ficult to administer, and particularly if the heirs of the deceased spouse
from whom the property came are not readily ascertainable. In all proba-
bility the statute is not in accord with the wishes of either the decedents or
the heirs who take the property. 24
2. Ohio's Designation of Heir Statute.
The Ohio Revised Code 2 5 allows a person to designate an heir at law
if certain statutory procedures are followed.' 26  The Uniform Probate Code
does not have such a provision. Since an adult may not be adopted in
Ohio, 2' this provision allows the same end to be accomplished by permit-
ting the designation of a person as an heir. 28  When the prescribed pro-
cedure is followed, the person thus designated "will stand in the same
relation, for all purposes, to such declarant as he could, if a child born in
lawful wedlock. The rules of inheritance will be the same between him
and the relations by blood of the declarant, as if so born.' 2 9 The Supreme
Court of Ohio has, in a blatant exercise of judicial legislation, restricted
the application of this statute so that the designated heir does not inherit
through his designator from relatives by blood of the designator. 8 ' The
court attempts to justify this result by stating that any broader interpreta-
tion of the statute would lead to fantastic results. The court thought it
would necessarily follow that if the designee could inherit from and
through the designator, then the designee would also transmit inheritance
to the designator; sl but the statute requires no such conclusion. The stat-
ute speaks of the relationship of the designee to the designator and his
124 M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 141-42.
125 O0o REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (Page 1968).
126A person of sound mind and memory may appear before the probate judge of his
county and in the presence of such judge and two disinterested persons of such person's
acquaintance, file a written declaration declaring that, as his free and voluntary act,
he did designate and appoint another, stating the name and place of residence of such
person specifically, to stand toward him in the relation of an heir at law in the event of
his death. Such declaration must be attested by the two disinterested persons and
subscribed by the declarant. If satisfied that such declarant is of sound mind and
memory and free from restraint, the judge thereupon shall enter that fact upon his jour-
nal and make a complete record of such proceedings.... After a lapse of one year from
the date of such designation, such declarant may have such designation vacated or
changed by filing in said probate court an application to vacate or change such designa-
tion of heir; provided, that there is compliance with the procedure, conditions, and pre-
requisites required in the making of the original declaration.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (Page 1968).
127 Only a "child" may be adopted in Ohio under § 3107.02. A "child" is defined as any
person under the age of 21 by § 3107.01.
12 8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15, Comment (Page 1968).
129 Id.
13 0 Blackwell v. Bowman, 150 Ohio St. 34, 80 N.E.2d 493 (1948); see also Uhl v. Armstrong,
78 Ohio L. Abs. 592, 140 N.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1957).
181 150 Ohio St. at 44, 80 N.X.2d at 498.
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relatives. It does not attempt to create the same relationship between the
designator and designee in relation to the designee and his relatives. The
purpose and history of the statute militate against such a conclusion," 2
and such a result would seem to be unconstitutional as well.133
Ohio is in a distinct minority in providing this form of statutory author-
ity.' In most states the same result could be achieved by allowing adults
to be adopted. 13 5 Adopting the Uniform Code would provide an excellent
opportunity for Ohio to repeal this statute and to amend the adoption stat-
ute to allow persons to adopt adults with their consent. This would not
only provide desired uniformity, but would also allow the same result to
be accomplished.
II. ELECTIVE SHARE OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
Statutes in most states preserve for the surviving spouse and minor chil-
dren certain rights in the property of the decedent that cannot be destroyed
by testamentary transfers of the decedent. The right to a family allowance
during the administration of the estate, to receive certain exempt property,
and to a homestead exemption is universally guaranteed. In addition, some
states expressly protect the surviving spouse against disinheritance by the
deceased spouse.2 6 Children of the deceased spouse, while not protected
against intentional disinheritance, are given rights in their parents' estate if
it appears that they were unintentionally omitted from the will. The Uni-
form Probate Code concurs in the protections provided for the surviving
spouse and children by Ohio law, but with some substantive variations on
it. Part 2 of Article II, in the words of the official comment, is "designed
to protect a spouse of a decedent who was a domiciliary against dona-
tive transfers by will and will substitutes which would deprive the survivor
of a fair share of the decedent's estate.' '1 37
No part of the proposed Code is likely to generate as much controversy
as Part 2.38' The elective share concept is a direct descendent of common
law dower and curtesy. Over the years changes in society have shifted eco-
nomic emphasis away from agriculture as the primary source of wealth
to an industrial and commercial society in which wealth is represented
primarily by personal property. As the ancient rights of dower and cur-
tesy ceased to provide the necessary protection, states provided the elective
132 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15, Comment (Page 1968).
1 33 See Davis v. Laws, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 193 (C.P. 1928).
134 Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyer, 66 Ohio App. 136, 31 N.E.2d 161
(1940).
1352 AM. JuR. 2d Adoption § 11 (1962).
136 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 32.
13 7 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 2, General Comment.
138 "Almost every feature of the system described herein is or may be controversial." Id.
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share to take its place. In some cases the elective share was in addition to
the right to dower; in others it was wholly a substitute."9
The elective share, however, has proven inadequate for providing the
surviving spouse with the intended protection. In many states today a hus-
band can, by inter vivos transfers, divest himself of title to his property in
such a way as to deprive his spouse of her statutory share. So long as the
conveyance is not "illusory,' '140 most states have held the transfers valid,
regardless of the fact that they were made with the clear purpose of defeat-
ing marital rights. The present state of the law in this area is for the most
part unsatisfactory. Courts have been groping for solutions which will per-
mit a property owner to convey his property to others in good faith, yet at
the same time give his spouse some protection against gratuitous inter vivos
conveyances that are used to reach a result not allowed through a testa-
mentary instrument.14 ' Courts have developed a variety of theories'142 for
giving some relief to the disinherited spouse. Some courts have held that
such a transfer works a fraud upon the marital rights if the transfer were
made to deprive her of those rights, 43 while other courts have indicated
that the transfer is "illusory" as to the spouse, but is not otherwise inval-
id.144 The majority of courts have held, however, that if the conveyance
is not "a mask for the effective retention"'45 of the property, the convey-
ance is valid and the property cannot be reached by the surviving spouse,
as it is not a part of the probate estate. Conversely, though, an elective
share based solely on the probate estate can operate unfairly in favor of
the surviving spouse. The husband who provides for his wife by the use
of life insurance, by an inter vivos trust, or by holding his property with her
as a joint tenant with rights of survivorship, may have his testamentary
plans upset by her electing to take the statutory forced share. The Uni-
form Probate Code has attempted to deal with both of these problems.
The elective share applies to both probate and nonprobate transfers and
13 9 See generally T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 29 at 104-06; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 5.1-.49, 5.57-.74 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 5
209 at 140 et seq. (1971); 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 487 et seq. (3d ed.
1939).
140 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
141 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 113-17; Dick v. Bauman, 73 Ohio App. 107, 55 N.E.2d
137 (1943).
14 2 See W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960) for an analysis of these
theories.
143 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 114 n.8.
144 Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947). Harris was expressly over-
ruled by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 503,
179 N.E.2d 60, 69 (1961). "We reject the rule of the Bolles and Harris cases, to the effect that,
if a settlor reserves to himself the income during life, with the right to amend or revoke the trust
.. such reserved rights ... defeat the parting with dominion ... and thereby create a right in
the widow .. ." Id. See also Purcell v. Cleveland Trust Co., 6 Ohio App. 2d 235, 217 N.E.2d
876 (1965).
145 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,381, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (1937).
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takes into account provisions made for the spouse outside of the testamen-
tary scheme through the application of the "augmented estate" 146 concept.
Section 2-201 Right to Elective Share.
(a) If a married person domiciled in this state dies, the surviving spouse
has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the aug-
mented estate under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated.
(b) If a married person not domiciled in this state dies, the right, if any,
of the surviving spouse to take an elective share in property in this state
is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at death.
Under this section, the surviving spouse, rather than the probate court
or the personal representative of the decedent, has the burden of asserting
an election to take under the will or the statutory forced share. 47 Under
Ohio law the burden of issuing the citation to the surviving spouse rests
with the court or personal representative. If, under the Code, the surviv-
ing spouse chooses to waive the will and take the forced share, the elec-
tive share is one-third of the augmented estate; in Ohio, however, the
spouse takes the share to which he or she is entitled under the statute of
descent and distribution, with a maximum limitation of one-half of the
net estate.
148
Subsection (b) is also different from present Ohio law. This subsec-
tion provides that the law of the decedent's domicile governs the right of
the surviving spouse to take an elective share of property in this state.
Under the Ohio statute
the surviving sbouse-not only the surviving spouse of a testator who was
domiciled in Ohio at the time of his death, but also the surviving spouse
of a testator who was not domiciled in, but owned property in, Ohio, and
whose will has not previously been admitted to probate . . .has the right
... to elect whether to take under his deceased spouses' will or under the
statute of descent and distribution. 149
This is true regardless of whether, under the law of the state of domicile,
the surviving spouse would be entitled to make an election or not. In the
Gould case the decedent and her surviving spouse were domiciled in Ber-
muda, where the surviving spouse had no right of election. Thus, if the
Code is adopted in Ohio, the law of the surviving spouse's domicile, and
not Ohio law, would govern a determination of the right to make an elec-
tion. This provision will have slight impact, however, should the Code be
adopted by most states.
Section 2-202 Augmented Estate.
The augmented estate means the estate reduced by funeral and adminis-
tration expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and exemp-
146 UNIFOR PROBATE CODE § 2-202.
147 Id., Article II, Part 2, General Comment.
148 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1971).
149 In re Gould's Estate, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 289, 297, 140 N.E.2d 793, 800 (P. Ct. 1956).
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tions, and enforceable claims, to which is added the sum of the following
amounts:
(1) The value of property transferred by the decedent at any time dur-
ing marriage, to or for the benefit of any person other than the surviving
spouse, to the extent that the decedent did not receive adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth for the transfer, if the transfer is
of any of the following types:
(i) any transfer under which the decedent retained at the time of
his death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the
property;
(ii) any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time
of his death a power, either alone or in conjunction with any other
person, to revoke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for
his own benefit;
(iii) any transfer whereby property is held at the time of decedent's
death by decedent and another with right of survivorship;
(iv) any transfer made within two years of death of the decedent to
the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of the
years exceed $3,000.
(2) Any transfer is excluded if made with the written consent or
joinder of the surviving spouse. Property is valued as of the decedent's
death except that property given irrevocably to a donee during lifetime of
the decedent is valued as of the date the donee came into possession or
enjoyment if that occurs first. Nothing herein shall cause to be included
in the augmented estate any life insurance, accident insurance, joint an-
nunity, or pension payable to a person other than the surviving spouse.
(3) The value of property owned by the surviving spouse at the dece-
dent's death, plus the value of property transferred by the spouse at any
time during marriage to any person other than the decedent which would
have been includable in the spouse's augmented estate if the surviving
spouse had predeceased the decedent, to the extent the owned or trans-
ferred property is derived from the decedent by any means other than
testate or intestate succession without a full considerati+n in money or
money's worth. For purposes of this subsection:I
(i) Property derived from the decedent includes, but is not limited
to, any beneficial interest of the surviving spouse in a trust created by the
decedent during his lifetime, any property appointed to the spouse by
the decedent's exercise of a general or special power of appointment
also exercisable in favor of others than the spouse, any proceeds or in-
surance (including accidential death benefits) on the life of the decedent
attributable to premiums paid by him, any lump sum immediately pay-
able and the commuted value of the proceeds of annuity contracts under
which the decedent was the primary annuitant attributable to premiums
paid by him, the commuted value of amounts payable after the decedent's
death under any public or private pension, disability compensation,
death benefit or retirement plan, exclusive of the Federal Social Security
system, by reason of service performed or disabilities incurred by the
decedent, and the value of the share of the surviving spouse resulting
from rights in community property in this or any other state formerly
owned with the decedent. Premiums paid by the decedent's employer,
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his partner, a partnership of which he was a member, or his creditors,
are deemed to have been paid by the decedent.
(ii) Property owned by the spouse at the decedent's death is valued
as of the date of death. Property transferred by the spouse is valued
at the time the transfer became irrevocable, or at the decedent's death,
whichever occurred first. Income earned by included property prior to
the decedent's death is not treated as property derived from the dece-
dent.
(iii) Property owned by the surviving spouse as of the decedent's
death, or previously transferred by the surviving spouse, is presumed to
have been derived from the decedent except to the extent that the sur-
viving spouse establishes that it was derived from another source.150
The official comment states that the purposes of the augmented estate
concept as used in computing the elective share of the surviving spouse
are:
(1) to prevent the owner of wealth from making arrangements which
transmit his property to others by means other than probate deliberately
to defeat the right of the surviving spouse to a share, and,
(2) to prevent the surviving spouse from electing a share of the pro-
bate estate when the spouse has received a fair share of the total wealth of
the decedent either during the lifetime of the decedent or at death by
life insurance, joint tenancy assets and other nonprobate arrangements.' 51
Both of these stated purposes conflict with present Ohio law. In the
first situation, Ohio courts have held that the owner of property can make
arrangements to transmit it to others outside of probate, which will defeat
the rights of the surviving spouse to a statutory share of that property.'5 2
Under § 2-202 of the proposed Code, there are four situations in which
transfers made "during marriage' 53 by a decedent to a person other than
the surviving spouse are brought into the augmented estate for the purpose
of determining its size; in Ohio, property transferred in none of these four
situations would be considered part of the decedent's estate for purposes
of the forced share. The Ohio courts have held that a decedent may re-
tain, at the time of his death, the possession, enjoyment or right to income
from his property,5 4 as well as the power to revoke. 55 Ohio law also pro-
vides that the rights of parties to joint and survivorship property are based
150 The Joint Editional Board has reorganized this section by placing the paragraph now
numbered as § 2-202(2) as an unnumbered paragraph under § 2-202(1), and renumbering sub-
section (3) as § 2-202(2). 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NoTEs 4 (Dec. 1972).
151 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202, Comment.
152 Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961); Neville v.
Sawicki, 146 Ohio St. 539, 67 N.E.2d 323 (1946).
153 Only transfers made during the marriage are included. Thus a decedent could provide
for issue of a prior marriage by life insurance or a revocable inter vivos trust without fear of
these provisions being upset by a subsequent marriage. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202,
Comment.
154 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(I)(i).
1551d. § 2-202(1)(ii); Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60
(1961).
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entirely upon the contract and would not be subject to the decedent's
testamentary estate;15 neither are dollar or time limitations presently placed
upon transfers, so long as the transfer is inter vivos and not testamentary
in nature. 157
While the Uniform Code provision is complicated, it is nevertheless an
improvement upon most present day statutes because it reduces the possible
inequities that may result. The following example illustrates its operation.
Suppose first that the decedent testator leaves a net probate estate of
$70,000, of which $15,000 is left to his spouse. During his life he trans-
ferred personal property into joint ownership with A which has a value of
$40,000 at his death. Assume also that he opened a savings account in a
bank in hi's name "in trust for B," the balance in the account at death being
$15,000. The -augmented estate would include the probate estate
($70,000), the personal property held in joint ownership with A
($40,000), and the "Totten" trust account for B ($15,000). Thus the
surviving spouse could elect one-third of $125,000, or a share of over
$41,000. Against this one-third share would be credited the $15,000 pro-
vided for the surviving spouse under the will. The additional $26,000
would come from the other devisees under the will and from A and B in
proportion to the amounts they received. 58
The second situation covered by § 2-202 provides for an accounting, in
the augmented estate, of property the surviving spouse has received from
the decedent, either during the lifetime of the decedent or at death, and by
any nonprobate arrangements. This is to prevent the surviving spouse
from electing a share of the probate estate if the spouse has already received
a "fair" share of the total wealth. This property is then deducted from her
share of the augmented estate. If, on the same facts as used in the above
example, the decedent testator had provided for his spouse by naming her
as beneficiary of his life insurance policy in the amount of $50,000, this
would be included in the augmented estate, but it would also be charged
against the surviving spouse's share. The augmented estate would be in-
creased to $175,000 and the surviving spouse's ultimate share would be
over $58,000. Since the surviving spouse has received $15,000 under the
will and $50,000 in life insurance proceeds, the elective share would be
fully satisfied and the surviving spouse would not be entitled to any of the
property passing to the other devisees under the will or to A and B. Con-
sequently, as a result of this feature, the Code will reduce the number of
elections made to cases of express disinheritance. 5 9 This provision is also
156 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1)(iii); Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28
N.E.2d 636 (1940); Kipp v. Kipp, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 400, 101 N.E.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1970).
157 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1)(iv); Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St.
489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961); Purcell v. Cleveland Trust Co., 6 Ohio App. 2d 235, 217 N.E.2d
876 (1965).
158 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 230.
159 [I~t is obvious that this section will operate in the long run to decrease substantially
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contrary to the Ohio statute which allows that a surviving spouse may take
property, such as life insurance, that is outside of the probate estate of the
decedent and still elect to take under the law and receive the full statutory
share of up to one-half of the probate estate. 6 '
There has been substantial criticism of this proposed Code provision on
the basis that the evil the statute tries to correct rarely occurs and that the
statute, because of its complexity and ambiguities, is an open invitation to
litigation.161 The official comment admits that "[tjhe augmented net es-
tate approach embodied in this section is relatively complex and assumes
that litigation may be required in cases in which the right to an elective
share is asserted."' 62  Even so, it seems that it would be preferable to deal
with the complexity and litigation rather than to allow the present inequi-
ties, both in favor of and against the surviving spouse, to continue.
Section 2-203 Right of Election Personal to Surviving Spouse.
The right of election of the surviving spouse may be exercised only dur-
ing his lifetime by him. In the case of a protected person, the right of
election may be exercised only by order of the court in which protective
proceedings as to his property are pending, after finding that exercise
is necessary to provide adequate support for the protected person during
his probable life expectancy.
Under the Ohio statute, 163 as under the Uniform Code, the right
electiofi is personal to the surviving spouse. Ohio also provides for elec-
tions to be made when the surviving spouse is under a legal disability.6 4
In that case, if the probate court determines that if it serves the best inter-
est of the incompetent surviving spouse, the court may exercise, in the
spouse's behalf, the right to elect to take against the will and under the
laws of intestacy.'65 The Ohio statute'66 also provides that the death of
the number of elections. This is because the statute will encourage and provide a legal
base for counseling of testators against schemes to disinherit the spouse, and because
the spouse can no longer elect in cases where substantial provision is made by joint
tenancy, life insurance, lifetime gifts, living trusts set up by the decedent, and the other
numerous nonprobate arrangements by which wealth is today transferred. On the
other hand the section should provide realistic protection against disinheritance of the
spouse in the rare case where decedent tries to achieve that purpose by depleting his
probate estate.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202, Comment.
160 Weller v. Weller, 32 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329 (C.P. 1934).
161 Zartman, supra note 13, at 421.
162 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202, Comment.
163 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1971); "The election provided by Section
2107.39 for a surviving spouse to choose whether she desires to take under her husband's will
or under the statute of descent and distribution is solely for the benefit of the surviving spouse,
and where that spouse is under a legal disability the probate court must elect on her behalf the
provision which is better for her, considering only her interests." In re Estate of Cook, 19 Ohio
St. 2d 121, 125,249 N.E.2d 799, 802, (1969).
164 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.45 (Page 1968).
165 In re Estate of Callan, 101 Ohio App. 114, 135 N.E.2d 464 (1956).
166 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.38 (Page 1968).
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the surviving spouse prior to the filing of the court's entry, fixing the terms
of payment for property elected to be purchased, is nullified and the
spouse's heirs do not succeed to that right. 67
Section 2-204 Waiver of Right to Elect and of Other Rights.
The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of the sur-
viving spouse to homestead allowance, exempt property and family al-
lowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or partially, before or
after marriage, by a written contract, agreement or waiver signed by the
party waiving after fair disclosure. Unless it provides to the contrary,
a waiver of "all rights" (or equivalent language) in the property or
estate of a present or prospective spouse or a complete property settle-
ment entered into after or in anticipation of separation or divorce is a
waiver of all rights to elective share, homestead allowance, exempt prop-
perty and family allowance by each spouse in the property of the other
and a renunciation by each of all benefits which would otherwise pass
to him from the other by intestate succession or by virtue of the pro-
visions of any will executed before the waiver or property settlement.
This provision is entirely consistent with present Ohio law. 6" If the
antenuptial or separation agreement is voluntarily made and fair and rea-
sonable to the parties, it will bar each, upon the death of the other, from
all statutory rights of the surviving spouse. The proposed Code stipulates
that there must be "fair disclosure" by each spouse as to the extent of
their property; similarly, Ohio courts have held that there must be a full
disclosure by the parties of the property held by each of them. 6 ' The
fact that a prospective spouse had a reputation of wealth is not enough to
charge the other with knowledge of the kind or amount of such wealth."
Thus the Ohio courts may construe "fair disclosure" to mean "full disclo-
ure.
Ohio's statute does have a provision not found in the Uniform Probate
Code. Under it, in order to attack the agreement waiving rights in the
other spouse's estate, the action must be brought within six months of the
appointment of the personal representative; otherwise the agreement can-
not be attacked on any grounds.' 7 ' The corresponding provision of the
Uniform Code does not state whether there is a time limitation for attack-
167 Under § 2113.38 of the Ohio Revised Code the surviving spouse is given the right to
purchase real and personal property not specifically devised or bequeathed by the decedent, in
the following manner: (1) the mansion house and household goods at their appraised value;
(2) listed securities at the market price at the time of purchase; and (3) other real or personal
property at the appraissed value which does not exceed one-third of the appraised value of the
estate, including the mansion house and household goods the spouse has elected to purchase.
168 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.03 (Page 1968).
369In re Estate of Mosier, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 268, 133 N.E.2d 202 (P. Ct. 1954).
170 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 185 N.E.2d 89 (P. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 176 Ohio
St. 469, 200 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
171 Burlovic v. Farmer, 96 Ohio App. 403, 115 N.E.2d 411 (1953), aff'd, 162 Ohio St. 46
120 N..2d 705 (1954). See also Osborn v. Osborn, 10 Ohio Misc. 171, 226 N.E.2d 814
(C.P. 1966), aII'd, 18 Ohio St 2d 144, 248 N.E.2d 191 (1969); Cantor v. Cantor, 86 Ohio L.
Abs. 452, 174 N.E.2d 304 (P. Ct. 1959).
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ing an agreement for lack of fair disclosure. In order to secure title to
property within a reasonable time after the death of the decedent, it would
be helpful if the proposed Code provided a time limitation for attacking
the agreement. However, the next section may be construed to cover this
problem.
Section 2-205 Proceeding for Elective Share; Time Limit.
(a) The surviving spouse may elect to take his elective share in the aug-
mented net estate by filing in the Court and mailing or delivering to the
personal representative a petition for the elective share within 6 months
after the publication of notice to creditors for filing claims which arose
before the death of the decedent. The Court may extend the time for
election as it sees fit for cause shown by the surviving spouse before the
time for election has expired.
(b) The surviving spouse shall give notice of the time and place set for
hearing to persons interested in the estate and to the distributees and
recipients of portions of the augmented net estate whose interests will
be adversely affected by the taking of the elective share.
(c) The surviving spouse may withdraw his demand for an elective share
at any time before entry of a final determination by the Court.
(d) After notice and hearing, the Court shall determine the amount of
the elective share and shall order its payment from the assets of the
augmented net estate or by contribution as appears appropriate under
Section 2-207. If it appears that a fund or property included in the aug-
mented net estate has not come into the possession of the personal repre-
sentative, or has been distributed by the personal representative, the Court
nevertheless shall Lx the liability of any person who has any interest in
the fund or property or who has possession thereof, whether as trustee
or otherwise. The proceeding may be maintained against fewer than all
persons against whom relief could be sought, but no person is subject
to contribution in any greater amount than he would have been if relief
had been secured against all persons subject to contribution.
(e) The order or judgment of the Court may be enforced as necessary in
suit for contribution or payment in other courts of this state or other
jurisdictions. -72
This part of the Code corresponds to Ohio law, but with some minor
procedural differences. Under the Ohio statutel 7a the surviving spouse
must make the election in person before a judge or deputy clerk. Subsec-
tion (a) does not seem to require this personal appearance, but rather
states only that he or she shall file his petition in the probate court and mail
or deliver it to the personal representative of the decedent. The Uniform
Code provides a six month time limit for the filing of an election petition
from the date of the publication of notice to the creditors, while the Ohio
provision has a limit of seven months after the appointment of the per-
sonal representativesY.4  Both the Ohio statute and the Code allow for
172 Section 2-205 (a) (line 4) should read "within six months after the first publication of
notice to creditors." 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NOTES 5 (Dec. 1972).
a73 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107A3 (Page 1968).
17 4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1971).
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an extension of time upon a showing of good cause.175 Under the pro-
posed Code the burden of initiating the election is upon the surviving
spouse though, while under the Ohio statute the burden is upon the per-
sonal representative or, at his failure, upon the court to issue a citation to
the surviving spouse to elect to take under the will or under the statute of
descent and distribution; this citation is to be issued, in Ohio, after the
probate of the will and the filing of the inventory, appraisement, and
schedule of debts.'" The proposed Code further places the responsibility
on the surviving spouse for giving notice to other persons interested in the
estate of a hearing for the election, " but Ohio statutory law has no such
provision. In subsection (c), the Code provides that the surviving spouse
may rescind his election at any time before entry of a final determination
by the court. While there is no specific Ohio statute on point, it would
seem that § 2107.43 of the Ohio Revised Code, which requires that the
election be made in person, would cover this, particularly in light of the
decision of one Ohio court' holding that an election could be rescinded
if the surviving spouse did not have full knowledge of the condition of
the estate. This was allowed even though the election had become final. 9
Section 2-206 Effect of Election on Benefits by Will or Statute.
(a) The surviving spouse's election of his elective share does not af-
fect the share of the surviving spouse under the provisions of the dece-
dent's will or intestate succession unless the surviving spouse also ex-
pressly renounces in the petition for an elective share the benefit of all
or any of the provisions. If any provision is so renounced, the property
or other benefit which would otherwise have passed to the surviving
spouse thereunder is treated, subject to contribution under subsection
2-207(b), as if the surviving spouse had predeceased the testator.
(b) A surviving spouse is entitled to homestead allowance, exempt
property and family allowance whether or not he elects to take an elec-
tive share and whether or not he renounces the benefits conferred upon
him by the will except that, if it dearly appears from the will that a pro-
vision therein made for the surviving spouse was intended to be in lieu
of these rights, he is not so entitled if he does not renounce the provi-
sion so made for him in the will.
Ohio's law is consistent with subsection (a), as exemplified by what
one Ohio court has stated:
The election of the widow to renounce the provisions of the will made for
her and to take under the law did not destroy the efficacy of testator's last
will and testament, other than to withdraw therefrom the one-half of the
net estate, her interest in the estate established under the provisions of
Section 10504-55, General Code, and she is not entitled to have the estate
175 Id.; UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205 (a).
176 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1971).
177 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205 (b).
178 Smith v. First Nat'l. Bank, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 102, 124 N.E.2d 851 (C.P. 1954).
179 See text accompanying notes 168-71 supra.
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administered as to her one-half of the net estate as though there were no
will, ... A taking against the will by a surviving spouse does not operate
to render the estate intestate, and is not allowed to break the testamentary
plan further than is absolutely necessary. .. but the will is construed as if
it contained no provisions for the renouncing spouse, and distribution is
made as if he or she had died.180
The second sentence of subsection (a) does not have a counterpart in
the Ohio Revised Code. Ohio statutes do provide that a bequest or legacy
under a will may be refused, and, if so, that it shall pass by the residuary
clause if there is one and by intestacy if not.'81 Any competent adult may
renounce an interest through intestate succession and the renounced prop-
erty shall be distributed as if the renouncer had predeceased the decedent. 82
However, one must make a distinction between the surviving spouse's elec-
tion to take against the will, thus electing to take the statutory forced share
(which has frequently been referred to by the courts as "renouncing the
will"), and the actual renunciation of a bequest under the will or the in-
testate share; in the former case one would "renounce the provision of the
will" in order to take a greater share of the estate, while in the latter case
one takes nothing.
Ohio law agrees with subsection (b). The Ohio courts have held
that a surviving spouse may claim both that which is provided for her in
the will and the statutory exemptions. 8 4 If the surviving spouse elects to
take under the law (that is, to take against the will), she is also entitled to
take the statutory exemption in addition to the amounts she would take as
a result of the election.' 85
Section 2-207 Charging Spouse With Gifts Received; Liability of Others
For Balance of Elective Share.
(a) In the proceeding for an elective share, property which is part
of the augmented estate which passes or has passed to the surviving
spouse by testate or intestate succession or other means and which has
not been renounced, including that described in Section 2-202(3), is
applied first to satisfy the elective share and to reduce the amount due
from other recipients of portions of the augmented estate.
(b) Remaining property of the augmented estate is so applied that
liability for the balance of the elective share of the surviving spouse
is equitably apportioned among the recipients of the augmented estate
in proportion to the value of their interests therein.
(c) Only original transferees from, or appointees of, the decedent
and their donees, to the extent the donees have the property or its pro-
ceeds, are subject to the contribution to make up the elective share of the
-180In re Estate of Ellis, 66 Ohio App. 121, 126-27, 32 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1940).
'
81 OHO REy. CODE ANN. § 2113.60 (Page 1968).
182Id. § 2115.16.
183 In re Estate of Fetzer, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 275, 130 N.E.2d 732 (Ct. App. 1954).
184 Id.
185 Schardt v. Prexler, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 119, 67 N.E.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1946).
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surviving spouse. A person liable to contribution may choose to give up
the property transferred to him or to pay its value as of the time it is
considered in computing the augmented estate.
Subsection (a) of the Code differs from present Ohio law.'8 6 In Ohio
the statutory allowances would be set aside first and can equal 20 percent
of the estate up to a maximum of $2,500.187 In determining the surviv-
ing spouse's statutory forced share no consideration is given, in Ohio, to
gifts made to the surviving spouse by the decedent during his lifetime.
Under the proposed Code, 88 on the other hand, such gifts would be in-
cluded in the augmented estate to determine the elective share, thereby re-
ducing the amount that other beneficiaries would not receive because it
was needed to satisfy the surviving spouse's elective share. With respect
to subsection (b), Ohio's position is typified by the following:
[I]n the absence of a showing that the testator intended that the effect of
an election of a surviving spouse to take against the will should be borne
to the contrary, that when the election results in the executor being de-
prived of property, or interests in property, to such extent and in such man-
ner, that the property, or interests in property remaining available for dis-
tribution to different classes of legatees named in different items of the will
would, if so distributed, cause the reduction resulting from said election
to be borne equitably, but not necessarily equally or proportionately, be-
tween said classes, distribution shall be made accordingly without further
adjustment or contribution between the classes. 189
Ohio has no statutory provision comparable to subsection (c), but it
would seem that much the same principles are also applicable in Ohio."° °
III. SPOUSE AND CHILDREN UNPROVIDED FOR IN WILLS
Section 2-301 Omitted Spouse.
(a) If a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving spouse who
married the testator after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse
shall receive the same share of the estate he would have received if the
decedent left no will unless it appears from the will that the omission
was intentional or the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside
the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary pro-
vision is shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the
transfer or other evidence.
(b) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made
by the will abate as provided in Section 3-902.
Ohio has no statute comparable to this. In Ohio, the omitted spouse
would have no alternative but to elect to take the statutory share against
8 6 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2115.13 (Page 1968).
187 Id.
18 8 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-207(a).
189 Blackford v. Vermillion, 107 Ohio App. 26, 31, 156 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1958).
19 0 ld.
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the will. The Uniform Code treats the omitted spouse in the same manner
as a pretermitted child and provides an intestate share for him or her, but
this provision is only applicable in those cases in which the testator has
married after the execution of the will. If the will were executed after the
marriage it is presumed that the omission was intentional, and the surviving
spouse must then rely upon the elective share provision. 1" The official
comment states that the effect of this provision is to reduce the number of
cases in which the spouse claims an elective share.192
The Uniform Code has adopted a liberal rule on the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence to show that a transfer is intended instead of a testamen-
tary provision. 19 3 Statements of the testator will be admissable to show his
intent. This same evidence would be inadmissable in Ohio since the tes-
tator's intent can only be determined from the "four corners" of the will. 94
While this liberal rule opens the door to the admission of parol evidence,
it is more likely that the testator's true intent will be ascertained and ful-
filled.
Section 2-302 Pretermitted Children.
(a) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children
born or adopted after the execution of his will, the omitted child receives
a share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have received
if the testator has died intestate unless:
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
(2) when the will was executed the testator had one or more children
and devised substantially all his estate to the other parent of the omit-
ted child; or
(3) the testator provided for the child by transfer outside the will and
the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the trans-
fer or other evidence.
(b) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to pro-
vide in his will for a living child solely because he believes the child to
be dead, the child receives a share in the estate equal in value to that
which he would have received if the testator had died intestate.(c) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made
by the will abate as provided in Section 3-902.
The Uniform Code's provision for the pretermitted child is similar to
the Ohio statutory provision'95 with some variations. Under the Ohio stat-
ute the share given to the surviving spouse is excluded from the abatement
in making up the intestate share of the pretermitted child.'96 If, for exam-
191 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a).
192 Id. § 2-301, Comment.
193 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 236.
194 Third Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. Davidson, 157 Ohio St. 355, 105 N.E.2d 573 (1952).
'95 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (Page 1968).
196 Id. § 2107.34 provides in relevant part that:
[UJ]nless it appears by such will that it was the intention of the testator to disinherit
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pie, the testator has a wife and three children (alive at the time the will
was executed) and in his will leaves one-half of his estate to the wife and
one-sixth to each of the three children, the pretermitted child born after
the execution of the will would take his share by an abatement of the share
of the other children, the wife's share being excluded. Thus, the wife
would still take her one-half and each of the children would now take a
one-eighth share. Under the Uniform Code,197 if the testator has children
when the will is executed, and he devises substantially all of his estate to
the other parent of the omitted child, then such omitted child is not en-
titled to a share. If, however, he has divided his estate in the manner of
the above example, it would seem that the omitted child is entitled to
abatement from all, including the surviving spouse. But subsection (c)
states that shares are to abate as provided by § 3-902, which excludes from
abatement the share of the surviving spouse who elects to take an elective
share, and neglects to state whether her share is excluded from abatement
if she chooses to take her share under the will. Presumably it is not. Sub-
section (b) of § 3-902 does provide, however, that "if the testamentary
plan or the express or implied purpose of the devise would be defeated by
the order of abatement stated in subsection (a), the shares of the distrib-
utees abate as may be found necessary to give effect to the intention of the
testator."'19 8 Thus consideration must be given to the purpose of the tes-
tator in providing his testamentary scheme. The official comment states
that "even in the absence of statute, general legacies to a wife, or to per-
sons with respect to which the testator is in loco parentis, are to be pre-
ferred to other legacies in the same class because this accords with the prob-
able purpose of the legacies."' 99
It would seem then that present Ohio law would be changed and the
surviving spouse's share would be subject to abatement, at least to the ex-
tent that the share was not only greater than her elective share, but also
not substantially all of the estate. If, however, this would defeat the tes-
tamentary plan or the purpose of the testator then his intent is to govern. 200
The Uniform Code201 also raises another unresolved question in the use of
the phrase "to the other parent." Must the gift to the parent be outright?
Would the typical trust arrangement for the benefit of the surviving spouse
such pretermitted child or heir, the devises and legacies granted by such will, except
those to a surviving spouse, shall be abated proportionately ... so that such pretermitted
child or heir will receive a share equal to that which such person would have been en-
titled to receive out of the estate if such testator had died intestate with no surviving
spouse, owning only that portion of his estate not devised or bequeathed to or for the
use and benefit of a surviving spouse.
197 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (a) (2).
198Id. § 3-902(b).
199 Id. § 3-902, Comment.
200 Id. § 3-902(b).
2 01 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (a) (2).
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meet this requirement to effectively bar a share to the pretermitted
child ?202 If it does not, then it would seem that this clause is too restric-
tive.
Subsection (a) (3) is similar to present Ohio law. It states that if the
testator provided for the child by transfers outside the will and intended
these transfers to be in lieu of a testamentary provision, then the child
does not take a share under the will. Under the Ohio statute2 3 any por-
tion of the testator's estate that the child received by means of an advance-
ment, whether he is pretermitted or not, is charged against his share. Of
course, one of the most difficult problems here has been the evidentiary
problem of determining the testator's intention. The Uniform Code pro-
vides a more liberal rule by allowing "statements of the testator"204 to show
that non-testamentary provisions were intended in lieu of provisions under
the will. While there is some danger that the will might be varied by in-
troducing extrinsic evidence to prove the decedent's intent, it is more likely
that his actual intent will be honored under the Uniform Code. Although
the official comment states that "this section is not intended to alter the
rules of evidence applicable to statements of a decedent;" there is some
question with respect to whether it in fact does so.205
Subsection (b) provides for that rare case in which the testator fails to
provide for a living child because he believes him to be dead. The Ohio
statute has a more exhaustive provision,06 to cover the case in which the
lineal descendants of that child are provided for by the testator. In that
case the omitted child takes the portion his lineal descendants would have
taken.207
IV. EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES
This section deals with the rights which are preserved for the surviv-
ing spouse and minor children. These rights are protected not only against
unsecured creditors but also against attempts of the decedent to defeat
them in his will. These provisions for the protection of the family have a
limited dollar value. The official comment states that these are only sug-
gested amounts, and it is left to the states adopting the Uniform Code to
alter the dollar amounts or to vary the terms and conditions in other ways
necessary to accommodate local traditions.08 In addition, the Code limits
these rights to families of a decedent who are domiciled within the state.
202 Zartman, supra note 13, at 424.
2 0 3 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (Page 1968).
2 0 4 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302(a) (3).
20 5 Zartman, supra note 13, at 424.
2 06 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (Page 1968).
2071,d.
2 08 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 4, General Comment.
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Section 2-401 Homestead Allowance.
A surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this state is en-
titled to a homestead allowance of [$5,000]. If there is no surviving
spouse, each minor child and each dependent child of the decedent is
entitled to a homestead allowance amounting to [$5,000] divided by the
number of minor and dependent children of the decedent. The home-
stead allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims against
the estate. Homestead allowance is in addition to any share passing to
the surviving spouse or minor or dependent child by the will of the
decedent unless otherwise provided, by intestate succession or by way of
elective share.
The Uniform Code limits the homestead allowance to families of do-
miciliary decedents, 09 whereas the Ohio statutes are silent on whether the
decedent must have been domiciled within the state. However, Ohio case
law21° makes it clear that this is a prerequisite to claiming a homestead ex-
emption under the statute2. or the money consideration in lieu of the
homestead exemption. 12 The Uniform Code also provides for the home-
stead exemption in terms of a dollar value, although the distribution to the
family may be in property rather than in money.213  Ohio law presumes
a homestead in real property214 but if the real property is sold to pay a lien
which precludes the allowance of the homestead, the excess of the pro-
ceeds, not exceeding $500, shall be paid in lieu of the exemption.2 15 As a
practical matter, the homestead exemption is of minor value in Ohio.
This is so because of the unrealistic low dollar limitation218 in relation to
present day property values, and because the real property, even if owned
in fee simple, will often be subject to encumbrances that are not included in
the exemption. On the other hand, the. allowance under the Uniform
Code will be equally valuable whether the family residence is owned free
of debt, subject to a mortgage or is rental property.2" If the Uniform
Code's suggested dollar amount of $5,000 is adopted by Ohio, the home-
stead would be of some practical value once again.
The Uniform Code provides that any surviving spouse domiciled in
the state is entitled to the homestead allowance. A literal reading of the
Ohio statutory provisions21 8 would seem to preclude a widower, without an
unmarried daughter or unmarried minor son living with him, from claim-
209 Id. § 2-401.
210 Campbell v. Bennington, 4 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 447, 16 Ohio C. Dec. 239 (Cir. Ct.
1904).
211 OHIO REV. CODE § 2329.73 (Page 1954).
212 Id. § 2329.76.
2 1 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-906(a) (2).
214 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.75 (Page 1954).
215 Id. § 2329.76 (Page 1954).
216 $1,000 in value or $500 in cash in lieu of the homestead.
217 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 237.
2 1 8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.09, .73, .75 (Page 1968).
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ing the exemption. Ohio courts have held that the right to a homestead
exemption applies to every debtor who has a family living with him.219
Thus it would seem that the Uniform Code would enlarge the class of
persons eligible to claim the homestead exemption in Ohio to include a
widower who had no family living with him.2 2 0
Under the Uniform Code the homestead allowance has priority over all
claims against the estate. This is in contrast to present Ohio law which
designates at least five types of claims that are superior to the homestead
exemption. 22' Thus the adoption of the Uniform Code in Ohio would also
change present law by giving the homestead exemption priority over all
claims-a status it does not now enjoy.
Section 2-402 Exempt Property.
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a de-
cedent who was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value
not exceeding $3,500 in excess of any security interests therein in house-
hold furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances and personal ef-
fects. If there is no surviving spouse, children of the decedent are en-
titled jointly to the same value. If encumbered chattels are selected and
if the value in excess of security interests, plus that of other exempt
property, is less than $3,500, or if there is not $3,500 worth of exempt
property in the estate, the spouse or children are entitled to other assets
of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up the $3,500 value.
Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a deficiency of
exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, except
that the right to any assets to make up a deficiency of exempt property
shall abate as necessary to permit prior payment of homestead allow-
ance and family allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit
or share passing to the surviving spouse or children by the will of the
219 In re Estate of Zerkle, 68 Ohio App. 480, 43 N.E.2d 204 (1941).
220 One Ohio court has held that every surviving spouse is entitled to the homestead exemp-
tion, whether or not the qualifying children are living with him. The court's rationale for the
holding was that § 2127.26 of the Ohio Revised Code does not restrict the exemptions to sur-
viving spouses living with their families or widows and therefore all surviving spouses, includ-
ing widowers without families living with them, are entitled to the exemption. In re Estate of
Barnhiser, 10 Ohio Supp. 117, 25 Ohio Op. 388 (P. Ct. 1943). The Barnhiser court treated
§§ 2329.73 and 2127.26 as if they were inconsistent acts passed at different times and held that
the latter should be followed. It does not seem that the two sections are inconsistent, however,
since § 2127.26 expressly limits its application to spouses who are "entitled to have a homestead
set off," and § 2329.73 sets out those persons who are entitled to the exemption. Widowers
without families living with them are not included within § 2329.73, persons entitled to the
exemption. I have been unable to find another Ohio case in which this issue was considered.
Ohio Jurisprudence 2d merely states the holding of the Barnhiser court without comment; 27
0. JUR. 2d, Homesteads § 12 (1957). An article in the Ohio State Law Journal mentions the
case, also without comment; see Nadler, Exemptions, 16 OHIo ST. LJ. 63, 73 (1955).
221 Nadler, Exemptions, 16 OHio ST. L.J. 63, 74 (1955); § 2329.72 provides, in part, that
homestead exemptions
do not extend to a judgment rendered on a mortgage executed by a debtor and his wife,
nor to a claim for manual work or labor for less than one hundred dollars, nor to impair
the lien by mortgage or otherwise of the vendor for the purchase money of the premises
in question, nor the lien of a mechanic, or other person, under a statute of this state,
for materials furnished or labor performed in the erection of the dwelling house there.
on, nor for the payment of taxes due thereon....
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decedent unless otherwise provided, by intestate succession, or by way of
elective share.
The Uniform Code provides that if there is no surviving spouse, the
children of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value ($3,500).
The Ohio statute2 2 makes no provision for children in situations in which
there is no surviving spouse. It does provide, however, that "[e]very per-
son who is the chief support of a family or who is a person paying ... for
the support of a minor child, or is the chief support of any dependent
person ... may hold property exempt . . .,,23 which would seem to have
the same effect. The official comment to the Uniform Code states that
the exemption is available to adult children if the decedent left no
spouse,224 whereas under present Ohio law adult children are not entitled
to this exemption. The Uniform Code also limits the exemption to per-
sons who are domiciled within the state. The Ohio exemption laws have
been extended to cover nonresidents as well.22a
The Uniform Code provides that every surviving spouse is entitled to
the exemption. The narrower Ohio statute,226 which does not cover every
surviving spouse, is intended to cover only persons who are heads of fam-
ilies or are supporting other persons or widows.2  The exempt value of
$3,500 under the Uniform Code is considerably greater than that allowed
by the Ohio statutes.228 In Ohio the surviving spouse, or minor children in
the absence of the surviving spouse, may select certain property specified
by the statute, which is, if selected, neither an asset of the estate nor sub-
ject to administration.2 9 This property, which includes household goods,
farm equipment, automobiles, etc., cannot exceed 20 percent of the ap-
praised value of the estate, with a maximum of no more than $2,500, if
there is a surviving spouse, or $1,000 if there is no surviving spouse but
minor children, or less than $500 if neither, provided there is that much
property in the estate.230  Both Ohio law and the Uniform Code provide
that if the property selected is less than the statutory amount then the per-
sons entitled to the exemption are entitled to a sum of money necessary to
2 22 OHIO REV. CODE ANN, § 2329.66 (Page 1954).
223 d.
22 4 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-402, Comment.
2 25 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Naylor, 73 Ohio St. 115, 76 N.E. 505 (1905); Sproul
v. McCoy, 26 Ohio St. 577 (1875); Jacoby v. Dotson, 7 Ohio N.P. 276, 7 Ohio C. Dec. 412
(C.P. 1898).
2 26 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page 1953).
2 2 7 Diehl v. Friester, 37 Ohio St. 473 (1882); Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 298 (1863);
Hoover v. Haslage, 5 Ohio N.P. 90, 7 Ohio C. Dec. 98r (C.P. 1897), aff'd, 16 Ohio C.C.R. 570,
9 Ohio C. Dec. 404 (1898). But see § 2329.62, which covers every person not included in §
2329.66.
228 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2115,13 (Page 1968), 2329.66 (Page 1954).
229 Id. § 2115.13.
280 Id.
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make up the difference. Both statutes also provide that exempt property
shall have priority over other claims against the estate.2 '
Section 2-403 Family Allowance.
In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt property,
if the decedent was domiciled in this state, the surviving spouse and
minor children whom the decedent was obligated to support and children
who were in fact being supported by him are entitled to a reasonable al-
lowance in money out of the estate for their maintenance during the
period of administration, which allowance may not continue for longer
than one year if the estate is inadequate to discharge allowed claims.
The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in periodic installments.
It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the surviv-
ing spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the children,
or persons having their care and custody; but in case any minor child
or dependent child is not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance
may be made partially to the child or his guardian or other person hav-
ing his care and custody, and partially to the spouse, as their needs may
appear. The family allowance is exempt from and has priority over all
claims but not over the homestead allowance. The family allowance is
not chargeable against any benefit or share passing to the surviving
spouse or children by the will of the decedent unless otherwise provided,
by intestate succession, or by way of elective share. The death of any
person entitled to family allowance terminates his right to allowances
not yet paid.
Ohio's statutory provision, a2 which provides for a year's allowance to
the widow and minor children under the age of 18, is similar to the
family allowance provision of the Uniform Code; both provide the right
to the family allowance in addition to the homestead and exempt property
provisions."' The difference is that the Uniform Code requires the dece-
dent to have been domiciled in the state in order for the surviving spouse
or minor children to be eligible for the family allowance, whereas under
the Ohio statute2 34 the widow or children of a nonresident decedent, who
dies leaving property in the state and whose will has been admitted to
probate in Ohio, may apply for a year's allowance to be set off out of the
Ohio property.
Under the Uniform Code all minor children whom the decedent was
obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported by him
are entitled to the allowance. The Ohio statutes are more restrictive, 3"
231 The value of property selected under § 2115.13 shall take priority over the claims of all
unsecured creditors of the estate, including funeral expenses and the cost of administering the
estate, notwithstanding § 2117.25, which prescribes the order in which debts are to be paid. In
re Estate of Bremer, 67 Ohio App. 144, 36 N.E.2d 48 (1941).
.232 OHIo R-v. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page 1968).
233 Schardt v. Prexier, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 119, 67 N.E.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1946), Jacobsen v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 6 Oh-o Misc. 173, 217 N.E.2d 262 (C.P. 1965).
24 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.23 (Page 1968).2351d. § 2117.20.
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limiting the support allowance to widows and children under the age of
18 who need the allowance for their support. The Uniform Code
also provides that the family allowance is exempt from, and has priority
over, all claims except the homestead allowance, but in Ohio the allowance
is treated as a debt of the husband's estate.236 Furthermore, the Ohio stat-
utory provision 37 which sets out the order in which debts are to be paid
lists the allowance third in priority, after the costs of administration and
the funeral; however, the allowance is subject and subordinate to claims
that judgment lien creditors may have against the proceeds of the sale of
real property.23
8
Both Ohio law and the Uniform Code provide that the family al-
lowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share passing to the sur-
viving spouse or children either by the will or by intestate succession, unless
the will provides otherwise .23  However, one Ohio court has held that the
widow may be charged for consuming personal property of the deceased
out of the widow's allowance.240  The Uniform Code also expressly pro-
vides that the death of any person entitled to the allowance terminates his
right to any allowance not yet paid. Ohio courts, however, have held that
the right of the widow to the year's allowance vests immediately upon her
husband's death. 4' Thus if the widow dies within the 12-month period
after the death of her husband and the allowance has not been set off
during her lifetime, the allowance must be awarded on the basis of her rea-
sonable support for 12 months, and the allowance or any unpaid bal-
ance survives as an asset of her estate. 42 However, if the widow were to
die within the statutory period of time under Ohio's survivorship statute,2 3
then she would not be entitled to the allowance since the law deems that
there is no widow and that no property may be claimed by her personal
representative.244 The year's allowance in Ohio is also terminated as of
the date of the marriage of a minor child entitled to such allowance.2
5
Section 2-404 Source, Determination and Documentation.
If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised is not
used to satisfy rights to homestead and exempt property. Subject to this
restriction, the surviving spouse, the guardians of the minor children, or
children who are adults may select property of the estate as homestead
allowance and exempt property. The personal representative may make
236 Monger v. Jones, 91 Ohio App. 246, 108 N.E.2d 116 (1949).
m
7 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.25 (Page 1968).
23 8 Dillman v, Warner, 54 Ohio App. 170, 6 N.E.2d 757 (1935).
239 Jacobsen v. Cleveland Trust Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 173, 217 N.E.2d 262 (C.P. 1965).
24 0 In re Estate of Crouse, 44 Ohio App. 31, 184 N.E.253 (1932).
241 1n re Estate of Croke, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 483 (1951).
242 Id.
248 OHnO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.21 (Page 1968).
244 Io re Estate of Metzger, 140 Ohio St. 50,42 N.E.2d 443 (1942).
245 In re Estate of Nixon, 5 Ohio Misc. 169, 214 N.E.2d 716 (P. Ct. 1965).
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these selections if the surviving spouse, the children or the guardians of
the minor children are unable or fail to do so within a reasonable time
or if there are no guardians of the minor children. The personal repre-
sentative may execute an instrument or deed of distribution to establish
the ownership of property taken as homestead allowance or exempt prop-
erty. He may determine the family allowance in a lump sum not exceed-
ing $6,000 or periodic installments not exceeding $500 per month for
one year, and may disburse funds of the estate in payment of the family
allowance and any part of the homestead allowance payable in cash. The
personal representative or any interested person aggrieved by any se-lection, determination, payment, proposed payment, or failure to act
under this section may petition the Court for appropriate relief, which
relief may provide a family allowance larger or smaller than that which
the personal representative determined or could have determined.
The major difference between the Uniform Code and Ohio law is the
former's provision setting a maximum limit for the family allowance that
the personal representative may determine on his own initiative. In Ohio
the year's allowance is to be set off by the appraisers of the decedent's es-
tate or, if they fail to do so or there are no appraisers, then the probatejudge may fix the allowance upon motion of the executor or administra-
tor. 46 The Uniform Code establishes the amount that the personal rep-
resentative may determine at $6,000 for the year. However, the Ohio Revised
Code is silent on the amount of the family allowance, stating only that "suf-
ficient provisions or other property to support them for twelve months from
the decedent's death"2 47 be set off. One Ohio court has held that $4,500
set off for the widow was not excessive, considering the circumstances, even
though she could have been maintained at less expense. The court stated
that the least amount necessary was not the rule.24 8  However, the amount
of the year's allowance in excess of $3,000 is subject to the Ohio Estate
Tax.249 The Uniform Code section, which provides that the court on peti-
tion from any interested party may increase or diminish the family allow-
ance, is comparable to the Ohio statute.250  The Uniform Code provides
that the allowance is to be "reasonable" to maintain the family during ad-
ministration,25' whereas the Ohio provision is that "sufficient provisions"
be set off to support the family for 12 months.2 5 2  In making a de-
termination of the amount of the allowance, both the Uniform Code and
Ohio courts253 agree that consideration should be given to such factors as
246 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page 1968).
247 Id.
2 4 8 1n re Estate of Stump, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 570, 575, 185 N.E.2d 334, 336 (P. Ct. 1962). See
also In re Estate of Clark, 99 Ohio App. 458, 125 N.E.2d 917 (1955).
24 9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5731.03 (Page 1968).
250 Id. § 2117.22.
2 51 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403.
252 OHIo RE V. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page 1968).
2 5 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403, Comment; In re Estate of Croke, 155 Ohio St. 434,
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the previous living standards, age and physical condition of persons to be
supported, value of the estate, nature of other resources available to the
family to meet living expenses, as well as other relevant factors.
Ohio law makes one provision for a surviving spouse that is not found
in the Uniform Code. Section 2117.04 provides for the right of the sur-
viving spouse to remain in the family residence free of charge for one
year or, if the real estate is sold for the payment of debts, she is to be paid
the fair rental value of the unexpired term.254  Under the Ohio statute
this payment has the same priority in the payment of debts as the year's
allowance. Despite this difference the need for a similar provision is not
as great under the Uniform Code, given the section providing for a home-
stead allowance.
V. WILLS
Section 2-501 Who May Make a Will.
Any person 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind may make a
will.
The Ohio statutory provision 55 is almost identical to the Uniform
Code provision: both provide a minimum age of 18 for capacity to execute
a will, and both require that the testator be mentally competent. The Uni-
form Code requires that he be of "sound mind" while the Ohio statute
refers to "sound mind and memory." 56  The Ohio statute adds the re-
quirement that the testator not be under any restraint, a restriction not
found in the precise language of Uniform Code § 2-501. This Ohio pro-
vision refers to restraints imposed upon a testator as a result of undue
influence. 57 The Uniform Code provision would not be any change from
present Ohio law, however, since the courts would prohibit wills made
under undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity whether or not
such a "restraint" clause was present. 5
Section 2-502 Execution.
Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within Section 2-
513, and wills within Section 2-506, every will shall be in writing signed
by the testator or in the testator's name by some other person in the
testator's presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by at least
99 N.E.2d 483 (1951); In re Estate of Clark, 99 Ohio App. 458, 125 N.E.2d 917 (1955); In re
Estate of Mitchell, 97 Ohio App. 443, 127 N.E.2d 39 (1954); In re Estate of Weatherhead, 73
Ohio L. Abs. 524, 137 N.E.2d 315 (P. Ct. 1956).
254 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.24 (Page 1968).
255 Id. § 2107.02.
256 Id.
257 Cave v. McLean, 66 Ohio App. 196, 32 N.E.2d 581 (1939); Thompson v. Smith, 24
Ohio L. Abs. 82 (Ct. App. 1937); Olney v. Schurr, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 630, appeal dismissed,
131 Ohio St. 398, 3 N.E.2d 43 (1936).
25 8 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 233; Green, Public Policy Underlying the Law of Mental
Incompetency, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1189 (1940).
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2 persons each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's
acknowledgment of the signature or of the will.
With the adoption of this provision, current Ohio law would be changed
by eliminating the present requirement that the testator's signature be at
the end of the will.25 9 Ohio and 12 other states have this statutory re-
quirement, while the majority of states specify no particular place for the
testator to sign his will.26 ° In these states the courts generally require that
a signature located someplace other than the end of the will must be proved
as the testator's intended signature and most admit extrinsic evidence to
show such intention:2 61 The Code has adopted this majority position. Thus
if the testator were to write his name in the exordium clause or in the body
of the will with the intent that it be his signature, this would satisfy the
statute.
262
In Ohio and other states with statutory requirements that the signa-
ture be at the end, the meaning of "end" has caused some difficulty. Some
courts have held that the "physical end" of the will is the place intended
by the statute, while others have held that the "logical end" is the place in-
tended.263 The purpose of the requirement has been twofold: (1) to
eliminate the necessity of proof of the testator's intention that his signa-
ture was to authenticate his will; and (2) to prevent fraudulent additions
from being attached to the will.26 However, in practice these purposes
have not always been successfully achieved. First, courts have not elimi-
nated the necessity of proof of intent altogether, as evidenced by the
"physical end" versus "logical end" interpretations of the statutes. Sec-
ondly, the intended prevention of fraudulent additions can still be frus-
trated by a testator who executes his will in such a way that there is a con-
siderable blank space left between the dispositive portions of the will and
the attestation clause and signature.2 65 Thus the precautionary measure of
requiring the signature at the end does not always achieve its intended ob-
jectives. Since the reasons for the requirement can be so easily thwarted,
perhaps the Uniform Code's position of establishing minimal formalities is
a better approach.
Both Ohio law and the Uniform Code require that the testator either
sign the will or that someone else sign it for him in the testator's presence
and at his direction, and that the will be witnessed by at least two persons
259 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1968).
260 Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 613, 619 (1960).
2 6 1 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 64 n.47.
2 6 2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502, Comment.
263 The "logical end" test seems to be the generally accepted view today. See Mader v.
Apple, 80 Ohio St. 691, 89 N.E. 37 (1909); In re Estate of Stinson, 228 Pa. 475, 77 A. 807
(1910).
2 64 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 303; 2 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF
WILLS § 19.57 (3d ed. 1960).
265 Mader v. Apple, 80 Ohio St., 691, 89 N.E. 37 (1909).
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who are either present when the testator signs the instrument or when he
acknowledges his signature. In addition, the Ohio statute requires that the
witnesses have "attested and subscribed" in the presence of the testator.266
This requirement has resulted in a considerable amount of litigation in
most states to determine the precise meaning of "in the presence of" the
testator2 67 Some courts, by applying a strict interpretation, require that the
witnesses be within the actual sight of the testator when they sign as wit-
nesses.26 Other courts have adopted a more liberal approach and use a
conscious or constructive presence test which requires only that the wit-
nesses sign within the proximity of the testator and that he be conscious
of that fact.269 The purpose of the statutory provision is to prevent the
fraudulent substitution of some other writing for the will of the testator
and to make certain that the genuine will is the one which the witnesses
signY.7  There is considerable question as to how much fraud this require-
ment does in fact prevent. If the witnesses would fraudulently sign a
substitute instrument outside of the testator's presence, then would they
not also forge his signature? If the witnesses would perjure themselves as
to whether the testator's signature was made in their presence, they would
be just as willing to swear that they had signed in his presence.27 1 Because
the requirement has so little utility in the prevention of fraud and carries
with it the potential for generating law suits, the Uniform Code has omitted
it. The most plausible reason given for the requirement is that it "pro-
motes compactness and solemnity of the execution ceremony; '2 72 how-
ever, this does not seem to be a sufficient reason for its continuance. Thus
the Uniform Code would change the present Ohio requirement that the
witnesses be in the presence of the testator when they sign the will. Neither
the Uniform Code nor the Ohio statute require that the witnesses sign in
the presence of each other; 73 under both statutes the witnesses may sign at
separate times and need not see each other sign.
Section 2-503 Holographic Will.
A will which does not comply with Section 2-502 is valid as a holo-
graphic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and the ma-
terial provisions are in the handwriting of the testator.
A holographic will is one that is written wholly in the testator's hand-
266 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1968).
2 6 7 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 72; 2 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 264, §§ 19.119-
.126; Evans, Incidents of Testamentary Execution, 16 KY. L. J. 199, 200-03 (1928); Smith, At-
testation of Wills-An Examination of Some Problem Areas, 11 S. TEXAS L. J. 125 (1969);
Winston, Attestation in the Presence of the Testator, 2 VA. L. REv. 403 (1915).
268 In re Predgen's Will, 249 N.C. 509, 107 S.E.2d 160 (1959).
2 6 9 In re Demaris' Estate, 166 Ore. 36, 110 P.2d 571 (1941).
2 70 See 2 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 264, § 19.120.
271 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 340.
272 Id. at 341.
273 McFadden v. Thomas, 154 Ohio St. 405, 96 N.E.2d 254 (1951).
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writing. However, the fact that the will is written in the testator's hand
does not dispense with the formalities of execution, except as provided
by statute. 4  The majority of states, including Ohio, have no statutes
which give the holographic character of the instrument legal effect with-
out the legal formalities of execution.17 5  Of the 22 states that do have
such statutes, there are significant differences between them. Some states
require that the holograph be "entirely"276 in the handwriting of the
testator, while others require only that "the material provisions"271 and sig-
nature be in the testator's handwriting. The reason for this dispensation
in those states allowing the holographic will is that the handwritten char-
acter of the instrument is a presumptive guarantee of its genuineness and
thus a substitute for the normally required witnesses. 78 Even in states
in which the statutes require that the instrument be entirely in the testator's
handwriting, courts have applied various theories to validate instruments
that contain printed or other nonholographic matter. Some courts have
used the "intent to embody" theory and disregard the nonholographic
matter if they find that the testator did not intend it to be a part of his
will; other courts, applying a more liberal approach that may be called the
"surplusage" theory, disregard the nonholographic matter if there is a
sufficient part of the written matter in the testator's own handwriting. 79
The principal objection to both of these theories is that in varying degrees
they disregard the plain meaning of the statute, especially if it requires
that the will be wholly in the testator's handwriting.28
In keeping with its basic objective of validating the will whenever pos-
sible,281 the Uniform Code has adopted the more liberal surplusage theory
approach. Most of the problems that arise over holographic wills deal
with their construction rather than their authenticity. The handwritten
character of the will dispenses with the necessity of witnesses to insure
its genuineness. Many of these construction problems could have been
avoided had the testator obtained competent legal advice in drafting the
instrument. The law does not require, however, that a testator employ an
attorney to advise him in the drafting of an attested will. If there is com-
pliance with the statutory formalities the will is valid regardless of who
drafted it. However advisable it may be for one to seek the aid of an
attorney, it would certainly be against public policy to require it. Perhaps
most testators are more likely to seek advice from an attorney if he cannot
274 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 75.
275 Rees, supra note 260, at 634.
2 7 6 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (1950).
277 CAL. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 53 (West 1956).
278 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 75 at 357.
279Id. at 357-8.
2 8 1Ud.
281 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article If, Part 5, General Comment
1973]
158 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
execute the instrument entirely by himself, as is the case with the holo-
graphic will. There is, however, no substantial evidence available to prove
this possibility. Therefore, if we are not going to require persons to use
attorneys to draft and supervise the execution of attested wills, is there any
valid reason why holographic wills should not be allowed? The statu-
tory requirements are intended to protect against fraud, not to require the
employment of an attorney. The former objective is achieved in the form
of the testator's handwriting in the holograph.
Section 2-504 Self-proved Will.
An attested will may at the time of its execution or at any subsequent
date be made self-proved, by the acknowledgment thereof by the testator
and the affidavits of the witnesses, each made before an officer author-
ized to administer oaths under the laws of this State, and evidenced by
the officer's certificate, under official seal, attached or annexed to the
will in form and content substantially as follows:
THE STATE OF
COUNTY OF
WE --------------------------- and ------------ , the
testator and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are signed to the
attached or foregoing instrument, being first duly sworn, do hereby de-
clare to the undersigned authority that the testator signed and executed
the instrument as his last will and that he had signed willingly or di-
rected another to sign for him, and that he executed it as his free and
voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and that each of the
witnesses, in the presence and hearing of the testator, signed the will as
witness and that to the best of his knowledge the testator was at that
time 18 or more years of age, of sound mind and under no constraint
or undue influence.
Testator
Witness
Witness
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by -----------
the testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by-----------
and ------------- , witnesses, this ---------- day of ----------
(SEAL)
(Signed)---------------------------
(Official capacity of officer)
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Under present Ohio law,2" 2 before a will can be probated at least two
of the witnesses to the will, if available,8 3 are required to come before the
court to prove that the will was executed in accordance with the requisite
formalities. The Uniform Code provides that in cases in which proof of
execution is necessary, the testimony or affidavit of at least one witness is
required if available, or if not available, the execution may be proven by
other evidence. 284 With the self-proved will the Uniform Code introduces
a new innovation not presently available in Ohio. The official comment
states that the self-proved will "may be admitted to probate ... without
the testimony of any subscribing witness, but otherwise it is treated no
differently than a will not self-proved. Thus, a self-proved will may be
contested (except in regard to signature requirements), revoked, or
amended by a codicil in exactly the same fashion as a will not self-
proved."2 5 Therefore, fraud, forgery, undue influence or lack of testa-
mentary capacity would still be grounds to attack the validity of the will.
The self-proving feature would only foreclose a contest on those questions
relating to the signing of the will.
Section 2-505 Who May Witness.
(a) Any person generally competent to be a witness may act as a wit-
ness to a will.
(b) A will or any provision thereof is not invalid because the will is
signed by an interested witness.
Both the present Ohio statute2 8 and the Uniform Code8 7 require that
the witness to the will be "competent." This means that the witness is,
at the time of the execution of the will, generally competent to testify in
court.288  Under the common law rule a person who took a gift under the
will was an "interested" party and was not competent to testify in court
concerning the validity of that will.28 9  If there were not the prescribed
number of disinterested witnesses, then the entire will was invalidated. To
avoid the failure of the entire will when a beneficiary was a witness to it,
the Statute of George 11290 was passed. This statute validated the will
but nullified the gift in favor of the interested witness. Most American
states, including Ohio, have adopted provisions similar to those found in
282 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.14 (Page 1968).
283 Id. § 2107.16.
284 This section will only be of significance in formal testacy proceedings under §§ 3-405,
406 because § 3-303(c), dealing with informal probate proceedings, dispenses with the neces-
sity of the testimony of the witnesses even though the instrument is not self-proved. See §
2-504, Comment.
2 8 5 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504, Comment.
286 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1968).
2 8 7 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-505 (a).
288 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 65 at 310.
289 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575 (3rd ed. 1940).
290 25 Geo. II, c. 6 (1752).
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the Statute of George 11.291 Ohio provides that the gift to the witness is
void unless the witness would have taken a share of the testator's estate
at intestacy, in which case the witness may take as much of that share as
does not exceed the amount devised to him in the will. 92  If, for example,
the heir-witness would have received one-third of the testate estate of the
decedent, he may be a witness and receive a bequest under the will up to
that portion of the estate. If his intestate share would be larger than the
bequest given in the will, he is then limited to the amount given under the
will. If, however, the witness would not have been an heir at law of the
decedent, he would take nothing under the will, and thus would be compe-
tent to testify on behalf of the will as if the gift had never been made.
The Uniform Code provides2 3 that the will is not invalidated when signed
by an interested witness and changes present Ohio law by providing that
the witness does not lose his bequest if he is not also an heir at law. The
purpose of this change is not, of course, to encourage the use of interested
witnesses, but to avoid the invalidation of a gift in those rare cases in which
the witness beneficiary is not also an heir at law of the testator. The fact
that a witness receives a substantial portion of the estate would of itself
be a suspicious circumstance which could still lead to a challenge of the
will on the grounds of undue influence.294
Ohio presently allows a person to dispose of his personal property by
an oral will if certain requirements are satisfied. 295  However, the Uniform
Code does not have a provision recognizing oral wills and, presently, there
is considerable doubt as to the need for such a provision. Oral wills were
recognized and needed in the past when many people could not read or
write and when many had little or no access to legal services. Today, there
does not appear to be any rational basis for the continuation of this obsolete
method for making a will and it should be abolished.2 96  For those per-
sons who wish to dispense with the witnesses required by the formally at-
tested will, the holographic will provides them with a method of so doing.
Section 2-506 Choice of Law as to Execution.
A written will is valid if executed in compliance with Section 2-502 or
2-503 or if its execution complies with the law at the time of execution
291 Rees, supra note 260, at 629.
29 2 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.15 (Page 1968).
29 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-505 (b).
294 Id. § 2-505, Comment.
295 An oral will, made in the last sickness, shall be valid in respect to personal estate if re-
duced to writing and subscribed by two competent disinterested witnesses within ten
days after the speaking of the testamentary word. Such witnesses must prove that the
testator was of sound mind and memory, not under restraint, and that he called upon
some person present at the time the testamentary words were spoken to bear testimony
to such disposition as his will. No oral will shall be admitted to record unless it is
offered for probate within six months after the death of testator.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.60 (Page 1968).
29 6 Rheinstein, The Model Probate Code: A Critique, 48 COLuM. L. REV. 534, 550 (1948).
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of the place where the will is executed, or of the law of the place
where at the time of execution or at the time of death the testator is
domiciled, has a place of abode or is a national.
A problem caused largely by our mobile society may arise in situations
in which a testator executes his will in one state and then moves to or pur-
chases real property in another state. The question then arises of whether
the will must conform with the requirements for formal execution under
the law of the latter to be valid. Both the Ohio statutes2 7 and the Uni-
form Code purport to solve this problem by expanding the validating law
to include the law of the place where the will was executed and where the
testator was domiciled at the time of death. The Uniform Code provision
seems to be broader than the present Ohio statute since it includes as valid,
wills that are valid under the law (1) where executed, (2) where the tes-
tator is domiciled when the will is executed, (3) where the testator is
domiciled at his death, and (4) where the testator has an abode or is a
national. The Ohio statute covers two of these situations but it does not
mention as valid wills which are valid under the law where the testator
is domiciled at execution, or where the testator has an abode or is a na-
tional. The official comment states that '[t]he purpose of this section is
to provide a wide opportunity for validation of expectations of testa-
tors."-' 9 If and when the Uniform Code is widely adopted, the impact
of this section will be minimal.299 Presently, there may be a few circum-
stances in which the execution would be valid under the Uniform Code
but not under Ohio law; however, these situations would be extremely
rare.
Section 2-507 Revocation by Writing or by Act.
A will or any part thereof is revoked
(1) by a subsequent will which revokes the prior will or part expressly
or by inconsistency; or
(2) by being burned, torn, canceled, obliterated, or destroyed, with the
intent and for the purpose of revoking it by the testator or by another
person in his presence and by his direction.
This section of the Uniform Code would result in substantial change to
present Ohio law. First, it would allow partial revocation of a will by a
physical act done to the instrument. The Ohio statutes° has been con-
strued as permitting the revocation of the entire will by a physical act;
partial revocation by a physical act has not been recognized in Ohio.301 A
second major alteration in present Ohio law would be that the Uniform
297 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.18 (Page 1968).
298 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-506, Comment.
299 Id.
300 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.33 (Page 1968).
301 Coghlin v. Coghlin, 79 Ohio St. 71, 85 N.E. 1058 (1908); Griffin v. Brooks, 48 Ohio St.
211, 31 N.E. 743 (1891); In re Estate of Downie, 6 Ohio Misc. 36, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 31, 213
N.E.2d 833 (P. Ct. 1966).
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Code does not allow for the revocation of a will by the "testator's express
written direction" 3Q2 -apart from a subsequent will. Under the present
Ohio statute an instrument which does nothing except revoke the will is
valid so long as that instrument is executed with the formalities required
by the statute, however under the Uniform Code a will can be revoked
only by a subsequent will or by a physical act done to the instrument.
This leaves unanswered the question of whether a nondispositive instru-
ment can revoke the prior will. Most of the cases indicate that it can."0 '
However, the Uniform Code provision does allow a holographic will to
revoke a formally executed will, whereas this would not be allowed under
the present Ohio law.
The Uniform Code provides that a will may be revoked "by being
burned, torn, canceled, obliterated or destroyed with the intent .
while the Ohio statute provides for "tearing, canceling, obliterating or de-
stroying such will with the intention of revoking it .... " Both of these pro-
visions use the traditional language found in revocation statutes304 which
has been interpreted by the courts in numerous cases. The official com-
ment 305 states that the section leaves open the question of whether a subse-
quent will-which has no express revocation clause-is inconsistent with
the prior a will so as to revoke the latter, either partially or entirely. In
Ohio it is well settled that a will is revoked, even in the absence of an
express revocation clause, if the second will is inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the first will, and if the second will is only partially inconsistent
with the first will, the first is revoked only to that extent."'° The comment
also states that it should be left to the courts to determine not only
whether the physical act was done to the instrument with the requisite in-
tent, but also whether it was of sufficient magnitude so as to revoke the
will. 0 7 This would allow present court interpretations of the statute to re-
main in effect. The section does not affect present law in regard to the ac-
cidental destruction of a will which is later ratified by revocatory intent.
This question seems to be unanswered in Ohio.20 8
202 OHIO REV. CODE ANIN. § 2107.33 (Page 1968).
303 Most statutes dealing with wills provide for a nondispositive instrument as a revoking
instrument. But if the statute provides only for a revocation by a "subsequent will or codicil,"
the better view seems to be that revocations unaccompanied by dispositive provisions are
permitted. E.g., In re Estate of Smith, 31 Cal. 2d 563, 191 P.2d 413 (1948); Kehr Will,
373 Pa. 473, 95 A.2d 647 (1953); Grotts v. Casburn, 295 Ill. 286, 129 N.E. 137 (1920); In re
Estate of Peirce, 63 Wash. 437, 115 P. 835 (1911). Contra, Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444,
211 P. 668 (1923). See also Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1346 (1968).
304 Statute of Frauds, 29 Chas. II, c. 3, § VI (1676); Wills Act, 7 Win. IV & 1 Vict. c. 26,
§ XX (1837).
3 05 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-507, Comment.
306 Hennessy v. Volz, 59 Ohio App. 1, 16 N.E.2d 1019 (1938); Paully v. Crooks, 41 Ohio
App. 1, 179 N.E. 364 (1931).
3 0 7 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-507, Comment.
3 0 8 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.33 (Page 1968).
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Section 2-508 Revocation by Divorce; No Revocation by Other Changes of
Circumstances.
If after executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage annulled,
the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment of
property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision conferring
a general or special power of appointment on the former spouse, and any
nomination of the former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator or
guardian, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Property pre-
vented from passing to a former spouse because of revocation by divorce
or annulment passes as if the former spouse failed to survive the de-
cedent, and other provisions conferring some power or office on the for-
mer spouse are interpreted as if the spouse failed to survive the decedent.
If provisions are revoked solely by this section, they are revived by testa-
tor's remarriage to the former spouse. For purposes of this section,
divorce or annulment means any divorce or annulment which would ex-
dude the spouse as a surviving spouse within the meaning of Section
2-802(b). A decree of separation which does not terminate the status
of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section. No
change of circumstances other than as described in this section revokes
a will.
Once again the Uniform Code will change present Ohio law. Ohio's
statutory provision provides in part: "This section does not prevent the re-
vocation implied by law, from subsequent changes in the circumstances of
the testator."3 9  For there to be a revocation implied by law, the Ohio
courts have interpreted "subsequent changes in circumstances" to mean a
divorce coupled with a full settlement of property rights.3 1°  Anything
less than divorce plus a full property settlement has not been considered
to constitute a revocation by the Ohio courts.3 11 Under the Uniform Code
a divorce or annulment alone would revoke the provisions in the will with
respect to the former spouse, regardless of whether or not there was a
property settlement. The provision would not operate, however, if the
testator is separated but not divorced at his death. A complete property
settlement entered into either before or after a separation or divorce does
constitute a renunciation of benefits under a prior will, unless otherwise
provided by the settlement.31 2
No other change in cirucmstances operates to revoke the will under the
Uniform Code. This will modify the rule in some states where a subse-
so9 Id.
310 Younker v. Johnson, 160 Ohio St. 409, 116 N.E.2d 715 (1954).
[A] divorce, coupled with a full property settlement, is such a subsequent change in the
circumstances of the testator that any legacy or bequest in a will executed during mar-
riage for the benefit of the divorced wife is impliedly revoked .... But divorce alone,
without a separation agreement executed during coverture, does not impliedly revoke a
devise or bequest for either one of the divorced parties.
Davis v. Davis, 24 Ohio Misc. 17, 21, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 388, 391, 258 N.X.2d 277, 280, (C.P.
1970).
311 Codner v. Caldwell, 156 Ohio St. 197, 101 N.E.2d 901 (1951); Lang v. Leiter, 103 OhioApp. 119, 144 N.E.2d 332 (1956); Sutton v. Bethell, 97 Ohio App. 52, 116 N.E.2d 594 (1953).
3 1 2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-204.
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quent marriage or a marriage coupled with the birth of a child operates to
revoke a will. 3 This would not affect Ohio's law since the Ohio courts
have considered neither marriage nor marriage plus birth as a circumstance
which would revoke a will by operation of law.3 14
The Uniform Code provision would be a distinct improvement over
present Ohio law. Primarily, it seems clear that the Uniform Code is
more likely to effectuate the intent of the average testator. In most cases,
it is doubtful that the divorced testator would wish to benefit his ex-spouse,
and even though most divorces are coupled with a property settlement
this provision would govern those cases in which there is no such settle-
ment. 15 The Uniform Code provision protects against inadvertent failure
to change the will in those cases. Second, state statutory provisions, in-
cluding Ohio's,3 16 have been justly criticized for introducing an undesirable
element of uncertainty into the determination of the validity of a duly
executed will.317 The Uniform Code will remove this uncertainty by clear-
ly stating what circumstances will operate to revoke a will by operation of
law.
Section 2-509 Revival of Revoked Will.
(a) If a second will which, had it remained effective at death, would
have revoked the first will in whole or in part, is thereafter revoked by
acts under Section 2-507, the first will is revoked in whole or in part
unless it is evident from the circumstances of the revocation of the sec-
ond will or from testator's contemporary or subsequent declarations that
he intended the first will to take effect as executed.
(b) If a second will which, had it remained effective at death, would
have revoked the -first will in whole or in part, is thereafter revoked by a
third will, the first will is revoked in whole or in part, except to the
extent it appears from the terms of the third will that the testator in-
tended the first will to take effect.
This provision is very similar to the Ohio law 18 and does not seem to
change it. The Uniform Code speaks of revocation of the will "in whole
or in part," while the Ohio statute does not make this distinction. How-
ever, Ohio courts have stated that "[al will is revoked by the execution
of, and is not revived by the subsequent destruction of, a second will duly
executed, when the second will contains an express clause of revocation, or
is utterly inconsistent with the provision of the first will; and, further,
that, if inconsistent in part with the provisions of the former will, it revokes
the former will to that extent ....319
313Id. § 2-508, Comment.
314 M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 94-95.
3 15 Mundy v. Mundy, 15 Ohio C.C.R. 155, 8 Ohio C. Dec. 44 (Cir. Ct. 1897).
316 The Ohio statute does not mention specific situations in which the will is revoked by
operation of law; but only subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator.
3 17 L. SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw 83, Comment (1946).
318 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.38 (Page 1968).
3 19 Paully v. Crooks, 41 Ohio App. 1, 7-8, 179 N.E. 364, 367, (1931).
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There has been some criticism directed to Section 2-509, contending that
it is not only confusing but also fails to provide for the contingency of
four or more wills.2 It is true that the revival problem could have been
handled in a more simplified manner, perhaps by following the Ohio pro-
vision, however, there does not seem to be a problem as to the fourth or
subsequent will. The Ohio statutory provision speaks only of the second
will revoking the first and the revocation of the second reviving the first.32 '
The Ohio courts have never had a problem in construing the legislature's
intent to mean a subsequent will, regardless of whether it was a second,
third, fourth, fifth or sixth. 22  The intent of the legislature seems so clear
in this regard that it would be difficult to imagine a court using such a
literal construction.
Section 2-510 Incorporation by Reference.
Any writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by
reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes
the writing sufficiently to permit its identification.
Both the Uniform Code and the Ohio statute323 allow an extrinsic writ-
ing to be incorporated by reference into a will. It is often a convenience,
as well as a safeguard against mistake, to refer to an existing document in
the will instead of reproducing its content. The testator may, for exam-
ple, wish to incorporate either an inter vivos trust or trust provisions in
the will of another person into his own will. Rather than repeat these
lengthy provisions, he may simply refer to them in his will and state to
what extent they are to govern the disposition of his property. Ohio324
and the majority of states recognize this doctrine, while a few states pro-
hibit incorporation altogether.32 5
Ohio's statutory provision differs from that of the Uniform Code. Ohio
requires that the will refer to the extrinsic writing as being in existence at
the time the will is executed,326 whereas the Uniform Code has deleted this
requirement. To qualify for incorporation under the latter, the writing
must be in existence when the will is executed, but the will need not refer
to it as such. The language used in the will must manifest an intent to
incorporate, however, and must describe the writing sufficiently so it can be
identified. The Ohio provision also requires that the incorporated mate-
320 Zartman, supra note 13, at 426-27.
321 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.38 (Page 1968).
322 Crane v. Tunkey, 11 Ohio L.R. 454, 58 W.L.B. 316 (C.P. 1913); Baily v. McElroy, 89
Ohio L. Abs. 292, 186 N.E.2d 219 (P. Ct. 1962).
323 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.05 (Page 1968).
324 Linney v. Cleveland Trust Co., 30 Ohio App. 345, 165 N.E. 101 (1928).
225 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 80; 2 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 264, § 19.17.
326 Section 2107.05 provides in part: "An existing document, book, record, or memorandum
may be incorporated in a will by reference, if referred to as being in existence at the time the
will is executed."
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rial be deposited with the court when the will is probated or within 30
days thereafter, unless the court grants an extention of time.
Section 2-511 Testamentary Additions to Trusts.
A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determinable by the law of
this state, may be made by a will to the trustee of a trust established or
to be established by the testator or by the testator and some other person
or by some other person (including a funded or unfunded life insurance
trust although the trustor has reserved any or all rights or ownership of
the insurance contracts) if the trust is identified in the testator's will and
its terms are set forth in a written instrument (other than a will) exe-
cuted before or concurrently with the execution of the testator's will or
in the valid last will of a person who has predeceased the testator (re-
gardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust).
The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or
because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or after the
death of the testator. Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, the
property so devised (1) is not deemed to be held under a testamentary
trust of the testator but becomes a part of the trust to which it is given
and (2) shall be administered and disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the instrument or will setting forth the terms of the trust,
including any amendments thereto made before the death of the testa-
tor (regardless of whether made before or after the execution of the
testator's will), and, if the testator's will so provides, including any
amendments to the trust made after the death of the testator. A revo-
cation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes
the devise to lapse.
Frequently a person while living creates a trust and may wish to include
additional property in the trust by means of a testamentary disposition. If
the will specifies the precise terms of the trust it is clear that the testamen-
tary disposition would be valid. 2 ' The only question in such a case is
whether the trustee can adminster property which the trust receives from
the will. Normally, the terms of the trust are not reproduced in the will,
and, therefore, they can generally be given effect either on the ground of
incorporation by reference, or on the ground that the existing trust is a
fact of independent legal significance. Certain questions are not clearly
answered under these two doctrines. If the testator relies upon the doctrine
of incorporation by reference, and "pours-over" property from his will in-
to a trust which can be amended, and an amendment is made after the exe-
cution of the will, the question arises whether the amendment to the trust
will invalidate the "pour-over"? Secondly, if the "pour-over" is not inval-
idated, is the property passing under the will to the trust to be managed
according to the terms of the trust that were effective when the will was
executed or pursuant to those that were effective when the testator died?
Yet, if the independent legal significance doctrine is relied upon, the ques-
tion arises whether certain inter vivos trusts with minimal trust assets, such
327 1 A. Sco'rr oN TRusTs § 54.3 (3rd ed. 1967).
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as an unfunded life insurance trust, qualify as an act of independent sig-
nificance. Finally, when the "pour-over" is valid the question remains
whether the "poured over" assets in the trust are subject to statutory pro-
visions governing testamentary trusts.32 8
To resolve these uncertainties a number of states, including Ohio," 9
have enacted statutes which deal with the "pouring over" of property by will
into the pre-existing inter vivos trust.330 The Uniform Code has adopted
the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act. Ohio's statutory pro-
vision is substantially similar to this Uniform Act. Under both the Ohio
statute and the Uniform Code the "pour-over" is valid if the trust is identi-
fied as such in the testator's will, and its terms are set forth in a written
instrument or in the last will of a person who predeceased the testator.
In either case, it must be executed before or concurrently with the execu-
tion of the testator's will. Both statutes provide that the "pour-over" is not
invalidated because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the
trust was amended after the execution of the will. Under the Uniform
Code the devise is valid, regardless of the existence, size or character of
the trust res. The Ohio "pour-over" statute does not mention this, how-
ever, and one Ohio court has held that a trust res must exist.331 The Ohio
Statute of Frauds provides that a trust is not invalid because the corpus
consists only of the primary or contingent rights to life insurance proceeds
or because the assets have a nominal value.3"2 Thus, in Ohio the trust res
must be in existence even if it only consists of the trustee being a contin-
gent beneficiary under a life insurance contract. The Uniform Code would
seem to modify Ohio's present law on this point since there is no such re-
quirement that the res must to be in existence.
328 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 245-46.
329 A testator may by will devise, bequeath, or appoint real or personal property, or any
interest in such property, to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written instru-
ment executed by the testator or any other person either before or on the same date of
the execution of such will and which is identified in such will.
The property or interest so devised, bequeathed, or appointed to such trustee shall
be added to and become a part of the trust estate, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court having jurisdiction of such trust, and shall be administered in accordance with
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating such trust, including, unless the
will specifically provides otherwise, any amendments or modifications thereof made in
writing before, concurrently with, or after the making of the will and prior to the
death of the testator. The termination of such trust, or its entire revocation prior to the
testator's death, shall invalidate such devise, bequest, or appointment to such trust.
This section shall not affect any of the rights accorded to a surviving spouse under
section 2107.39 of the Revised Code.
This section applies to wills executed before October 5, 1961 as well as to wills
executed thereafter.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.63 (Page 1968).
330 1 A. SCOTT ON TRusTs, supra note 327, at 409; 2 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note
264, § 19.27.
331 Knowles v. Knowles, 4 Ohio Misc. 153, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 218, 212 N.E.2d 88 (P. Ct.
1965).
332 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.01(B) (Page Supp. 1971).
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Both statutes also provide that "poured-over" property should be ad-
ministered in accordance with the terms of the trust, including any amend-
ments to the trust made in writing after the initial execution of the will.
The Ohio statute limits amendments to those made prior to the testator's
death while the Uniform Code extends this provision to include amend-
ments made after the death of the testator if the will so provides. Under
both statutes the devised property is not considered to be held under a testa-
mentary trust unless the will provides otherwise.
Section 2-512 Events of Independent Significance.
A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events which
have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by
the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or
before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of a
will of another person is such an event.
The Uniform Code recognizes the doctrine of "independent legal sig-
nificance." The doctrine allows a will to dispose of the estate by reference
to acts or events that have significance independent of their effect upon
the will. For example, a devise "to the person who takes care of me in my
last illness," or "to such persons as shall be in my employ at the time of my
death," is valid under the doctrine, even though it is necessary to look
beyond the will to determine the beneficiary referred to therein. Further-
more, the fact that the testator is also involved in the future act in select-
ing the property or beneficiary will not necessarily invalidate the bequest.
It is clear that a bequest "to the woman I marry" or of "the automobile I
own at my death" is valid even though the testator is involved in the non-
testamentary act. Since these acts have significance apart from their testa-
mentary effect, the doctrine permits reference to them. 333
The Ohio statute33 4 also recognizes the doctrine of independent legal
significance with respect to inter vivos trusts;-3 however, the doctrine's
application to situations other than those dealing with inter vivos trusts is
not clear. One Ohio court has held'3 6 that there must be a trust res in
existence at the time of the testator's death in order for a "pour-over" to
be made from the estate into the intended trust. The court did not express-
ly state that the lack of a res kept the trust from having independent legal
significance, however such an inference can be made. If this implication
is correct it would seem that the doctrine would only be applied in the in-
ter vivos trust situation in Ohio. Since the doctrine was not recognized in
333 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 81.
334 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.63 (Page 1968); Comment, Decedents' Estates-Inde-
pendent Legal Significance and Pour-Over Wills, New Legislation, 13 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
795 (1962).
33
, See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.63, Comment (Baldwin Supp. 1961).
336 Knowles v. Knowles, 4 Ohio Misc. 153, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 218, 212 N.E.2d 88 (P. Ct.
1965).
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Ohio prior to the passage of this statute, 37 it appears that its application
would be limited to the trust situation covered by the statute. Therefore,
adoption of the Uniform Code would broaden the application of the doc-
,trine to all situations where there are acts or events that have significance
'apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will.
Section 2-513 Separate Writing Identifying Bequest of Tangible Property.
Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will
may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible
personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other
than money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of tite, and secur-
ities, and property used in trade or business. To be admissible under
this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the wriing must
either be in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by him and
must describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The
writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the
testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the
will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be
a writing which has no significance apart from its effect upon the dispo-
sitions made by the will.
Often times a testator makes reference in his will to a list to be pre-
pared in the future which would dispose of certain property to certain
named persons. The majority of courts hold that the list is testamentary
and the bequests fail."3 8 The list will not qualify under the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference since it was not in existence at the time the will
was executed; furthermore, since the list has no significance other than its
testamentary effect of disposing of the testator's property, it does not qual-
ify under the doctrine of acts of independent legal significance.
In keeping with its policy of effectuating the testator's intent and of
relaxing the formal requirements of execution, the Uniform Code allows
the testator to refer in his will to a separate instrument, including one that
was prepared or altered after the execution of the will, which disposes of
certain limited types of tangible property.3 9  The provision limits the
kinds340 of property that may be disposed of sufficiently to prevent abuse
and to justify an exception to the general requirements of testamentary for-
mality. The exception is limited to tangible personal property other than
money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of title, and securities and
property used in a trade or business. The writing must either be in the
hand of the testator or signed by him and must describe the articles and
the devisees with reasonable certainty.
Ohio has no statutory provision comparable to this and the Uniform
337 Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195,-58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
338 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 81 at n.14.
3 3 9 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-513, Comment.
240 The typical case would be a list of personal effects and those persons whom the testator
wished to take these specific items.
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Code, therefore, would change present Ohio law. Since the writing need
not qualify as being in existence at the time the will was executed, a re-
quirement of the Ohio statute, 4 ' it would not be an incorporation by ref-
erence and the writing would not have independent legal significance un-
-der the Ohio statute342 since it would have no legal significance apart from
its disposition of property under the will. Ohio law seems to limit the doc-
trine to the inter vivos trust situation.
VI. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Part 6 of Article II codifies a number of rules governing the interpre-
tation and construction of wills. The official comment states: "[A]Il of
the 'rules' set forth in this part yield to a contrary intent expressed in the
will and are therefore merely presumptions." '43 This would be true under
present Ohio law also. The Ohio courts have held that in construing a
will the sole function of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the in-
tent of the testator, and that intent must be ascertained from the words
used in the will, given the usual and ordinary meaning of such words.3 44
It might be noted that the Uniform Code has simplified the language
normally used by the statutes. Instead of distinguishing 'between and list-
ing legacies, bequests, and devises 345 as statutes traditionally do, one term-
devise-is used by the Uniform Code to describe all dispositions of prop-
erty by will, both real and personal.34 In advancing this policy of simpli-
fication a person who is to receive property is a "devisee, ' 3 47 and those who
have already received property under a will or by statute are "distribu-
tees. ' 3 48  It might also be noted that the Uniform Code has no separate
rules of construction for trust agreements and other nontestamentary in-
struments.
Section 2-601 Requirement That Devisee Survive Testator by 120 Hours.
A devisee who does not survive the testator by 120 hours is treated as
341 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.05 (Page 1968).
342 Id. § 2107.63.
3 4 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 6, General Comment.
344 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Frost, 166 Ohio St. 329, 142 N.E.2d 507 (1957); Findley v. Con-
neaur, 145 Ohio St. 480, 62 N.E.2d 318 (1945); Townsend v. Townsend, 25 Ohio St. 477
(1874); Collins v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 Ohio App. 2d 1, 251 N.E.2d 610 (1969); Foureman
v. Foureman, 79 Ohio App. 351, 70 N.E.2d (1946), appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio St. 539, 75
N.E.2d 66 (1947).
345 The term "devise" is properly restricted to real property, and is not applicable to
testamentary dispositions of personal property, which are properly called "bequests" or
"legacies." But this distinction will not be allowed in law to defeat the purpose of a
testator; and all of these terms may be construed interchangeably or applied indif-
ferently to either real or personal property, if the context shows that such was the in-
tention of the testator.
Park Nat'l Bank v. Dillon, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 387, 389, 165 N.E.2d 829, 831 (C.P. 1959).
34 6 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(7).
3 47Id. § 1-201(8).
34 8 Id. § 1-201(10).
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if he predeceased the testator, unless the will of decedent contains some
language dealing explicitly with simultaneous deaths or deaths in a com-
mon disaster, or requiring that the devisee survive the testator or sur-
vive the testator for a stated period in order to take under the will.
This section is similar to the Uniform Code provision3 49 dealing with
survivorship in the case of intestate succession.3 50 Both provisions require
that the heir or devisee survive the decedent by five-days, unless, in the testate
case, the will has different survivorship requirements or contains language
dealing explicitly with simultaneous or common disaster deaths. As does
its intestate counterpart, this provision is intended to prevent multiple pro-
bate of the same property when the testator and devisee die within a short
time of each other. In some cases, however, the application of the survivor-
ship requirement may not be desirable. If, for example, one spouse has a
large separate estate and the other does not, property that is transferred at
death from the spouse with the large estate to the other may qualify for
the marital deduction which will result in a substantial tax savings. The
marital deduction requires, however, that there be a surviving spouse be-
fore it is applicable.35' I In those cases in which the tax savings exceeds the
cost of double probate, estate planners commonly provide that if the couple
die simultaneously the spouse with the large separate estate shall be treated
as having predeceased the other, thus making the latter the survivor. 52
The Uniform Code provides for this situation by making the survivorship
requirement not applicable when the will makes provision for this situa-
tion, and therefore it will not result in a loss of tax savings.
There has been some question as to whether the Uniform Code provi-
sion will apply to any devise other than the unadorned gift.353 If the de-
vise is qualified by an "if living" or "if he survives me" phrase then, it is
conceivable that the section would not apply. Clearly, it does not apply
when the will requires that the devisee survive the testator. 54 If, for ex-
ample, the will said "to A, if he survives me," would A take if he survived
the testator by one hour or one day? If so, the application of the section
may be quite limited. It would seem that this question could be resolved
by deleting this from the section, leaving in tact the section requiring
survival for a stated period of time, or the provision allowing for a deter-
mination of which spouse is to be treated as having predeceased the other.
349 Id. § 2-104.
350 See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
351 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
352 If the order of deaths cannot be established, a presumption provided in the will that the
testator was survived by his spouse, if effective under the state law, will be followed for tax pur-
poses. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(e) (1954). In Ohio the will provision takes precedence over
the statute. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.21 (Page 1968).
353 Zartman, supra note 13, at 427.
354 [U]nless the will.., contains some language... requiring that the devisee survive ....
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-601.
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Section 2-602 Choice of Law as to Meaning and Effect of Wills.
The meaning and legal effect of a disposition in a will shall be deter-
mined by the local law of a particular state selected by the testator in his
instrument unless the application of that law is contrary to the public
policy of this state otherwise applicable to the disposition.
Traditionally, the law of the decedent's domicile at death governed the
disposition of personal property and the law of the situs controlled the dis-
position of real property.3 55 When a court is required to interpret or con-
strue a will to ascertain a meaning of a given provision, reference to the
testator's choice of law is one means of determining his intent. Some au-
thors would allow a testator to choose the body of law which he wished to
be applicable even in absence of an authorizing statute.356 The Uniform
Code allows "a testator to select the law of a particular state for purposes
of interpreting his will without regard to the location of property covered
thereby." ' Thus, a testator domiciled in Ohio could, if he chooses, de-
cide that Massachusetts law is to be used to interpret his will, even though
he has no property located in that state. Of course, if he fails to make such
a determination the laws of Ohio would be applied to the construction of
his will,158 at least to all his personal property and the real property which
is located in Ohio. Under present Ohio law, the law of the situs would be
applied in construing language in the will which devised real property lo-
cated outside of Ohio.35 9 This provision of the Uniform Code would not
change present Ohio law. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that wills
made by Ohio residents and probated in Ohio are to be administered un-
der Ohio law, unless the will dearly shows a contrary intention on the
part of the testator3s5  The court held that one is presumed to know that
Ohio law will govern the administration of a will and if one wishes a dif-
ferent result than that provided by the Ohio law, then it should be written
in the will." 1 Thus it would seem then that the Ohio testator can present-
ly make the choice provided by the Uniform Code.
There seems to be little reason not to allow the testator to make this
choice, since a settlor of a revocable living trust of personalty can achieve
his own choice of law by creating the trust in the state whose law he wishes
355 See H. GOODICH, CONFLCTS or LAws §§ 166, 167 (4th ed. 1964); R. LEPLAR, AMER-
ICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 198 (1968); G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAwS 380
(3d ed. 1963).
356 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 240,264 (Prop. Off. Draft 1969).
3 57 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-602, Comment.
358 Seeley v. Bedillion, 23 Ohio Misc. 4, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 128, 260 N.E.2d 639 (C.P. 1969).
359 Nolan v. Borger, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 225, 203 N.E.2d 274 (P. Ct. 1963). If the decedent
is domiciled outside of Ohio the distribution of Ohio personal property shall be according to the
law of its deceased owner's domicile, rather than the law of Ohio, unless such application would
bring about a result contrary to Ohio public policy. Howard v. Reynolds, 30 Ohio St. 2d 214,
283 N.E.2d 629 (1972).
360 Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919).
861Id. at 257, 124 N.E. at 168.
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to be applicable. 62 It follows that he should be permitted to do the same
by a provision in his will. The major objections to such a choice have been
that it will create uncertainty with respect to titles to real property and also
will burden the local courts by requiring them to apply a foreign law. 6'
These objections are overcome, however, when we consider that title ex-
aminers will generally insist on a court construction when the meaning of
a devise of real property is involved. Additionally, courts are already ap-
plying foreign law in other circumstances, such as a will devising land "to
my heirs-at-law according to the law of" a particular state or devising land
outside of the state
Section 2-603 Rules of Construction and Intention.
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal ef-
fect of his dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in the
succeeding sections of this Part apply unless a contrary intention is indi-
cated by the will.
This provision would not change present Ohio law. It has long been
established in Ohio that wills are to be construed liberally to give full ef-
fect to the testator's intent. 6 One Ohio court has noted that: "The car-
dinal rule to follow in a will construction case is to ascertain the intention
of the testator. This intention is determined from the words used in the
will and construction from the four corners. There is no fixed rule appli-
cable to the construction of wills." '65 That court concluded that rules of
construction are useful or applicable only insofar as they aid in determin-
ing the proper construction with respect to the intention of the testator.
Section 2-604 Construction That Will Passes All Property; After-Acquired
Property.
A will is construed to pass all property which the testator owns at his
death including property acquired after the execution of the will.
This provision of the Uniform Code is very similar to the present Ohio
statutory provisions.366  Both the Uniform Code 67 and present Ohio law
adopt a presumption against intestacy,368 allow a will to pass after-acquired
property,369 and provide that for a devise of realty, an absolute title in fee
simple passes if nothing appears in the will showing a contrary intent.3 0
362 See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 NXE.2d 337 (1950).
3 63 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 260.
364 Becker v. Fisher, 112 Ohio St. 284, 147 N.E. 744 (1925); Moon v. Stewart, 87 Ohio St.
349, 101 N.E. 344 (1913); Decker v. Decker, 3 Ohio 157 (1827).
365 Nolan v. Borger, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 225,229,203 N.E.2d 274, 276-77 (P. Ct. 1963).
3 66 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.50-.51 (Page 1968).
3 67 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 250.3 68 Wright v. Masters, 81 Ohio St. 304, 90 N.E. 797 (1909); Fifth Third Union Trust v.
Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E.2d 920 (1946).369 Pruden v. Pruden, 14 Ohio St. 251 (1862); Fitzgerald v. Bell, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 423, 6 Ohio
Supp. 119, all'd, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 631, 39 N.E.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1941).
370 Jones v. Jones, 48 Ohio App. 138, 192 N.E. 811 (1933), aff'g 30 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 81
(C.P. 1932).
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Section 2-605 Anti-lapse; Deceased Devisee; Class Gifts.
If a devisee who is a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandpar-
ent of the testator is dead at the time of execution of the will, fails to
survive the testator, or is treated as if he predeceased the testator, the
issue of the deceased devisee who survive the testator by 120 hours take
in place of the deceased devisee and if they are all of the same degree
of kinship to the devisee they take equally, but if of unequal degree
then those of more remote degree take by representation. One who
would have been a devisee under a class gift if he had survived the testa-
tor is treated as a devisee for purposes of this section whether his death
occurred before or after the execution of the will.
Both the Uniform Code and the relevant Ohio statute3 7 provide that if
a devisee within a certain class of specified persons predeceases the testator,
the gift passes to the descendent of the predeceased devisee rather than to
the residuary devisees. The Uniform Code limits the application of this
anti-lapse provision to relatives who are of the degree of kinship of grand-
parents or relatives descending from grandparents. This is consistent with
the Uniform Code policy372 of eliminating remote relatives from inheriting.
The Ohio statute also limits the application of the anti-lapse provision, but
not to the same extent as the Uniform Code. In Ohio the provision is
limited to relatives of the testator, which would include anyone capable
of inheriting under the statute of descent and distribution. 73
Both the Uniform Code and the Ohio statute save the void gift, i.e.,
gifts made to a devisee who is dead at the time the will is executed. 4
The Ohio statute does not make specific reference to class gifts, 75 while the
Uniform Code expressly states that the anti-lapse provision applies to a class
gift. However, the Ohio courts have held that the issue of deceased mem-
bers of a class.take the share the deceased member would have taken had
he been alive at the time of the testator's death.3 7 6 If, however, the testator
intended 77 that only members of the class should take, the anti-lapse stat-
ute would not apply. A deceased member's share would go to the surviv-
ing members of the class and not to the heirs of the deceased member. 7
Under the Uniform Code provision the issue of a predeceased devisee
371 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Page 1968).
372 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103.
373 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1968); see also Kovar v. Kortan, 3 Ohio Misc.
63, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 302, 209 N.E.2d 762 (P. Ct. 1965).
374 'When a devise ... is made to a relative of a testator and such relative was dead at the
time the will was made, or dies thereafter, leaving issue surviving the testator, such issue shall
take the estate devised as the devisee would have done if he had survived the testator.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Page 1968).
375 See Bensing, The Ohio Anti-Lapse Statute, 28 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1959).
376 Woolley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599 (1899); Thatcher v. Trouslot, 52 Ohio
App. 74, 3 N.E.2d 57 (1935).
377 A provision in the will such as "if living at the time of my demise" or "if he survives me"
would show the testator's intent that only members of the class should take. See Bensing, supra
note 375, at 28.
378 Nolan v. Borger, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 225,203 N.E.2d 274 (P. Ct. 1963).
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must survive the testator for 120 hours in order to take in the place of the
predeceased ancestor. And, if the devisee were to survive the testator but
die within the 120 hour period, the provision would apply; it would be
treated as if the devisee failed to survive the testator. Again, this would
also be true in Ohio because the Ohio survivorship statute 79 dealing with
the presumptive order of death is to be read in conjunction with the Ohio
anti-lapse statute. 80 The Uniform Code also provides that if the devisee
is deceased and his issue are all of the same degree of kinship they are to
take equally, but if they are of unequal degrees of kinship, the more remote
take by representation. The Ohio anti-lapse provision is silent on this
point, but the procedure conforms with Ohio law regarding distribution."8'
Section 2-606 Failure of Testamentary Provision.
(a) Except as provided in Section 2-605 if a devise other than a re-
siduary devise fails for any reason, it becomes a part of the residue.
(b) Except as provided in Section 2-605 if the residue is devised to
two or more persons and the share of one of the residuary devisees fails
for any reason, his share passes to the other residuary devisee, or to other
residuary devisees in proportion to their interests in the residue.
This provision of the Uniform Code would not change present Ohio
law.382 Under both if the lapsed gift is not of the residue and no alterna-
tive provision is provided in the will, the lapsed gift passes by the residuary
clause.3s If there is no residuary clause in the will or if for some reason
it fails, then the lapsed legacy passes as intestate property both under Ohio
law 84 and under the Uniform Code.
Both the Uniform Code and the Ohio statute expressly cover residuary
dispositions. In Ohio, if the residuary gift is made to two or more persons
who were relatives of the testator and some die before the testator with-
out issue, the gift does not lapse and pass as intestate property to the heirs
or next of kin of the testator. Instead, the gift goes to the surviving resid-
uary devisees absent an express disposition in the will. If one of the resid-
uary devisees predeceased the testator leaving issue surviving the testator,
however, the statute then applies and the issue take the share by repre-
sentation. 85 If a residuary devise is left to a devisee who is not a relative,
that devise is not covered by the anti-lapse statute, but the issue of the de-
379 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.21 (Page 1968).
8 8 0 Muckerheide v. Zink, 1 Ohio App. 2d 76, 202 N.E.2d 725 (1964); Schuck v. Schuck,
80 Ohio L. Abs. 394, 156 N.E.2d 351 (P. Ct. 1958).
381 Schneider v. Dorr, 3 Ohio Misc. 103, 128-29, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 391, 406, 210 N.E.2d 311,
327 (P. Ct. 1965). See also Bensing, supra note 375, at 18-21.
3 8 2 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Page 1968).
3 8 3 Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (1952).
3 84 Leopold v. Weaver, 9 Ohio App. 379, 29 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 567 (1918).
385 Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (1946); see also Bensing, supra note
375, at 25-28.
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visee may still take if the will so provides.3 6 If the devisee had no issue
the gift would pass to the other residuary devisees, at least if they were rela-
tives of the testator. It is not clear under the Ohio statute whether the
residuary devisee can take the lapsed gift if he is not a relative. It would
appear that he could not unless the will so provided. This does not seem
to be the case under the Uniform Code in which the surviving residuary
devisees take the lapsed gift. This would seem to be more consistent with
the testator's probable intent, assuming he would prefer the residuary de-
visees to take the property rather than have it pass by intestacy. The ortho-
;dox view has been that the property passes by intestacy rather than to the
surviving devisees .3 7 The Uniform Code 3 8 reflects the more modern view
and presumes that the testator would prefer the surviving residuary devisees
to take instead of having the property pass by intestacy. This would
broaden the scope of Ohio law to include nonrelatives.
Section 2-607 Change in Securities; Accessions; Nonademption.
(a) If the testator intended a specific devise of certain securities
rather than the equivalent value thereof, the specific devisee is entitled
only to:
(1) as much of the devised securities as is a part of the estate at time
of the testator's death;
(2) any additional or other securities of the same entity owned by the
testator by reason of action initiated by the entity excluding any ac-
quired by exercise of purchase options;
(3) securities of another entity owned by the testator as a result of
a merger, consolidation, reorganization or other similar action initiated
by the entity; and
(4) any additional securities of the entity owned by the testator as a
result of a plan of reinvestment if it is a regulated investment com-
pany.
(b) Distributions prior to death with respect to a specifically devised
security not provided for in subsection (a) are not part of the specific
devise.
If a testator devises specific property in his will and that property is not
owned by him at the time of his death, the general rule is that the gift is
adeemed by extinction. 89 Most courts have held in this case that the testa-
tor's intention is not to be considered, the only issue being whether the
property is part of the estate.390 If it is not, the bequest is adeemed and the
devisee receives nothing. Some courts, however, have refused to apply
the doctrine, if its application would defeat a gift in situations in which the
386 Evans v. Cass, 23 Ohio Misc. 300, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 417, 256 N.E.2d 738 (P. Ct. 1970).
38 7 T. Atkinson, supra note 70, § 140 at 748; 4 W. BOwE & D. PARKER, supra note 264,
§ 33.56.
38 8 UNIFORM PROBATE3 CODE § 2-606(b).
389 See T. Atkinson, supra note 79, at 134.
390 See, e.g., Lang v. Vaughn, 137 Ga. 671, 74 S.E. 270 (1912); Elwyn v. DeGarmendia,
148 Md. 109, 128 A. 913 (1925); Moffatt v. Heon, 242 Mass. 201, 136 N.E. 123 (1922); Welch
v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197 (1927).
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testators probably intended that the gift should be valid.8 91 The Uniform
Code takes this same approach and specifies the property which the de-
visee will receive. 92 Ohio's statutory provision, at least to the extent that
the testator alters his interest in his property, is also in accord with this ap-
proach.293
Modern developments in securities' distribution, such as stock splits,
,dividends and changes in corporate structure (such as the development of
the conglomerate and mergers) have created serious problems in those sit-
uations in which a testator makes a specific bequest of stocks or bonds in
his will and there has been a change in the composition of his holdings by
the time of his death. Most courts, including Ohio's, hold that if the
change is only one of form and not of substance, there is no ademption, 94
such as when one corporation in which a testator owns stock is merged into
another and given a new name.3 95 The Uniform Code provides that the de-
visee, in these situations, receives not only the devised securities which are
a part of the testator's estate, but also additional securities'" of the same
or another entity which are owned by the testator pursuant to some action
initiated by the entity, such as a merger, consolidation or reorganization.
'Also, additional securities in a regulated investment company, which have
been purchased by the testator as a result of a reinvestment plan, go to the
391 See, e.g., In re Elliott's Estate, 174 Kan. 252, 255 P.2d 645 (1953); Walsh v. Gillespie,
338 Mass. 278, 154 N.E.2d 906 (1959).
392 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-607, 608.
3 9 3 An act of a testator which alters but does not wholly divest such testator's interest in
property previously devised or bequeathed by him does not revoke the devise or be-
quest of such property, but such devise or bequest shall pass to the devisee or legatee
the actual interest of the testator, which would otherwise descend to his heirs or pass
to his next of kin; unless, in the instrument by which such alteration is made, the in-
tendon is declared that it shall operate as a revocation of such previous devise or be-
quest.
If the instrument by which such alteration is made is wholly inconsistent with the
previous devise or bequest, such instrument will operate as a revocation thereof, unless
such instrument depends on a condition or contingency, and such condition is not
performed or such contingency does not happen.
OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.36 (Page 1968).
394 See, e.g., In re Frahm's Estate, 120 Iowa 85, 94 N.W. 444 (1903); Goode v. Reynolds,
208 Ky. 441, 271 S.W. C00 (1925); Gorham v. Chadwick, 135 Me. 479, 200 A. 500 (1938);
Bool v. Bool, 165 Ohio St. 262, 135 N.E.2d 372 (1956); Clegg v. Lippold, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 590,
123 N.E.2d 549 (P. Ct. 1951). See also Note, Ademption by Extinction: The Form and Sub-
stance Test, 39 VA. L. REV. 1085 (1953).
895 Warren v. Shoemaker, 4 Ohio Misc. 15, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 20, 207 N.E.2d 419 (P. Ct.
1965).
396 Securities include
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or paicipation in an oil, gas or mining title or lease or in payments out of
production under such a title or lease, collateral trust certificate, transferable share, vot-
ing trust certificate or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
security, or any certificate of interest or participation, any temporary or interim certi-
ficate, receipt or certificate of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(37).
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specific devisee of the stock. No other distributions with respect to a spe-
cifically devised security prior to the testator's death are included in the
specific devise. Thus, cash dividends declared and payable as of a record
date prior to the testator's death do not pass as a part of the specific devise,
even if they were paid after his death. 97  This would also be the case in
Ohio. The Ohio courts have held not only that cash dividends do not pass
to the specific devisee, but also that stock dividends will not pass with the
specific devise, but rather become a part of the residue. 9s This is so even
though the stock dividends were received by the testator prior to his death.
The Uniform Code would change this so that the stock dividends would
go to the specific devisee of the stock. Of course, stock or cash dividends
received by the executor during the administration of the estate would go
into the residue under either the Code or present Ohio law., 9
If, for example, the testator in his will devised "my 100 shares of the
ABC Corporation common stock to A," and the corporation had declared
a stock dividend in its own nonvoting preferred stock, and the testator
owns these additional shares of preferred stock at his death, they will pass
to the specific devisee with the shares of common stock owned by the testa-
tor at his death. If the corporation had issued stock options and the testa-
tor had exercised these options to purchase additional shares of common
stock, however, these shares would not pass to the devisee since they were
not acquired as the result of an action initiated by the corporation.
Section 2-608 Nonademption of Specific Devises in Certain Cases; Sale by
Conservator; Unpaid Proceeds of Sale, Condemnation or Insurance.
(a) If specifically devised property is sold by a conservator, or if a
condemnation award or insurance proceeds are paid to a conservator
as a result of condemnation, fire, or casualty, the specific devisee has
the right to a general pecuniary devise equal to the net sale price, the
condemnation award, or the insurance proceeds. This subsection does
not apply if subsequent to the sale, condemnation, or casualty, it is ad-
judicated that the disability of the testator has ceased and the testator
survives the adjudication by one year. The right of the specific devisee
under this subsection is reduced by any right he has under subsection
(b).
(b) A specific devisee has the right to the remaining specifically de-
vised property and:
(1) any balance of the purchase price (together with any security in-
terest) owing from a purchaser to the testator at death by reason of
sale of the property,
3971d. § 2-607, Comment.
398 Warren v. Shoemaker, 4 Ohio Misc. 15, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 20, 207 N.E.2d 419 (P. Ct.
1965).
399 Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Gardner, 24 Ohio Misc. 223, 53 Ohio Op. 2d 261, 262
N.E.2d 430 (C.P. 1970); Day v. Brooks, 10 Ohio Misc. 273, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 224 N.E.2d
557 (P. Ct. 1967); Warren v. Shoemaker, 4 Ohio Misc. 15, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 20, 207 N.E. 2d
419 (P. Ct. 1965).
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(2) any amount of a condemnation award for the taking of the prop-
erty unpaid at death;
(3) any proceeds unpaid at death on fire or casualty insurance on the
property; and
(4) property owned by testator at his death as a result of foreclosure,
or obtained in lieu of foreclosure, of the security for a specifically de-
vised obligation.
The Uniform Code provides for nonademption in situations in which the
devised asset is eliminated from the testator's estate at a time when he is
unable to change his will. This result reflects the probable intent of the
testator. The devise should not adeem since presumably the testator would
still wish to benefit the devisee in his will. If, for example, the testator's
property is being managed by a conservator, the Uniform Code provides
that the conversion of the asset into money in certain specified cases gives
the specific devisee the right to a general pecuniary devise equal to the net
amount received for the property. This position is in accord with the
result which a majority of courts have reached on the same issue."' While
the Uniform Code converts the specific devise into a general pecuniary de-
vise for distribution purposes, under Ohio case law it would remain a spe-
cific devise.401
The Uniform Code 0 2 does not distinguish reasons for a testator's being
under a conservatorship. °5 It may be that he is mentally incompetent or
merely physically incapacitated. In either case, the effect seems to be the
same: if the asset is converted during the conservatorship, the gift is not
adeemed. Ohio courts, in determining whether there has been an ademp-
tion of the devise in the situations specified in subsection (a), have made a
distinction between conservatorships that result from mental incompetence
and those that are the result of physical incapacity. If the conservator is
appointed for a testator who is physically disabled but whose testamentary
capacity remains unimpaired, then the conversion of the property would
be an ademption of the devise because the testator has the capacity to make
400 See, e.g., Our Lady of Lourdes v. Vanator, 91 Idaho 407, 422 P.2d 74 (1967); Lewis v.
Hill, 387 IlL 542, 56 N.E.2d 619 (1944); Walsh v. Gillespie, 338 Mass. 278, 154 N.E.2d 906(1959).
401 Roderick v. Fisher, 97 Ohio App. 95, 99, 122 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1954).
402 UIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-608(a).
403 Appointment of a conservator or other protective order may be made in relation to
the estate and affairs of a person if the court determines that (i) the person is unable to
manage his property and affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, . . . and (ii) the person has
property which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided,
or that funds are needed for the support, care and welfare of the person or those en-
titled to be supported by him and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or
provide funds.
Id. § 5-401(2). The official comment states that the term "disabled persons" is used in this sec-
tion to include a broad category of persons who, for a variety of reasons, may be unable to man-
age their own property. Id. § 5-401, Comment.
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a testamentary disposition of his property.404 But, if the testator is men-
tally incompetent and lacks the testamentary capacity to make a new will at
the time of the conversion and thereafter until his death, then the devise
would not be adeemed.4 5 Since the Uniform Code provision does not
make such a distinction, it would change present Ohio law. There would
be no ademption in either situation if the testator had been adjudicated in-
competent-for whatever reason.
The Uniform Code 06 also provides for nonademption in situations in
which the specifically devised property has been removed from the testa-
tor's estate at or shortly before his death. In each of these situations °0
there has been such a material alteration in the subject matter of the devise
that a majority of jurisdictions, including Ohio,40 8 would cause the devise
to be adeemed if the testator were not under a conservatorship. If the re-
moval was involuntary 9 it is reasonable to assume that the testator did
not intend an ademption of the specific devise. If the testator had a rea-
sonable period of time to amend his will after the property had been re-
moved from his estate, however, this assumption would no longer be valid.
His failure to act would indicate that he intended the devise to fail. If
the removal of the property from the estate had been done voluntarily410
by the testator, it seems clear that he would not intend for the specific
devisee to receive the property. The Uniform Code provides, in both the
voluntary and involuntary situations, that the portion of the purchase price
paid to the testator during his lifetime is adeemed. Yet, any balance owed
at his death, together with any security interest in the property, is not
adeemed and goes to the specific devisee. The testator's probable intent
in these situations would suggest that a voluntary removal of the asset
should be an ademption and that an involuntary removal should not, pro-
vided, of course, that the testator did not have a reasonable period of time
to change his will after the involuntary removal. 41'
Section 2-609 Non-Exoneration.
A specific devise passes subject to any security interest existing at the
date of death, without right of exoneration, regardless of a general di-
rective in the will to pay debts.
This provision would change existing Ohio law.4 2  Ohio presently
4 0 4 Roderick v. Fisher, 97 Ohio App. 95, 122 N.E.2d 475 (1954).
405 Bishop v. Fullmer, 112 Ohio App. 140, 175 N.X.2d 209 (1960).
406 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-608 (b).
407Id. §§ 2-608(b) (1)-(4).
408 Lewis v. Thompson, 142 Ohio St. 338, 52 N.E.2d 331 (1943).
409 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-608(b)(2), (3).
4101d. §§ 2-608(b) (1), (4).
411 For a criticism of § 2-608 see Zartman, supra note 13, at 430.
412 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.54 (Page 1968) provides in part:
A devisee or legatee shall not be prejudiced by the fact that the holder of a claim se-
cured by lien on the property devised or bequeathed failed to present such claim to the
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follows the common law rule of exoneration: if real or personal property
which secures a personal debt of the testator is specifically devised and the
will does not indicate a contrary intent, the personal representative has
a duty to pay the debt out of intestate or residuary property first and the
specific devisee is entitled to the specific devise free of the lien.418  The
Uniform Code abolishes this common law presumption regarding the tes-
tator's intent; there is no right to exoneration unless the will provides
otherwise.
Depending upon the particular circumstances, the Uniform Code ap-
proach may or may not carry out the probable intent of the testator. Liens
on property at the time a will was executed would seem to indicate that
the testator was contemplating the property as it then existed, subject to the
lien, and the presumption should be against exoneration. If, however, at
the time the testator executed the will, the property devised is owned free
of any liens but is later encumbered, it is much more likely that the testa-
tor intended the specific devisee to take the property free of the lien. This
would be true particularly if the testator had mortgaged or pledged the
property to secure a loan, the proceeds of which increase the residuary es-
tate. The Uniform Code should be modified to reflect the testator's prob-
able differing intents in each of these two situations.4 14
Section 2-610 Exercise of Power of Appointment.
A general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition
of all of the testator's property, does not exercise a power of appoint-
ment held by the testator unless specific reference is made to the power
or there is some other indication of intention to include the property
subject to the power.
Several states have recently adopted special legislation relating to pow-
ers of appointment. Since there is some indication that this will be followed
by more states, the Uniform Code has generally avoided any provisions re-
lating to these powers.415 There is need, however, for uniformity of result.
Does a will purporting to dispose of all of a testator's property exercise a
power of appointment of which he is the donee? Or does the use of a
standard residuary clause manifest an intent to exercise such a power ?416
The Ohio law on this issue is somewhat confused at present. It has
been the rule that a power of appointment is not exercised by a general re-
executor or administrator for allowance within the time allowed by . . . the Revised
Code, and the devisee or legatee shall be restored by right of contribution, exoneration,
or subrogation, to the position he would have occupied if such claim had been pre-
sented and allowed for such sum as is justly owing thereon.
413 Holmes v. Hrobon, 93 Ohio App. 1, 103 N.E.2d 845 (1951). See also T. Atdnson, supra
note 70, § 137; 6 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 264, § 52.16.
414 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 255-56.
415 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-610, Comment.
416 See 1 AMmuCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 139, § 23A0; 5 W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, supra note 264, § 45.21; L. SMwES & A. SMITH, LAW OF FuruRE INTEREsT § 973
(1956).
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siduary clause or by a will which makes a general disposition of all of the
testator's property.4 17 One Ohio court has recently held, though, that a
testamentary power of appointment is an "estate, right or interest in prop-
erty ' 418 under the statutory provision that passes all of a decedent's prop-
erty under his will, and, therefore, a testamentary power of appointment
is exercised by the general residuary clause in the testator's will unless the
will manifests a different intention.419  The court held that since the will
did not manifest a different intent, the statute applied to the power of ap-
pointment as an "estate, right or interest in property."
The trial court, in considering the application of the statute to powers,
rejected the contention on the basis that the caption to the provision and
the history of the statute indicated that its purpose was to provide for the
passage'of property acquired after the execution of a will.420 It further
stated that since the section made no reference to powers and since there
is a requirement for strict construction of statutes which are in derogation
of the common law, the section was not intended to change Ohio law with
respect to the exercise of a general power of appointment in a general
residuary clause.
The court of appeals, in reversing this decision, held that the statutory
provision is applicable to all of a testator's property and is not limited to
property acquired subsequent to the execution of a will.42' The court noted
that reference to the title of a statute to determine its meaning is appro-
priate if the intended subject matter is in doubt. But the court said that
since the statute in question was clear and concise, to interpret the title to
limit its application to property acquired subsequent to the execution of a
will constituted judicial legislation.42 It would appear that the court gave
considerable weight to the fact that the testator was a deaf-mute and that
his concept of property was broader than that of a normal person because
of his limited ability to communicate, which would handicap him in dis-
cerning and differentiating between the power to appoint property and
417 Ohio courts have held that neither the residuary clause nor a general recital of property
passing under the will may exercise a power of appointment, unless "[ain intention to execute
a testamentary power of disposition may be shown by (a) referring to the power in the will; (b)
by making a specific disposition of the subject matter of the power; or (c) by showing that the
will not have any operation except as an execution of the power." Herron v. Jones, 55 Ohio
App. 274, 277, 9 N.E.2d 703, 704 (1936), citing Kiplinger v. Armstrong, 34 Ohio App. 348,
352, 171 N.E. 245, 246 (1930).
418 "Any estate, right, or interest in any property of which a decedent was possessed at his
decease shall pass under his will unless such will manifest a different intention." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.50 (Page 1968).
419 Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Kirkham, Case No. 4993, Ohio App. 7th D., June 12,
1972, rev'g 21 Ohio Misc. 163, 255 N.E.2d 892 (C.P. 1969). See also Dollar Savings & Trust
Co. v. First Natl Bank, - Ohio Misc. -, 285 N.E.2d 768, 773 (C.P. 1972).
420 Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Kirkham, 21 Ohio Misc. 163, 167, 255 N.E.2d 892, 895
(C.P. 1969).
421 Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Kirkham, Case No. 4993, Ohio App. 7th D., June 12, 1972.
422 Id. at 4.
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property he owned. The fact that the testator was not on good terms with
his heirs at law also influenced the court's finding that the intent of the
testator was to exercise the power.
The official comment to the Uniform Code states that there are two rea-
sons for it taking the position that a general residuary clause is not sufficient
to exercise a power of appointment: "(1) this is still the majority rule in
the United States; and (2) most powers of appointment are created in
marital deduction trusts and the donor would prefer to have the property
pass under his trust instrument unless the donee affirmatively manifests
an intent to exercise." '423 The comment further states that an intent to ex-
ercise such power may be effective if it is "indicated by the will." This
wording will permit a court to find the manifest intent if the language of
the will, interpreted in light of all the surrounding circumstances, shows
that the donee intended an exercise, except, of course, if the donor has
conditioned exercise on an express reference to the original creating instru-
ment. 24 Thus the Uniform Code makes available the modern rule of in-
terpretation of a donee's will, which was adopted in Ohio by the Kirkham
case. That court looked to the surrounding circumstances and determined
that the donee intended the power to be exercised even though the will
lacked such express language.
Section 2-611 Construction of Generic Terms to Accord with Relationships
as Defined for Intestate Succession.
Halfbloods, adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock are in-
cluded in class gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance
with rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate suc-
cession, but a person born out of wedlock is not treated as the child of
the father unless the person is openly and notoriously so treated by the
father.
When a will contains class gift terminology, questions of construction
often arise concerning the inclusion within the class of persons with a
particular status. These questions have generated a large volume of liti-
gation in Ohio as well as in other states, and courts are divided on who
should be included within the class.
Until recently in Ohio, the presumption had been that the adopted child
was not included in a class of beneficiaries if the testator had been a
"stranger to the adoption"42 5 and had not indicated an intent to include
the adopted child by the language used in his will.428  Under this view an
4 2 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-610, Comment.
424 Id.
425 The "stranger to the adoption rule" presumes that an adopted child is deemed excluded
from a class of beneficiaries if the testator was not a party to the adoption proceedings and has
not otherwise manifested an intent to include his adopted children. National City Bank v. Mitch-
ell, 13 Ohio App. 2d 141, 234 N.E.2d 916 (1968).
426 Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Davidson, 157 Ohio St. 355, 105 N.E.2d 573 (1952);
Albrightv. Albright, 116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927).
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adopted child was included in a class described by the terms "issue" or
"child" if the term was used by the adopting parent, but such child was
excluded if the term was used by anyone else, particularly if the adoption
took place after the execution of the will or the death of the testator.427
Recently, however, one Ohio court18 held that the legislature has abro-
gated the "stranger to the adoption" rule by statute.429 In this case one of
the adoptions occurred subsequent to the execution of the will of the tes-
tator and the other subsequent to a codicil. Both adoptions were prior to
the death of the testator, who had been a "stranger" to the adoption.
The court affirmed the trial court's holding that the adopted children were
included in the class of grandchildren. By way of dictum the court stated
that children adopted by any of the testator's children after the testator's
death would also be considered members of the class of grandchildren.430
The court reasoned that the Ohio statutory provision conferred upon the
legally adopted child the same rights; status and legal relationship to the
adopting parents as though he had been born to them, and that limita-
tions in wills executed after the effective date of the statute43 in favor of
"grandchildren" of the testator would also apply to his adopted grand-
427 National City Bank v. Judkins, 8 Ohio Misc. 119, 37 phio Op. 2d 200, 219 N.E.2d
456 (C.P. 1964).
The court in the Judkins case listed factors that are to be considered in determining whether
or not the adopted child is to be included in a class gift. The court stated that:
The determination of the right of an adopted child to succeed to interests in property
which by the terms of a will, living trust or other instrument are limited to a "child,"
"children," "issue," "grandchildren," "heirs," "legal heirs," or "heirs of the body,"
etc. of the person or class of persons named in such instrument depends upon many
diverse factors. These include (1) the content and phraseology of the instrument,
(2) the provision of the adoption statutes in effect at the time of the adoption as an
aid to the construction of the instrument, (3) the time when the instrument was exe-
cuted in relation to the time of the adoption, and (4) whether the settlor or testator
was himself the adopting parent or whether the issue involved an adopted child or
persons other than the testator or settlor.
Id. at 129, 37 Ohio Op. 2d at 205-06, 219 N.E.2d at 463.
428 Conkle v. Conkle, 31 Ohio App. 2d 44, 285 N.E.2d 883 (1972); Weitzel v. Weitzel, 16
Ohio Misc. 105, 45 Ohio Op. 2d 55, 239 N.E.2d 263 (P. Ct. 1968). The Weitzel court held
that:
The stranger-to-the adoption presumption is unfair, inequitable, and has no relation-
ship to the actual attitude and experience of the general public, the courts and students
of adoption, and therefore should be avoided either by judicial action or by legislative
fiat. In the alternative the .. rule should be restricted to adoptions occurring after the
death of the testator and of which that testator had no knowledge or reason to believe
that they would occur. The construction used by the North Carolina Courts should be
adopted as the rule in Ohio if the stranger to the adoption rule is not voided entirely:
The adopted child will be included in a class gift to strangers if (1) the testator knew of
the adoption, (2) the testator approved of the adoption, (3) the adoption occurred prior
to the death of the testator and after the execution of the will or instrument, (4) the
testator had the physical and mental ability to change the will to eliminate the adopted
children. And alternately to all the above, any other circumstances which are present
tending to show that the testator intended to include adopted children within the class.
Weitzel v. Weitzel, 16 Ohio Misc. at 115, 45 Ohio Op. 2d at 61, 239 N.E.2d at 270.
4 29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page 1972).
4 30 Conkle v. Conkle, 31 Ohio App. 2d 44, 52, 285 N.E.2d 883, 886-87 (1972).
43 1 Effective Oct. 26, 1961.
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children. This would be true whether they were adopted prior or subse-
quent to either the execution of the testator's will or his death, in the ab-
sence of any language in the will showing a contrary intent. It would seem
that on the basis of the Conkle case, Ohio law now conforms with the Uni-
form Code, at least as to the inclusion of adopted persons in the class gift
terminology and terms of relationship.
Under Ohio's statute of descent and distribution,432 half-bloods share in
the same manner as whole bloods. An Ohio court in the construction of
a will in which the remainder was given to the "legal heirs" of the life
tenant held that a half sister of the life tenant who died without issue took
rather than the heirs of the testator.4 33 In a case in which the testatrix de-
vised property to her brothers and sisters, a court held that a half sister and
a stepbrother should be included in the class because the testatrix had only
one full sister and no brothers, but had always referred to the half sister
and stepbrother as "sister" and "brother," respectively.434 The court stated
that the meaning of the terms "brother" and "sister" in a will depends
upon the intention of the testator.435 On the basis of these cases and the
Ohio statute 6 it would appear that half-bloods should be included in class
gift terminology in Ohio.
Ohio law also provides that, "[Blastards shall be capable of inheriting
or transmitting inheritance from and to the mother, and from and to those
from whom she may inherit or to whom she may transmit inheritance, as if
born in lawful wedlock."4 37 This statute permits the illegitimate child, so
far as the mother and her relatives are concerned, to enjoy the same rights
of inheritance as does a legitimate child.4"' While there are no Ohio cases
directly in point, it appears that the illegitimate child would share in class
gifts made to "heirs," "issue," "children," or any other term describing the
relationship of the mother to the illegitimate child. In Ohio the common
law rule governs the relationship of the illegitimate child with the natural
father, unless the child is legitimized by one of the two means provided
for by statute.439 There is no common law right to inherit from or through
the natural father. Therefore, the illegitimate child in Ohio would not be
included in a class gift made to the children of the natural father.440  The
Uniform Code provision would modify present Ohio law with respect to
432 OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(F) (Page 1968).
4 3 3 Reif v. Ulmer, 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s). 234, 20 Ohio Dec. 342, aft'd, 85 Ohio St. 496, 98 N.E.
1131 (1912).
434 Griffitt v. Wetzel, 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 49, 25 Ohio Dec. 257 (C.P. 1915).
4351d.
4 36 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(F) (Page 1968).
437 Id. § 2105.17.
438 Kest v. Lewis, 169 Ohio St. 317, 159 N.E.2d 449 (1959).
439 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page 1968). The methods allowed are marriage to the
mother with an acknowledgment of the child as his own by application to the probate court.
4 4 0 Blackwell v. Bowman, 150 Ohio St. 34, 80 N.E.2d 493 (1948).
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situations in which a natural father openly and notoriously treats a child as
his own. Under Ohio law this kind of acknowledgment, absent either
the father's marriage to the mother or an order from the probate court, does
not enable the child to inherit from or through the father, and thus the
child would not be included as a relative of the father for purposes of
a class gift.441
Section 2-612 Ademption by Satisfaction.
Property which a testator gave in his lifetime to a person is treated as a
satisfaction of a devise to that person in whole or in part, only if the
will provides for deduction of the lifetime gift, or the testator declares
in a contemporaneous writing that the gift is to be deducted from the
devise or is in satisfaction of the devise, or the devisee acknowledges in
writing that the gift is in satisfaction. For purpose of partial satisfaction,
property given during lifetime is valued as of the time the devisee came
into possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the time of death
of the testator, whichever occurs first.
The doctrine of satisfaction is the testate counterpart to (and reflects
the same policy considerations as) the doctrine of advancements in the in-
testate area. This provision of the Uniform Code parallels the provision
for advancements.4 2 It requires written evidence of an intent that life-
time gifts made by the testator are to be taken into account during the
distribution of the estate.443 Ohio law would be changed in this area with
the adoption of the Uniform Code. Ohio presently follows the common
law rule: if a gift is made subsequent to the execution of the will to a child
of the testator or one with whom the testator stands in loco parentis, and
the gift is of the same type or for the same purpose as the gift in the will,
there is a presumption that the testator intended the gift under the will to
be adeemed pro tanto, absent any expressed intention to the contrary evi-
denced by the will or by extrinsic circumstances. 44  This presumption only
arises if the devisee is a child of the testator or one with whom the testator
stands in loco parentis. If the gift is to some other person, the presumption
does not arise and it must be shown, either from the will or by extrinsic
evidence, that the testAtor intended the gift to adeem.4 45
The Uniform Code does away with this presumption of satisfaction
and requires either a contemporaneous writing from the testator stating
that the gift is to be deducted, a writing from the devisee stating the
gift is in satisfaction, or a provision in the will providing for the deduc-
tion of gifts made during the testator's life.446  The satisfaction provi-
441 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Mcillan, 171 F. Sipp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
442 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-110.
443 Id. § 2-612, Comment.
4 44 Ellard v. Ferris, 91 Ohio St. 339, 110 N.E. 476 (1915).
445 Id.
4 4 6UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-612.
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sion applies equally to children of the testator, persons with whom the
testator stands in loco parentis, and strangers, as does the provision for ad-
vancements.4 47
VII. CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO DEATH
Section 2-701 Contracts Concerning Succession.
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or
to die intestate, if executed after the effective date of this Act, can be
established only by (1) provisions of a will stating material provisions
of the contract; (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and ex-
trinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a writing
signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. The execution of a joint
will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to
revoke the will or wills.
The Ohio Statute of Frauds provides that any agreement to make a will
or to make a devise to any person by a will is unenforceable unl~ss it is in
writing. 48 Such agreement must be signed by either the maker or some-
one else at his express direction. If the instrument is signed by someone
other than the maker, the instrument must be witnessed and subscribed
by at least two witnesses who heard the maker acknowledge that he author-
ized the signing. The Uniform Code contains a similar requirement, pro-
viding that the will must set out the material provisions of the contract,
make specific reference to the contract by extrinsic evidence to prove its
terms, or require a separate writing signed by the maker evidencing such
contract.
449
It does not appear that the adoption of the Uniform Code would change
existing Ohio law. The Ohio courts have refused to apply the doctrine of
part performance to an oral contract to make a will under any circum-
stances. 450 Thus not only part performance, but also full performance of
an oral contract to make a will does not remove the contract from the
operation of the Ohio statute.45 ' Courts have traditionally allowed the
use of equitable doctrines, however, to avoid the harsh impact of the Stat-
ute of Frauds.452 In Ohio several remedies are available to an injured
party. One of the most common has been an action at law for damages. 53
In addition, Ohio courts have also held that equitable relief in the nature
4 4 7 See text accompanying notes 94-101 supra.
448 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.04 (Page 1968).
44 9 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-701.
450 Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 112 N.E.2d 326 (1953); Snyder v. Warde, 151
Ohio St 426, 86 N.E.2d 489 (1949).
4 5 1 Frantz v. Maher, 106 Ohio App. 465, 155 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
4 52 See generally Schnebly, Contracts to Make Testamentary Dispositions as Affected by the
Statute of Frauds, 24 MIcH. L. REv. 749 (1926).
453 Newbold v. Michael, 110 Ohio St. 588, 144 N.E. 715 (1924); Kling v. Bordner, 65 Ohio
St. 86, 61 N.E. 148 (1901); Crabill v. Marsh, 38 Ohio St. 331 (1882); Howard v. Bower, 37
Ohio St. 402 (1881).
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of specific performance45 4 may be granted against those to whom the prop-
erty has passed. This injunctive relief requires them to convey the property
in accordance with the terms of the contract.455 If the oral contract to de-
vise property was made in return for services performed, then an action on
the quantum meruit theory is alternatively available. 45 6
There have been arguments made both for457 and against4 58 statutory
prohibition of oral contracts to leave property by will. Based on a protec-
tive-judicial balance, it seems preferable to require a writing. This is con-
sistent with Ohio policy and eliminates many potentially unintended and
undesirable consequences for persons entering such contracts.459  The Uni-
form Code also provides that the execution of joint and mutual wills does
not raise the presumption of a contract prohibiting revocation, which is the
law in Ohio as well.460 However, the Uniform Code would have a broader
reach than has the Ohio statute. Ohio courts have held that the statute46
has no application to an oral agreement to die intestate,6 ' while the Uni-
form Code applies to contracts (1) to make a will; (2) prohibiting re-
vocation of a will; and (3) to die intestate.65
VIII. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 2-801 Renunciation of Succession.
(a) A person (or his personal representative )who is an heir, de-
visee, person succeeding to a renounced interest, beneficiary under a testa-
mentary instrument or person designated to take pursuant to a power of
appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument may renounce in
whole or in part the succession to any property or interest therein by
filing a written instrument within the time and the place hereinafter pro-
vided. The instrument shall (i) describe the property or part thereof
or interest therein renounced, (ii) be signed by the person renounc-
ing and (iii) declare the renunciation and the extent thereof.
(b) The writing specified in (a) must be filed within [6] months
after the death of -the decedent or the donee of the power, or if the taker
454 This relief, although commonly referred to as "specific performance," technically is not.
There can be no breach of the contract during the promisor's life, since he can make the agreed
will at any time, and after his death it is of course no longer possible for him to do so and thus
specific performance is impossible. See 55 0. JUR. 2d Wills § 19 (1963).
455 Emery v. Darling, 50 Ohio St. 160, 33 N.E. 715 (1893); In re Barnes, 64 Ohio L. Abs.
6, 108 N.E.2d 88 (C.P. 1950), aff'd, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 28, 108 N.E.2d 101 (1952).
456 Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 112 N.E.2d 326 (1953); Howard v. Brower, 37
Ohio St. 402 (1881); Struble v. Struble, 42 Ohio App. 353, 182 N.E. 48 (1932). See generally,
55 O. JuR. 2d Wills § 20 (1963).
457 O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 261.
458 See Note, Contracts: Statute of Frauds: Quasi-Specific Performance of Oral Contracts to
Will, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 132 (1960).
459 See O'Connell & Effland, supra note 11, at 261.
4 60 McGlone v. Gompert, 112 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
461 OmO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.04 (Page 1968).
4 62 Frantz v. Maher, 106 Ohio App. 465, 155 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
4 03 UNFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-701.
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of the property is not then finally ascertained not later than [61 months
after -the event by which the taker or the interest is finally ascertained.
The writing must be filed in the Court of the county where proceedings
concerning the decedent's estate are pending, or where they would be
pending if commenced. A copy of the writing also shall be mailed to the
personal representative of the decedent.
(c) Unless the decedent or donee of the power have otherwise indi-
cated by will, -the interest renounced, and any future interest which is to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the termination of the
interest renounced, passes as if the person renouncing had predeceased
the decedent, or if the person renouncing is one designated to take pur-
suant to a power of appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument,
as if the person renouncing had predeceased the donee of the power. In
every case the renunciation relates back for all purposes to the date of
death of the decedent or the donee, as the case may be.
(d) Any (1) assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge or trans-
fer of property therein or any contract therefor, (2) written waiver of
the right to renounce or any acceptance of property by an heir, devisee,
person succeeding to a renounced interest, beneficiary or person desig-
nated to take pursuant to a power of appointment exercised by testa-
mentary instrument, or (3) sale or other disposition of property pur-
suant to judicial process, made before the expiration of the period in
which he is permitted to renounce, bars the right to renounce as to the
property.
(e) The right to renounce granted by this section exists irrespective
of any limitation on the interest of the person renouncing in the nature
of a spendthrift provision or similar restriction.
(f) This section does not abridge the right of any person to assign,
convey, release, or renounce any property arising under any other sec-
tion of this Code or other statute.
(g) Any interest in property which exists on the effective date of
this section, but which has not then become indefeasibly fixed both
in quality and quantity, or the taker of which has not then become fi-
nally ascertained, may be renounced after the effective date of this sec-
tion as provided herein. An interest which has arisen prior to the effec-
tive date of this section in any person other than the person renouncing
is not destroyed or diminished by any action of the person renouncing
taken under this section.
The Ohio statutory counterpart allows any competent adult to renounce
any interest in property he may receive by way of intestate succession 4
or by will. 40 5 Renounced property shall pass as if the renouncer had pre-
deceased the decedent in the case of intestacy, or shall go into the residue,
if there be one, and if not then it passes as intestate property in the case
of a will. Under the Uniform Code if the devisee who renounces "is a rel-
ative who leaves issue surviving the testator, the issue will take under Sec-
tion 2-605; otherwise disposition will be governed by Section 2-606 and
464 OH1o REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.061 (Page 1968).
4 651d. § 2113.60.
19731
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
-general rules of law. '466  The reason for this pattern of distribution is
that it is consistent with the provision on how property passes in the case of
intestacy.467  This would modify Ohio law since the applicable Ohio stat-
ute468 does not provide for the issue of the devisee to take, but rather that
the property shall pass by the residuary clause if there is one or, if not, as
intestate property of the testator.
Both the Uniform Code and the Ohio statutory provisions allow the de-
visee or heir to renounce in whole or in part his inheritance, in which case
the interest passes as if he had predeceased the decedent. The reason for
such provisions is the common law policy that an heir cannot renounce be-
cause title vests in an heir by operation of law rather than by gift, the lat-
ter being the case for a will.469  Thus the heir cannot refuse the legacy,
but a beneficiary under a will can. In terms of policy this distinction is
difficult to justify, 7 and several states, including Ohio, have enacted legis-
lation to correct this inequity.47' Renunciation has its primary significance
as a postmortem estate planning device,4 72 but it may also be used by the
heir or beneficiary to avoid his own creditors who would levy on his share
of the estate 3.47  The Uniform Code provides that renunciation must be in
writing, signed by the renouncer, made within six months474 of the death of
the decedent, and must describe the property renounced. It also specifies
certain events which will bar one's right to renounce.475 However, the pres-
ence of a spendthrift clause in the instrument does not prevent renuncia-
tion.
Section 2-802 Effect of Divorce, Annulment, and Decree of Separation.
(a) A person who is divorced from the decedent or whose marriage
to the decedent has been annulled is not a surviving spouse unless, by
virtue of a subsequent marriage, he is married to the decedent at the
time of death. A decree of separation which does not terminate the
status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section.
46 6 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801, Comment.
467 Id.
468 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2113.60 (Page 1968).
469 In re Estate of Krakoff, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 387, 179 N.E.2d 566 (P. Ct. 1961); see also T.
Atkinson, supra note 70, § 139.
470 See Howe, Renunciation by the Heir, Devisee, or Legatee, 42 KY. L. REv. 605 (1953).
4 71 COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 153-43; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 15(b)-(d) (Supp. 1965); N.Y.
CONSOL. LAws, E.P.T.L. § 41-1.3 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-10; WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 237.01(8).
472 See Note, Disclaimers as a Postmortem Estate Planning Device, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 567
(1968); Platt, Tax Reform 1969: The Estate Tax Charitable Deduction and the Private Chari-
table Foundation, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 203 (1970).
4 73 See Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1428 (1941), 27 A.L.R. 472 (1923) for cases denying relief to
creditors of persons renouncing. Contra, In re Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401
(1940); Coomes v. Finegan, 223 Iowa 448, 7 N.W.2d 728 (1943), noted at 28 IOWA L. REV.
700 (1943), 41 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1943), 92 U. PA. L. REv. 105 (1943-44).
474 The time period is optional. Each state may set a time limitation within which the re-
nunciation must be submitted to the court.
4 75 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d).
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(b) For purposes of Part 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Article, a surviving
spouse does not include:
(1) a person who obtains or consents to a final decree or judgment of
divorce from the decedent or an annulment of their marriage, which
decree or judgment is not recognized as valid in this state, unless they
subsequently participate in a marriage ceremony purporting to marry
each to the other, or subsequently live together as man and wife;(2) a person who, following a decree or judgment of divorce or an-
nulment obtained by the decedent, participates in a marriage ceremony
with a third person; or(3) a person who was a party to a valid proceeding concluded by an
order purporting to terminate all marital property rights.
The general tenor and philosophy of the Uniform Code is to protect
the surviving spouse. For example, the surviving spouse is an heir under
the intestate succession provision and has a right to an elective share if she
does not care for the provision made for her in the will. Further, if the
testator unintentionally omits her from a will executed prior to marriage,
she has a right to the intestate share; and she also has a right to the home-
stead, exempt property and family alfowances.476
Under the Uniform Code a divorce or annulment terminates a surviving
spouse's status and the protection that status affords, unless there is a sub-
sequent marriage of the parties and the spouse is married to the decedent
at the time of the latter's death. A legal separation which does not termi-
nate the status of husband and wife does not affect the status of the sur-
viving spouse, and succession patterns are unchanged. However, if there is
a complete property settlement accompanying the separation decree, then
this may be a renunciation of benefits under § 2-204.Y The official com-
ment states that: "[Allthough some existing statutes bar the surviving
spouse for desertion or adultery, the present section requires some defini-
tive legal act to bar the surviving spouse. Normally, this is divorce." 478
In Ohio, the adultery of either spouse coupled with desertion will bar
that spouse from a dower interest in the property of the other, unless the
offense is later condoned by the injured party,479 thus divorce is unneces-
sary to bring about the barring of dower.480 Ohio courts interpreting the
statute4 "' have held that a husband living separate and apart from his wife
is not entitled as a surviving spouse to remain in the mansion house for
one year free of charge. Ohio courts have continued to hold, however,
476 Id. §§ 2-102 (intestate succession), -201 (elective share), -301 (unintentionally omitted
from will), -401 (homestead allowance), -402 (exempt property), -403 (family allowance).
477 Id. § 2-802.
478 ld.
479 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2103.05 (Page 1968); Mansfield v. McIntyre, 10 Ohio 28(1840).
480 Brown v. Kerns, 6 Ohio N.P. 68,9 Ohio Dec. 112 (C.P. 1898).
481 OmIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.24 (Page 1968); In re Estate of Lonz v. Glann, 66 Ohio
App. 467, 35 N.E.2d 153 (1940).
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that a surviving spouse cannot be deprived of the year's allowance 82 ex-
cept when there is a divorce:483 mere separation of husband and wife does
not destroy the latter's right of exemption as a widow; but until they are
divorced, the wife at the husband's death is entitled to a year's support and
the articles of personal property mentioned in the statute.184 Even though a
culpable wife deserts her husband and remains apart from him for a long
period of time, she is nevertheless entitled to the allowance if the marital
relationship has not been terminated before the husband's death.485
It appears that marital misconduct will not defeat the right of a guilty
surviving spouse to receive an intestate share nor bar him (or her) from
taking against the will under the Ohio statute. 88 One Ohio court has
held that the statute of descent and distribution operates automatically and
that there are no exceptions arising from the relations that existed between
a husband and wife. The fact that the wife is estranged from her hus-
band, whether voluntarily or not, will not preclude her from inheriting from
him.4 7 Hence, it would appear that the Uniform Code is consistent with
present Ohio law.
Section 2-803 Effect of Homicide on Intestate Succession, Wills, Joint As-
sets, Life Insurance and Beneficiary Designations.
(a) A surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally
kills the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under
this Articl., and the estate of decedent passes as if the killer had prede-
ceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or
for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer has predeceased the de-
cedent.
(b) Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills another joint
tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that
the share of the decedent passes as his property and the killer has no
rights by survivorship. This provision applies to joint tenancies [and
tenancies by the entirety] in real and personal property, joint accounts
in banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and other institu-
tions, and any other form of co-ownership with survivorship incidents.
(c) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other con-
tractual arrangement who feloniously and intentionally kills the princi-
pal obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not
entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy or other contractual arrange-
ment, and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the
decedent.
(d) Any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer shall be
treated in accordance with the principles of this section.
482 Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page 1968).
483 In re Diller, 5 Ohio N.P. 255, 6 Ohio Dec. 182 (P. Ct. 1896).
484 In re Estate of McMillan, 8 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 294, 18 Ohio C. Dec. 645 (Cir. Ct. 1906).
485 In re Estate of Clark, 99 Ohio App. 458, 125 N.E.2d 917 (1955).
4 8 6 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page 1968).
487 White v. Schwab, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 229, 235 (Ct. App. 1939). But see Edgar v. Richard-
son, 33 Ohio St. 581,31 Am. R. 571 (1878).
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(e) A final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing
is conclusive for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction
of felonious and intentional killing the Court may determine by a pre-
ponderance of evidence whether the killing was felonious and inten-
tional for purposes of this section.
(f) This section does not affect the rights of any person who, before
rights under this section have been adjudicated, purchases from the killer
for value and without notice property which the killer would have ac-
quired except for this section, but the killer is liable for the amount of
the proceeds or the value of the property. Any insurance company,
bank, or other obligor making payment according to the terms of its
policy or obligation is not liable by reason of this section unless prior
to payment it has received at its home office or principal address written
notice of a claim under this section.1488
States have taken various positions, either by statute or case law, on the
issue of whether one who has intentionally killed the person from whom
he is taking property, either testate or intestate, may keep it. One view is
that title passes to the slayer and he may retain it regardless of his crime.
The rationale is that one's right to inherit is fixed by statute and it is the
legislature which must provide an exception, not the courts.489  Another
position, which is that the slayer cannot take at all, is based upon the equi-
table principle that no one should be permitted to take advantage of or
profit from his own wrongdoing.49° A third view is that title passes to the
slayer, but he holds it as a constructive trustee for the heirs or next of kin
of the decedent.491 Many states have passed legislation to prevent the slayer
from taking title to the property. 92 The relevant Ohio statute493 provides
that a person convicted of murder in the first or second degree shall not
inherit from or take the property of the person whom he killed. In such
cases, property passes as though the slayer had predeceased the person
killed. The Ohio statute has no application unless the slayer is convicted
of murder in the first or second degree. A conviction of first degree man-
slaughter, for example, will not prevent one from inheriting or taking prop-
erty,494 thus the Uniform Code would change Ohio law in that respect. The
Uniform Code498 requires, in the alternative, either a conviction for felo-
488 Section 2-803 is bracketed to indicate that the section is merely suggested as distinguished
from being recommended as uniform. 2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NOTES (Oct. 1972).
489 Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); In re Estate of Duncan, 40
Wash. 2d 850, 246 P.2d 445 (1952).
490 Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So.2d 525 (1945); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165
A. 470 (Ct. App. 1933).
491 Kelley v. State, 105 N.H. 240, 196 A.2d 68 (1963); In re Estate of Mahoney, 126 Vt.
31,220 A.2d 475 (1966); RESTATEMENTOF RESTITurTION § 187(2) (1937).
49 2 T. Atldnson, supra note 70, § 37 n.35.
4 9 3 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Page 1968).
494 Wadsworth v. Siek, 23 Ohio Misc. 112, 50 Ohio Op. 2d 507, 254 N.E.2d 738 (P. Ct.
1970).
495 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(e).
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nious and intentional killing, or, in the absence of a conviction, a finding
by a probate court49" that the killing was felonious and intentional. The
official comment points out that under this section acquittal on the criminal
charges does not necessarily mean the slayer may receive the inheritance
or legacy. For example, he may be acquitted by a criminal court of the
charge of murder, but if he claims a part of the decedent's estate, the pro-
bate court may relitigate the issue of his guilt for purposes of determining
inheritance rights and may find that the killing was felonious and inten-
tional. The official comment draws an analogy to the tax field, in which
one may be acquitted of tax fraud in a criminal action and yet be found
guilty of fraud in a civil proceeding." 7 This does not seem to be objec-
tionable or violative of double jeopardy, since different considerations as
well as different standards of proof exist in criminal and civil proceed-
ings.4 9
8
Under the Uniform Code, since one need not be convicted in a crimi-
nal proceeding, the slayer who has subsequently committed suicide could
also be barred from taking pursuant to a determination that the killing was
felonious and intentional. This would not be true under present Ohio
law, as state courts have held that the statute does not apply to one who
commits suicide prior to a conviction.499  The Uniform Code provision
differs from present Ohio law on other points as well; for example, under
the former"' a joint tenancy is severed by the killing and the slayer can-
not take the decedent's share by right of survivorship. In Ohio, the courts
have held that the slayer is not divested of his vested interest in a joint ten-
ak.cy, absent a statute to that effect.501 Ohio courts have also held, however,
that as a matter of public policy one should not benefit from his own wrong-
doing. Thus a beneficiary under an insurance policy who murders the in-
sured cannot recover on the policy.02 In this situation, of course, the bene-
ficiary has no vested interest in the proceeds of the policy, as distinguished
from a joint owner in a joint and survivorship account, and this distinction
is relied upon by the Ohio courts. Under the Uniform Code03 the wrong-
doer would be prohibited from taking in either situation.
496The probate court shall make its determination of whether the killing was felonious and
intentional by the preponderance of the evidence.
4 97 UNIFORtM PROBATE CODE § 2-803, Comment.
4 98 See generally Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REV.
317 (1954); Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REV.
805 (1937).
499 Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 330 (1953); Harrison v. Hillegas, 13
Ohio Op. 523,28 Ohio L. Abs. 404 (P. Ct. 1939).
500 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b).
501 Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935); Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio
App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 330 (1953).
502 Neff v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100 (1952);
Filmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St. 208, 92 N.E. 26 (1910).
50 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b)-(c).
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Ohio law corresponds to the Uniform Code °4 since a slayer is not en-
titled to any benefits under Article 1.505 This would preclude him from
taking the homestead, exempt property, or family allowance.50 6 The Su-
preme Court of Ohio has held that the statute precludes a convicted mur-
derer from the $2,500 set-off in the inventory of the decedent's estate (as
property exempt from administration0 7 under the Ohio statute 0°). Ohio's
present legislation is in need of revision because of its poor drafting. The
present statute allows the killer to profit from his crime in certain cases,
and the slayer must be convicted of murder in the first or second degree
before the statute applies. Also, a conviction for a lesser included offense
is beyond the operation of the statute, even if the killing was felonious and
intentional. Furthermore, if a killer commits suicide, it is unjust to allow
property to pass to his heirs rather than to his victim's heirs.509
IX. CUSTODY AND DEPOSIT OF WILLS
Section 2-901 Deposit ofWill With Court in Testator's Lifetime.
A will may be deposited by the testator or his agent with any Court for
safekeeping, under rules of the Court. The will shall be kept confi-
dential. During the testator's lifetime a deposited will shall be delivered
only to him or to a person authorized in writing signed by him to re-
ceive the will. A conservator may be allowed to examine a deposited
will of a protected testator under procedures designed to maintain the
confidential character of the document to the extent possible, and to as-
sure that it will be resealed and left on deposit after the examination.
Upon being informed of the testator's death, the Court shall notify any
person designated to receive the will and deliver it to him on request;
or the Court may deliver the will to the appropriate Court.
Ohio law allows a testator to deposit his will for safekeeping with the
probate court.510 The Ohio statutory counterpart is similar to the Uniform
Code: both provide that the will is to be delivered only to the testator dur-
ing his lifetime or to a person authorized in writing to receive it. While
the Ohio statute requires that the written order be "proved by the oath of a
subscribing witness," 511 such is not the case under the Uniform Code.
The Uniform Code allows the conservator of a testator's estate to ex-
amine a deposited will. This would allow the conservator to have knowl-
5041d. § 2-803(a).
505 In Ohio the slayer must be convicted of murder in the first or second degree. He need
not be convicted under the Uniform Code if there is a finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that the killing was felonious and intentional.
505UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-401 (homestead allowance), -402 (exempt property),
-403 (family allowance).
507 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2115.13 (Page 1968).
5 0 8 Bauman v. Hogue, 160 Ohio St. 296, 116 N.E.2d 439 (1953). Contra, Tyack v. Tipton,
65 Ohio L. Abs. 397, 115 N.E.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1951).
509 See M. Sussman, supra note 16, at 21-22.
510 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.08 (Page 1968).
511 Id.
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edge of the testator's estate plan which may contain information necessary
for deciding the advisability of changing or selling an incompetent testa-
tor's property. Ohio has no such provision, but does provide that a testa-
tor can name the persons to whom the will is to be delivered by using an
endorsement on the wrapper. If no one so-named appears to demand the
will within two months after notice of the testator's death, the court will
publicly open the will and retain it until offered for probate. If the court
that opens the will has proper jurisdiction, it gives notice to either the
executor named in the will or some other persons immediately interested in
it. If the jurisdiction belongs to another court, then the will is delivered to
it.51 The Uniform Code provision does not specifically indicate to whom
the will should be delivered, but it does state that "the Court shall notify
any person designated to receive the will and deliver it to him on re-
quest. ' 513 This appears to be in accord with the Ohio provision.
Section 2-902 Duty of Custodian of Will; Liability.
After the death of a testator and on request of an interested person,
any person having custody of a will of the testator shall deliver it with
reasonable promptness to a person able to secure its probate and if none
is known, to an appropriate Court. Any person who wilfully fails to
deliver a will is liable to any person aggrieved for the damages which
may be sustained by the failure. Any person who wilfully refuses or
fails to deliver a will after being ordered by the Court in a proceeding
brought for the purpose of compelling delivery is subject to penalty for
contempt of Court.
Both the relevant Ohio statute" 4 and the Uniform Probate Code impose
a duty upon the person having custody of the testator's will to deliver it
for probating. Both statutes provide that the person withholding the will
is liable to any person aggrieved for the damages he may sustain because of
his failure to do so. The Ohio statute provides for the incarceration of any
person withholding a will until such person produces the instrument. The
Uniform Code states that "for the purpose of compelling delivery [the
person who wilfully refuses or fails to deliver a will3 is subject to penalty
for contempt of Court." 515 It further requires that the will shall be deliv-
ered for probate by the person having custody of it with "reasonable
promptness." Ohio does not stipulate any time period during which a
will must be delivered. Ohio does have a statutory provision,r'l however,
which deals with the effect of withholding a will, an issue not covered by
the Uniform Code. Under the Ohio law, any person who has knowledge of
a will and, without reasonable cause, intentionally conceals or withholds
512 d.
51 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-901.
514 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.09 (Page 1968).
5 15 UNIFo M PROBATE CODE § 2-902.
51 6 OnO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.10 (Page 1968).
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it for three years, is deprived of any rights he may have had under that will.
In such a case the property devised to the concealer descends to the other
heirs of the testator, exclusive of the one who concealed the will.
X. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Probate Code is the culmination of the efforts of distin-
guished scholars and practitioners in the probate field. It represents the
most modern and best thinking on the substantive rules of law that
should govern the devolution of property at death, and it thus affords a
sound basis for the revision of Ohio law.
The proposed patterns of distribution for intestate succession are a ma-jor improvement over present Ohio law. They reflect the probable wishes
of the average decedent by favoring the surviving spouse, except in those
cases in which there were children by a prior marriage. In most cases the
Uniform Code will avoid the problems and costs of guardianships by
keeping the property out of the hands of minor children, while at the same
time protecting children of a previous marriage from being disinherited.
It eliminates inheritance by distant collateral relatives, "laughing heirs"
who have no real claim upon the decedent. It limits the application of
the doctrine of advancements to those cases in which actual intent is shown.
In this field the function of existing rules in particular cases frustrates, as
often as it implements, the probable intention of a decedent. By compari-
son, the present Ohio law represents outmoded social policies designed to
serve a social order long since passed. The drafting is a hodge-podge of
ambiguous, antiquated language which continues to cause unnecessary liti-
gation and to produce unintented results.
The adoption of the Uniform Code would be a splendid opportunity
for Ohio to abolish both the remaining vestiges of dower and the "half
and half" statute. Both are remnants of antiquated doctrines and continue
to be potential clouds upon title to real property. The protection the Uni-
form Code provides for the surviving spouse and other members of the
decedent's family is clearly superior to the present Ohio law. The existing
Ohio statutes in this area are complicated, sometimes irrational, and of rela-
tively little value to the intended beneficiaries.
As to the execution of wills, the major effect of the Uniform Code will
be to relax the formal requirements necessary for the execution of a valid
will. It is designed to implement the intent of the testator and avoid the
rigidity of present rules. The elimination of oral wills would be of minor
significance. The advantages of the self-proved will in eliminating the
need for proof of execution after the death of the testator are obvious and
should be popular with both the bar and the public. A similar reception
should greet the provision allowing an unattested list separate from the
will to dispose of certain types of personal property. With respect to the
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revocation of wills, the Uniform Code will be an improvement over pres-
ent law, particularly in relation to revocation by operation of law; the
ambiguity of the Ohio statute would be replaced with a clear-cut revoca-
tion by subsequent divorce.
In the area of statutory construction the need for reform is perhaps
less obvious, because properly drafted wills avoid these problems. How-
ever, as long as wills are written without professional advice, as many pre-
sently are (and this can only be encouraged by the practice of permitting
holographic wills), there is a need for clear and concise rules for dealing
with the problems that arise as a result of nonprofessional drafting. In
this respect the Uniform Code provides better and more modern rules to
prevent ademption by extinction, to determine whether a will exercises a
power of appointment, and to provide for the construction of class gifts in
terms of relationship. As a result of such rules, much litigation and ac-
companying costs would be eliminated and the harsh results of the com-
mon law rules could be avoided as well. Of final importance, the simpli-
fication of the language used by the Uniform Code-abandoning the clut-
ter of archaic terms-will be greatly welcomed by anyone who has spent
time laboriously plodding through present statutes.
The purpose of this article has been to compare the Uniform Code to
present Ohio law, in the hope that it will foster in the organized bar, the
individual lawyer, and the legislature an interest in adopting the Uniform
Code in Ohio. As with any new law, and with law reform in general,
much of the opposition results from a fear of the unknown. We are all
more comfortable with the familiar than we are with the unfamiliar. It
is hoped that this article will provide a better understanding of the Uni-
form Code. There are, of course, a few instances in which the Uniform
Code could be improved, but these are minor and the need for uniformity
is an important countervailing consideration. By contrast, present Ohio
law has ambiguous and obsolete features, many of which are more likely
to frustrate than to further a decedent's probate intent. On balance, the
Uniform Code certainly deserves serious consideration by Ohio lawmakers.
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF OHIO AND UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
PATTERNS OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION*
OHIO LAW UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Case I: Children or Their Lineal Descendants But No Surviving Spouse.
All to children or their lineal descen- Same
dants per stirpes.
Case IIh Surviving Spouse and One Child of Decedent and Surviving
Spouse.
One-half to child or lineal descendants
per stirpes, one-half to surviving spouse.
First $50,000 plus one-half of the bal-
ance of the intestate estate to surviving
spouse, child takes the remaining one-
half of balance.
Case IIhb Surviving Spouse and More Than One Child, All Being
Children of Decedent and Surviving Spouse.
One-third to surviving spouse, two-thirds
to children equally, lineal descendants
per stirpes.
First $50,000 plus one-half of the bal-
ance of the intestate estate to surviving
spouse, children take the remaining one-
half of balance equally.
Case IV: Surviving Spouse and Children, One or More of Ihom Are
Children of Decedent by a Prior Marriage.
If more than one child, one-third to sur-
viving spouse and two-thirds to children
equally, lineal descendants per stirpes.
One-half to surviving spouse, one-half to
decedents children equally, lineal descen-
dants per stirpes.
Case V: Surviving Spouse and Parents But No Children.
Three-fourths to surviving spouse and
one-fourth to parents. If no parents all
to the surviving spouse.
First $50,000 plus one-half of balance to
the surviving spouse. Parents take one-
half of balance. If no parents all to the
surviving spouse.
* See text and notes 26-54 supra. These distributions are subject to homestead, exempt
property and family allowances.
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